People ex rel. Katz v. Jones
Citation | 10 Misc.2d 1067,171 N.Y.S.2d 325 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Jack KATZ, Patrolman, P.D. v. Allan R. JONES, Defendant. City Magistrate's Court of City of New York, Traffic Court, Borough of Queens, North Queens District |
Decision Date | 26 February 1958 |
Court | New York Magistrate Court |
Rose L. Weisler, New York City, for the people.
Milton Jacobowitz, Far Rockaway, for defendant.
STEPHEN S. SCOPAS, City Magistrate.
This case involves a charge against one Allan R. Jones, of operating a motor vehicle on the 6th day of December, 1957 at about 7 P.M. in excess of the speed allowed by law, to wit, 40 miles per hour in violation of Article 4, Section 60 of the Traffic Regulations.
The summonsing officer, Patrolman Jack Katz, testified that while operating radio patrol car number 1231, defendant was observed traveling north on the Van Wyck Expressway at what appeared to him to be an excessive rate of speed; that he paced the defendant at an equal distance from his in the vicinity of Liberty Avenue for a distance of three-tenths of a mile; and that his speedometer at no time read less than 55 miles per hour. The defendant testified that he was operating a 1957 Triumph sports car, purchased by him as a demonstrator car in June of 1957. He maintained that his speedometer never registered in excess of 40 miles per hour. He conceded, however, that his speedometer was never tested as to accuracy since the purchase of his vehicle.
These diametrically opposed contentions placed the guilt or innocence of the defendant squarely upon proof of accuracy of the speedometer in vehicle number 1231 operated by Patrolman Katz on the day in question.
The People have the burden of proving the charge of a traffic offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Heretofore, it has been the practice of the Police Department, as part of the People's case, to produce, in addition to the summonsing officer who witnessed the alleged violation, a second witness who either tested or witnessed the testing of the speedometer of the summonsing officer's vehicle prior to, and subsequent to, the date of the alleged violation. This has resulted in demobilizing from the more vital duties of patrol a number of officers for the purpose of appearing in court and acting as witnesses. Quite often the public has been inconvenienced because of a conflict in the scheduled appearances of these officers throughout the various boroughs of our city.
The customary testimony of the speedometer witness is to the effect that the police car is backed on a set of rollers; that the vehicle is started and run at various speeds from 10 to 70 miles an hour to simulate road driving; that the speedometer on the vehicle is tested against the master speedometer, which is directly in front and slightly to the left of the vehicle in question. If there is no variance of a mile and one-half either way under 50 miles per hour, or two and one-half miles either way over 50 miles per hour, then the speedometer of the vehicle is considered accurate. A card is signed by the tester and two patrolmen who witness the test, and it is filed at the Command for use in speed trials. There are other provisions for the repair of speedometers in the event their testing fails to come within the aforesaid tolerance, but we are not concerned with those records at this time.
In lieu of the appearance of a second witness at this trial to testify to the routine testing of the summonsing officer's vehicle, the People offered in evidence, pursuant to Section 374-a of the Civil Practice Act, the card kept at the Command reflecting the pertinent results of such tests made of the speedometer on police vehicle number 1231. Over the objections and exception taken by defense counsel, this card was deemed accepted in evidence by the Court as People's Exhibit 1.
The summonsing officer testified that this card was kept in the ordinary course of business pursuant to the Rules and Procedures promulgated by the Police Commissioner. He testified further that the vehicle of the summonsing officer was tested on December 4, 1957 (prior to the alleged violation) by Patrolman McDonald and witnessed by Patrolmen Weinberg and Mupo and found to be accurate on that date as well as on December 18, 1957 (subsequent to the alleged violation) when the next test was made and witnessed by the same patrolmen. None of the aforesaid patrolmen were in court to testify, and their failure to appear formed the basis of defense counsel's objection who maintained that this deprived defendant of his right to confrontation and cross-examination.
The Court now feels that it should review the pertinent authorities bearing on the propriety of its action in admitting into evidence the police records pursuant to Section 374-a of the Civil Practice Act.
Section 982-8.0 of the Administrative Code, entitled 'Judicial Notice' provides, in part, as follows:
'All courts shall take judicial notice of all laws contained in this code, the charter, local laws, ordinances, the sanitary code, resolutions, and of all rules and regulations adopted pursuant to law.'
Section 885 of the City Charter reads, in part, as follows:
'Each head of an agency may, except as otherwise provided by law, make rules and regulations for the conduct of his office or department and to carry out its powers and duties.'
Richardson on Evidence, 8th Edition, Section 25, pages 16 and 17, states:
'By virtue of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, Section 982-8.0, the Court however is required to take judicial notice of all rules and regulations of New York City administrative boards and agencies.'
This Court, quite mindful of its origin as a police court, and in conformity with the authorities heretofore cited, took judicial notice of the following Rules and Procedures promulgated by the Police Commissioner:
Section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the rules of evidence in civil cases are applicable also to criminal cases.
Recently in the case of People v. Heyser, 2 N.Y.2d 390, 161 N.Y.S.2d 36 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle that the reading of an untested speedometer, standing alone, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for speeding. The same case is authority, however, for the proposition that a conviction could be sustained if the patrolman qualified by virtue of his tested experience to estimate the speed of motor vehicles and, of course, had opportunity to observe the defendant's vehicle.
In the instant case the summonsing officer was not qualified as an expert and hence was not asked his opinion.
Early in Common Law, the Shop Book Rule was devised as an exception to the rule against hearsay. This rule was adopted at a time when a party in interest could not testify in his own behalf, but the rule remained after that disqualification was removed. Smith v. Smith, 163 N.Y. 168, 57 N.E. 300, 52 L.R.A. 545; Tomlinson v. Borst, 30 Barb. 42. As commerce expanded, and business organizations were no longer run by one shop keeper, it was necessary to enlarge the rule to admit book entries that were made in the regular course of business. Under this rule, the book entries were admissible only when it could be shown that the entry was made in the regular course of business by one in discharge of his duty, or in the regular course of his employment. The transaction also had to be recorded reasonably near the time it occurred, and it had to be proved that the entrant had personal knowledge of the transaction or that he received the information from one who had the personal knowledge and the duty to make such report. Mayor, etc., of New York City v. Second Ave. R. Co., 102 N.Y. 572, 7 N.E. 905.
There could be no doubt that these old rules were too antiquated to keep apace with progress and finally in 1928 the Legislature enacted Section 374-a into the Civil Practice Act. This Section reads simply and clearly but nevertheless, has been the subject of much litigation. In its present form, it begins...
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