People ex rel. Kazubowski v. Ray

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DAVIS; WARD
• Citation: People ex rel. Kazubowski v. Ray, 272 N.E.2d 225, 48 Ill.2d 413 (Ill. 1971)
• Decision Date: 21 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. 43368,43368
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. Edward J. KAZUBOWSKI, Petitioner, v. Loy E. RAY, Sheriff, Respondent.

Page 225

272 N.E.2d 225

48 Ill.2d 413

The PEOPLE ex rel. Edward J. KAZUBOWSKI, Petitioner, v. Loy E. RAY, Sheriff, Respondent.

No. 43368.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 21, 1971.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 12, 1971.

See 92 S.Ct. 78.

Anna A. Phelps, Kewanee, for petitioner.

William K. O'Connor, State's Atty., Cambridge (Gregg A. Young, Andrews & Andrews, Kewanee, and Clarold L. Britton of Jenner & Block, Chicago, of counsel), for respondent.

DAVIS, Justice.

The petitioner, Edward J. Kazubowski, filed a petition for a writ of Habeas corpus in this court, seeking his release from the custody of Harold T. Johnson, Sheriff of Henry County, where he had been confined in the Henry County jail as a result of contempt citations. Subsequently, he filed a second or supplemental petition, requesting the same relief. A writ was issued, pending a hearing before this court, releasing the petitioner from the sheriff's custody. A return to the writ was filed by the respondent, and the petitioner filed an answer to the return. This matter comes before the court on this record.

The petitioner had been in the custody of the respondent under three separate orders of commitment for contempt of court entered by the circuit court of the 14th Judicial Circuit, Henry County. All three orders arose out of a divorce proceeding in which the petitioner was the defendant. In Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 93 Ill.App.2d 126, 235 N.E.2d 664, the decree for divorce, the property settlement decree, and orders finding the petitioner in contempt for failure to pay alimony and attorney's fees were sustained. We denied a petition for leave to appeal from the judgment of the appellate court (39 Ill.2d 625), and the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of Certioarari. 393 U.S. 1117, 89 S.Ct. 993, 22 L.Ed.2d 122.

Subsequently, the defendant filed three separate and direct appeals to this court wherein he alleged that the effect of the orders of the trial court, entered after his unsuccessful appeal and the decision of the appellate court, was to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Those appeals were consolidated for hearing, and all final orders appealed from were affirmed by this court in Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 45 Ill.2d 405, 259 N.E.2d 282. The facts of the proceedings below were fully stated in this decision and need not be restated here.

The petitioner was committed, pursuant to three orders of the circuit court: one dated May 2, 1969, which this court has found to be valid (45 Ill.2d 405, 416, 417, 259 N.E.2d 282); an earlier unappealed order dated October 7, 1966; and a third order dated July 2, 1970, which was entered by the trial court subsequent to the aforementioned appeals, from which no appeal was taken. The unappealed orders must be presumed to be valid.

In seeking a writ of a habeas corpus, the petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter two of the three orders holding him in contempt. He construes the contempt citations to be criminal rather than civil and challenges the two orders in that they fail to meet the requirements of due process in a criminal contempt proceeding. Criminal contempt is conduct which is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially, while civil contempt ordinarily consists of failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing litigant therein. (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 21 Ill.2d 407, 409, 173 N.E.2d 417; People v. Gholson, 412 Ill. 294, 298, 106 N.E.2d 333.) These contempt actions arose out of a divorce proceeding, and were brought by the plaintiff in that proceeding for the purpose of collecting unpaid alimony, attorney's fees, and interest; they were not punitive in nature, but rather, were prosecuted to enforce the rights of the plaintiff in the divorce proceeding--the collection of money due under valid orders of the court; and they are civil in nature and, thus, are not subject to the due-process requirements of indirect criminal contempt proceedings.

In construing these contempt proceedings as criminal in nature, the petitioner twice filed his special and limited appearance to the rules to show cause which the court had issued prior to the entry of the contempt findings. He refused to offer any testimony at the hearings on the contempt citations, choosing instead to stand on his challenge to the jurisdiction of the court to hold him in contempt. By so doing, he apparently sought to preserve for review the question of whether these are, in fact, indirect criminal contempts.

The petitioner is in error in his contention for three reasons. First, he originally consented to the general...