People ex rel. Krapf v. Hayes

Decision Date24 January 1958
Docket NumberNo. 34507,34507
Citation148 N.E.2d 428,13 Ill.2d 143
PartiesThe PEOPLE ex rel. Floyd H. KRAPF, County Collector, Appellee, v. James HAYES et al., Appellants.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Floyd J. Stuppi, William J. O'Brien, Jr., R. W. Spangenberg, Edwin R. Eckersall, Marvin A. Jersild, William Lindgren, Chicago, and Gray, Thomas, Wallace & O'Brien, Joliet (Robert N. Wallace, Joliet, of counsel), for appellants.

Frank H. Masters, Jr., State's Atty., Joliet (Robert E. Higgins, Asst. State's Atty., Glenn E. Miller, Lockport, Charles J. McKeown, John C. Lang, Joliet, and John D. Lynch, Lockport, of counsel), for appellee.

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by certain railroads from judgments entered in the county court of Will County overruling their objections to the county collector's petition for judgment and order of sale against lots and lands upon which taxes were delinquent for the years 1953 and 1954.Separate objections were filed for each of these years to the taxes extended for building fund purposes for nine school districts and for Illinois municipal retirement fund purposes for six districts.The objections were consolidated for hearing and opinion.

Two principal questions, which we shall consider separately, are presented upon the pleadings and stipulated facts.The first relates to the issue of whether the debased building tax rate established under section 17-5.2 of the School Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 122, par. 17-5.2), and continued in effect under section 17-5.3(Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 122, par. 17-5.3), or the general building rate authorized under section 17-2(Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 122, par. 17-2), or the saved building fund rate provided for in section 17-7(Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 122, par. 17-7), constitutes the maximum extendable building tax rate for the school districts in question for the years 1953 and 1954.The resolution of this issue requires an analysis of certain pertinent provisions of the School Code and the Revenue Act, which refer to school districts having a population of less than 500,000 inhabitants.

Lack of uniformity in tax rates and in the assessment of property, with its attendant inequities, caused the legislature in 1945 to revise the laws pertaining to tax rates and assessments.This legislation is commonly referred to as the Butler laws.Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 120, pars. 643a, 643b, 643c;People ex rel. Bell v. New York Central Railroad Co., 10 Ill.2d 612, 141 N.E.2d 38.During the transition from partial to full assessment of property, section 17-5.2 of the School Code, after setting forth certain exceptions inapplicable here, provided that the tax rates of all other school districts shall be established either by resolution adopted after September 1, 1951, and before January 1, 1953, fixing as the maximum tax rate for the building fund 'the rate in effect on September 1, 1951 as determined in accordance with Section 162a of the Revenue Act or a rate of .0625% in the case of school districts not maintaining grades 1 to 12, and .125% in the case of school districts maintaining grades 1 to 12, whichever is greater; provided, that the rate for the building fund so established shall not limit the duties of the county clerk in extending tax rates as authorized in Section 17-7 of this Act,'(italics ours) or by referendum or inaction.Pursuant to this section, enacted in 1951, each school district involved, either by resolution or inaction, established such tax rate.For districts not maintaining grades 1 to 12, the rate was .0625 per cent, with the exception of one district which established a rate of .084 per cent.The building fund rate established by one school district maintaining grades 1 to 12 was .125. All of these districts had building bonds outstanding except school district number 212.This district established a building fund rate of .0624 per cent.Section 17-5.2 was repealed in 1953 by House BillNo. 83 which became sections 17-2,17-5.3,17-7, and other sections not pertinent here.

Section 17-2 of the School Code, as amended by House Bill No. 83 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 122, par. 17-2), authorized any such school district to levy a tax annually for building purposes upon all of its taxable property at a rate not to exceed .1875 per cent, and its prior provision subjecting this rate to debasement under the Butler laws was deleted.

Sections 17-5.2and17-5.3 of the School Code were control provisions which were correlated with the basic grants of authority contained in sections 17-2and19-9.Section 17-5.3 provides: 'Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, the maximum lawful tax rate for any fund on the effective date of this amendatory Act, whether representing a statutory rate, a referendum rate, or a rate determined by application of the formula set forth in Section 162a of the Revenue Act, or otherwise, shall continue in effect unless and until changed by referendum held after that date under applicable provisions of this Act.No school district nor the tax rate for any school district shall be subject to any of the provisions of Section 162a of the Revenue Act.'(Italics ours)This section continued in effect after its enactment the building rates of the school districts as heretofore established under section 17-5.2.Section 17-7 provided, inter alia, that the county clerk, in such school districts, shall determine from the certified copies of bond resolutions filed in his office the amount necessary to pay the maturing principal and interest on bonds of any such school district, and shall extend a separate tax sufficient to pay all such principal and interest thereon without limitation as to rate or amount; and that for any district that has building bonds outstanding on July 1, 1953, its maximum rate for building purposes shall be reduced by the rate of the separate tax extended to pay such maturing bonded debt, provided that in no case shall the rate for building purposes be reduced below .10 per cent for districts not maintaining grades 1 to 12, nor less than .16 per cent for districts maintaining grades 1 to 12, unless a smaller rate will produce the amount levied for building purposes by the district.

