People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Bd. of Directors of Chicago Theological Seminary

Decision Date18 June 1898
Citation174 Ill. 177,51 N.E. 198
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. KOCHERSPERGER, County Treasurer, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Cook county court; R. W. S. Wheatley, Judge.

Application by the people, on relation of D. H. Kochersperger, the county treasurer of Cook county, for a judgment of sale of property of the Chicago Theological Seminary. From a judgment sustaining objections thereto by the seminary, applicant appeals. Reversed.

W. F. Struckmann, Asst. Co. Atty. (Robert S. Hes and Frank L. Shepard, of counsel), for appellant.

David Fales (John P. Wilson, of counsel), for appellee.

WILKIN, J.

This is an appeal by the people, on the relation of the county treasurer and ex officio collector of Cook county, from a judgment of the county court of said county sustaining the objections of appellee to an application for a judgment of sale of certain of its property for nonpayment of taxes. The objection was that the property in question was exempt and free from all taxation whatever. It was stipulated that the appellee is the owner of a tract of land other than the tracts described in the objection, upon which is maintained a school for the purposes enumerated in the act of incorporation; also that the income from the property mentioned in the objection is used for the sole purpose of maintaining such school; that some of the lots are vacant and some are used; that where they are used all the rentals and income are held by the corporation for the exclusive use and support of the school, and for the objects contemplated in the charter; that all the parcels and lots were bought for the promotion of the objects mentioned in the charter; that the lands which are occupied by the buildings or other direct appliances of education are not taxed, or included in the parcels represented by the objection; that since the passage of the charter the corporation has accepted the same, and has expended in the erection and purchase of buildings, apparatus, and other facilities and appliances for education, being for the promotion of the objects stated in the charter, over $200,000 upon the lots in question, and also upon other lots owned by the corporation, and has built up an institution in which a large number of students are instructed, according to its charter. The act incorporating appellee was approved February 15, 1855, and is entitled ‘An act to incorporate the Chicago Theological Seminary.’ The first section creates certain persons named therein, and their sucessors, a body politic and corporate, to be styled ‘The Board of Directors of the Chicago Theological Seminary,’ with power to acquire, hold and convey property, real and personal. The second section prescribes that the seminary shall be located in or near the city of Chicago; that its object shall be to furnish instruction and the means of education to young men preparing for the gospel ministry, and that the institution shall be equally open to all donominations of Christians for this purpose. The fifth section is as follows: ‘That the property, of whatever kind or description, belonging or appertaining to said seminary, shall be forever free and exempt from all taxation, for all purposes whatsoever.’

The only question presented for our determination is whether or not the property of appellee, described in the application for judgment, is exempt from taxation by section 5 of its charter. Its contention is that by the language, ‘that the property, of whatever kind or description,belonging or appertaining to said seminary,’ all the property owned by it and used for the sole purpose of maintaining its school, of whatever kind or description, wherever situated, is exempt from all taxation. On the other hand, it is insisted on behalf of the people that section 5 is only applicable to and exempts from taxation the property belonging or appertaining to the seminary, which, by the second section of the charter, was to be located in or near the city of Chicago, and which has been so located and maintained.

The following propositions laid down by counsel for appellant are supported by the authorities cited, and are, we think, properly applicable to the decision of the issue here presented: First. All laws exempting property from taxation must be strictly construed. Montgomery v. Wyman, 130 Ill. 17, 22 N. E. 845. Second. The charter is a contract, but it is well settled that nothing can pass by implication. U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 738;Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 544. Third. It should not be presumed that the legislature intended to exempt property from taxation. That intention must appear affirmatively. Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514. Fourth. And when such intention appears it cannot be extended beyond the letter and spirit of the act of incorporation. Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. 168. Fifth. And such intention will be construed strictly. Theological Seminary v. People, 101 Ill. 578;In re Swigert, 123 Ill. 267, 14 N. E. 32. Sixth. There can be no ambiguity as to what is exempt. All ambiguities in the terms of the contract must operate against the grantees and in favor of the public, and the objector can claim nothing that is not clearly given by the act. Charles River Bridge Case, supra. Seventh. If, on a fair reading of the instrument, reasonable doubts arise as to the proper interpretation to be given to it, those doubts are to be solved in favor of the state; and...

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