People ex rel. Keefe v. Women's Catholic Order of Foresters

• Decision Date: 13 June 1896
• Citation: 44 N.E. 401,162 Ill. 78
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. KEEFE v. WOMEN'S CATHOLIC ORDER OF FORESTERS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

162 Ill. 78

44 N.E. 401

PEOPLE ex rel. KEEFE

v.WOMEN'S CATHOLIC ORDER OF FORESTERS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 13, 1896.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Petition by Minnie Keefe for a writ of mandamus to compel the Women's Catholic Order of Foresters, from which she was expelled as a member, to reinstate her. There was a judgment of the appellate court (59 Ill. App. 390) reversing a judgment in favor of relator after refusal of defendant to answer on overruling a demurrer to the petition, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

J. D. Casey, for appellant.

P. J. O'Shea, for appellee.

MAGRUDER, C. J.

This is a petition for mandamus, filed in the name of the people upon the relation of Minnie Keefe, alleging that she was the foundress of the Women's Catholic Order of Foresters, a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of Illinois, and composed of a grand lodge and subordinate lodges; and that she was a member of said grand lodge and of one of the subordinate lodges up to November 2, 1894, when she was expelled from membership both in said high court and said subordinate lodge; and praying for reinstatement in her said membership, and in the rights and privileges exercised by her therein prior to her expulsion. The defendant below (appellant here) demurred to the petition. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant elected to stand by its demurrer. Thereupon judgment was entered in accordance with the prayer of the petition. Upon appeal to the appellate court the latter court reversed the judgment of the circuit court with directions to sustain the demurrer and dismiss the petition. The present appeal is prosecuted from the judgment of the appellate court. The petition represents that the corporation is formed to establish a fraternal beneficial society or association to be carried on for the sole benefit of its members and their beneficiaries, and not for profit; that the society shall have a lodge system with ritualistic form of work and representative form of government, and shall make provision for the payment of death benefits, and may, in addition thereto, provide for the payment by local lodges of benefits, in case of sickness, disability, and old age of its members, subject to their compliance with its constitution and laws; that the funds from which payment of such benefits and the fund from which the expenses of the association shall be defrayed and derived are from assessments or dues collected from its members; that the payments of death benefits shall be made only to the families, heirs, blood relations, affianced husbands or affianced wives of, or to persons dependent on, the members; and such benefits shall not be willed, assigned, or otherwise transferred to any other person; and that the principal object of the formation of the said corporation is the purpose of benevolent insurance. Under the constitution of the order the board of 11 directors is known as the ‘High Court’; and the highest judicial authority is vested in the annual session, composed of the high court and representatives of subordinate courts. A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the order is appended to the petition as an exhibit, and made a part thereof, the petition alleging upon its face that such copy ‘is hereto appended, marked ‘Exhibit A,’ and made a part of this petition.' The petition shows that the relator was expelled by the high court. A section of one of the articles of the ‘Annual Session and High Court By-Laws' provides that ‘any subordinate court or member of the order feeling itself or herself aggrieved by a decision of the high court may appeal there from to the next annual session which shall thereafter convene, provided that it or she shall, within sixty days after such decision of the high court, file with the high secretary a written notice of such appeal, together with its or her objections to the decisions. The high secretary shall lay such appeal, together with all records and documents in the possession of the high court in relation to the case, before the next annual session. The decision of the annual session shall be final and conclusive on all persons interested.’ The relator took no appeal from the order of November 2, 1894, expelling her, but on December 15, 1894, filed in the circuit court the present petition for mandamus. The demurrer to the petition therefore presents the question whether the relator could resort to the courts for restoration to the privileges of the order without first exhausting the remedies secured to her by the constitution and by-laws of the order itself.

By uniting with a voluntary organization, such as these benefit societies are held to be, the member agrees to be bound by its constitution, by-laws, and rules. Among the provisions which he thus impliedly binds himself to abide by are those which relate to expulsion. Pitcher v. Board, 121 Ill. 412, 13 N. E. 187. He furthermore agrees to resort to such remedies as the constitution or by-laws provide for reviewing and correcting the decisions of the subordinate tribunals of the society. Nibl. Mut. Ben. Soc. (2d Ed.) § 47. If he has been tried and expelled, and the proceedings which result in his expulsion are subject to review under the laws of the society, such proceedings may be annulled by the action on the reviewing tribunal. Id. Therefore, ‘when the charter, constitution, or by-laws of the society require a member to first seek redress within the society, and by appeal to carry the question to its highest tribunal, he has no right to bring an action against the society in a court of the land until he has exhausted his remedy in its tribunals.’ Id. §§ 111, 311. It follows that a writ of mandamus will not be awarded where a member of a benefit society has been expelled, who has a remedy by appeal under the laws of the society which he has not exercised. 2 Bac. Ben. Soc. § 442. In Association v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 13 S. W. 379, it was held that, where the laws of a voluntary association granted a right of appeal, that remedy must be resorted to by an expelled member before the courts will award the writ of mandamus to restore him; and it was there said: ‘Members of such associations, having voluntarily constituted tribunals to adjust their differences, should not be permitted to resort to the courts of justice to set aside the illegal awards of such tribunals as long as there is another body which has power to reverse the sentence, and which has not been appealed to. The presumption is that, if plaintiff had appeared before the association at a proper meeting, and had taken an appeal from the sentence of the board of trustees, the sentence, if illegal, would have been set aside.’ In Essery v. Court Pride of the Dominion, 2 Ont. 596, where the plaintiff, being expelled from the Ancient Order of Foresters, filed his bill for restitution on the ground of illegal expulsion, but it appeared that the rules of the society provided certain tribunals to which he might have appealed for redress, but to which he did not appeal, the court refused to interfere, and held that members of charitable and provident societies should not be allowed to litigate their grievances with the societies in courts of law until they had exhausted every possible means of redress afforded by the internal regulations of their societies. In Zeliff v. Lodge, 53 N. J. Law, 536, 22 Atl. 63, where a member was suspended for 99 years, and took no appeal to the supreme lodge, as provided by the constitution, it was said: ‘If there is a right of appeal to a tribunal of the organization, a mandamus will not issue until that remedy is exhausted.’ See, also, Lafond v. Deems, 81 N. Y. 507;Harrington v. Association, 70 Ga. 340; Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun, 49; Olery v. Brown, 51 How. Prac. 92;Chamberlain v. Lincoln, 129 Mass 70; High, Extr. Rem. (3d Ed.) § 292; Karcher v. Supreme Lodge, 137 Mass. 368;Blumenfeldt v. Korschuck, 43 Ill. App. 434. In the case at bar, inasmuch as the petition shows on its face that the relator did not take an appeal from the sentence of expulsion entered against her by the high cou...