The limitations of sections 162a, 162b, and162c of the Revenue Act(Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 120, pars. 643a, 643b, and 64oc), ceased to apply to school districts having a population of less than 500,000 inhabitants on December 31, 1952, except to the extent that these restrictions upon tax rates were incorporated in the provisions of sections 17-5.2and17-5.2 of the School Code.

A statement of the problem and the statutes involved discloses that this legislation is not without ambiguity.These enactments, being in pari materia, should be construed together to determine the intent of the legislature.The primary object of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to such intent, and courts should consider the reason or necessity for the enactment, the contemporaneous conditions, existing circumstances, and the object sought to be obtained by the statutes.People ex rel. Bell v. New York Central Railroad, 10 Ill.2d 612, 141 N.E.2d 38;Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill.2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371.

The petitioner urges that the school districts in question which did not maintain grades 1 to 12 were entitled to a maximum building rate of .10 per cent; and that those maintaining grades 1 through 12 were entitled to a maximum building rate of .16 per cent by virtue of section 17-7 of the School Code; that section 17-5.3 continued these authorized rates in effect; and that the building fund rates established under section 17-5.2 and continued under section 17-5.3 are subordinated to the rates provided under section 17-7.The petitioner also suggests that these districts have a building fund rate of .1875 per cent under the provisions of section 17-2.The objectors contend that the maximum building rates of the districts in question must be determined by reference to sections 17-5.2and17-5.3 alone; and that section 17-7 assures a rate of 10 per cent to only those districts which have a building rate in excess of that amount and deals only with the extension of taxes and does not authorize any additional building purpose levy.They assign no particular purpose to section 17-2 and subordinate it to the control provisions of sections 17-5.2and17-5.3.

In order to determine the legislative intent, we will first consider the dichotomy of these enactments which both warrant and restrict the levy of taxes by such districts.Sections 17-2and19-9 contain the basic tax authorization.Section 17-2 grants to school districts the authority to levy a maximum tax of .1875 per cent for building purposes and section 19-9 authorizes the levy of taxes sufficient to pay maturing principal and interest payments on school bonds.

However, these basic taxing powers are subject to the control provisions of the School Code above mentioned which were designed to scale down the total permissible extension of school taxes in correlation with the restrictions of the Butler laws.A proper understanding of the relationship of these debasement provisions requires a historical consideration of legislation pertaining to building fund tax rates and the Butler laws.

Prior to 1935, the entire taxing authority of school districts was contained in section 189 of the School Law.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1931, chap. 122, par. 212.)As interpreted by this court, the statute provided that a single maximum tax rate should be extended for both building purposes and the payment of maturing principal and interest on school building bonds.People ex rel. Carnine v. Wabash Railway Co., 338 Ill. 382, 170 N.E. 223.In 1935, paragraph B was added to section 189 to permit the extension of taxes for the payment of any bonded indebtedness even though the rate exceeded the maximum rate for...

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12 cases
  • City of Highland Park v. Curtis
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 24, 1967
    ...contemporaneous conditions, existing circumstances, and the object sought to be obtained by the statutes. People ex rel. Krapf v. Hayes, 13 Ill.2d 143, 147, 148 N.E.2d 428 (1958). We must presume that the several enactments relative to the offense of drunken driving, relate to one subject a......
  • Swain v. Winnebago County
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • August 19, 1969
    ...These two statutes are in pari materia and must be construed together to determine the intent of the legislature. People ex rel. Krapf v. Hayes, 13 Ill.2d 143, 147, 148 N.E.2d (1958). The constitution of Illinois contains no express denial of the right of a public officer to resign, althoug......
  • First Am. Bank Corp.. v. Henry
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • January 21, 2011
    ...a municipality must look to that statute for authority to levy in support of its contribution to the fund. People ex rel. Krapf v. Hayes, 13 Ill.2d 143, 152, 148 N.E.2d 428 (1958). Pursuant to section 7–171(e), municipalities must levy and collect taxes to support their IMRF contributions i......
  • People ex rel. Adamowski v. Kerner
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 20, 1960
    ...not without ambiguity. Consequently, they should be construed together to determine the intent of the legislature. People ex rel. Krapf v. Hayes, 13 Ill.2d 143, 148 N.E.2d 428; People ex rel. Bell v. New York Central Railroad Co., 10 Ill.2d 612, 141 N.E.2d The intervening period between the......
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