People ex rel. Lauth v. Wilmington Coal Co.

Decision Date19 January 1949
Docket NumberNo. 30700.,30700.
Citation83 N.E.2d 741,402 Ill. 161
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. LAUTH v. WILMINGTON COAL CO. et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Will County Court; John C. Cowing, Judge.

Proceeding by the People on relation of Charles Lauth, County Collector, against the Wilmington Coal Company, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company and others, for judgments against and orders of sale of lands of defendants for delinquent taxes. From judgment in favor of the collector, defendants Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company and others, appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Gray, Thomas & Wallace and Barr & Barr, all of Joliet, for appellants.

James E. Burke, State's Atty., of Joliet (Charles J. McKeown, of Joliet, of counsel), for appellee.

WILSON, Justice.

The plaintiff, the county treasurer and ex-officio county collector of Will County, applied to the county court of Will County for judgments against and orders of sale of the lands of the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company, the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company and the Joliet Union Depot Company for delinquent taxes. Each railroad company objected to the educational fund tax levy of High School District No. 204 for the year 1945 as being excessive for the same reason and the causes were consolidated. The objection was predicated on the assertion that the special election held in the school district on September 15, 1945, and purporting to authorize an increase in taxes for educational purposes was illegal and void because the reverse side of the ballots used at the election allegedly did not bear the facsimile signature of the public officer causing the ballots to be printed. Evidence was heard on the isksue of fact as to the form of the ballot and, thereafter, the county court overruled the objection and entered judgments in favor of the collector. The railroad companies prosecute this appeal.

As the sole ground for reversal, the objectors contend that the judgment of the county court is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In addition to denying this assertion, the collector advances the more fundamental argument that there is no statutory requirement that ballots in local elections on the proposition of increasing school taxes must contain the facsimile signature of the public officer causing the ballots to be printed. The issue thus raised must be considered first.

Section 7 of article 16 of the Election Code relates to both Statewide and local elections on public measures. Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 46, par. 16-7. Pertinent to the present inquiry it ordains, ‘Whenever a public measure is submitted to be voted upon by the people within any district or political subdivision less than the State the substance of such public measure shall be clearly indicated on a separate ballot * * *.’ Any such separate ballot shall be printed on paper of sufficient size so that when folded once it shall be large enough to contain the following words, which shall be printed on the back, ‘Ballot for (name of public measure to be voted on). * * * All provisions of this Act relating to ballots shall apply to such separate ballot.' Among the other provisions of the Election Code touching on the form of ballots, section 3 of article 16 provides, in part, ‘On the back or outside of the ballot, so as to appear when folded, shall be printed the words ‘Official Ballot,’ followed by the designation of the polling place for which the ballot is prepared, the date of the election and a facsimile of the signature of the clerk or other officer who has caused the ballots to be printed.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 46, par. 16-3.

Whether article 16 of the Election Code is applicable to the election in question depends on principles now well established. Where the School Code, or any other statute establishing special or local elections, provides the particular form of ballot to be used, article 16 of the Election Code has no application. People v. Birdsong, 398 Ill. 455, 76 N.E.2d 185;Routt v. Barrett, 396 Ill. 322, 71 N.E.2d 660;Sanders v. Township of Salem, 385 Ill., 362, 52 N.E.2d 708;People ex rel. Burkholder v. Peoria & Eastern Railway Co., 375 Ill. 197, 30 N.E.2d 651. Conversely, in the absence of a prescribed form of ballot for a special election, article 16 of the Election Code is applicable. People ex rel. Rhodes v. Miller, 392 Ill. 445, 64 N.E.2d 869;Peaple ex rel. De Rosa v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 391 Ill. 145, 62 N.E.2d 460;People ex rel. Henry v. New York Central Railroad Lines, 381 Ill. 490, 45 N.E.2d 860;People ex rel Toman v. Chicago Great Western Railroad Co., 379 Ill. 594, 41 N.E.2d 960.

The special election of September 15, 1945, in High School District No. 204 was held pursuant to the authority granted by section 3.1 of article 17 of the School Code, Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 122, par. 17-3.1. Neither the particular section involved nor any other section of article 17 of the School Code establishes a form of ballot to be used in elections on the proposition of increasing school taxes. It follows,therefore, that the form of ballot in the election in question is governed by section 7 of article 16 of the Election Code and that all provisions of section 16-7 relating to local elections apply with equal force. By including the requirement that ‘All provisions of this Act relating to ballots shall apply to such separate ballot,’ section 16-7 incorporates the mandatory provision of section 16-3 to the effect that, on the back or outside of each ballot, there shall be printed a facsimile of the signature of the clerk or other officer causing the ballots to be printed. Furthermore, where article 16 of the Election Code is applicable, the failure of ballots to bear the facsimile signature of the public officer causing the ballots to be printed makes both the ballots and the election illegal and void. Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 46, par. 17-16; People ex rel. Vance v. Bushu, 288 Ill. 277, 123 N.E. 517.

Whether the judgment of the county court sustaining the tax is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence must next be determined. Prior to the hearing on the factual issue of the actual form of the ballot, the parties stipulated that High School District No. 204 levied a tax of $465,000 for educational purposes for the year 1945; that the county collector extended a rate of $1.25 per $100 of assessed valuation to produce the tax; that the legal rate for educational purposes was $1 unless an increased rate had been lawfully authorized by the electors of the high school district, and that the special election of September 15, 1945, was the only election relied upon as authorizing a tax rate of $1.25 for educational purposes. The issues at the hearing were thus reduced to the single question whether the ballots used in the election of September 15, 1945, were imprinted with a facsimile of the signature of the public officer causing the ballots to be prepared.

The principal witnesses were J. G. Skeel, secretary of the board of education of the high school district for eight years, and two men connected with the C. H. Peterson Printing Company. In substance, Skeel testified that he prepared the form of ballots for the election of September 15, 1945, and C. H. Peterson Printing Company printed the ballots. After the election, he burned all unused ballots and, six months later, he received all the used ballots from the township treasurer and, pursuant to instructions, burned them and personally saw them destroyed. At the time of the trial in September 1947, Skeel did not have a used or unused ballot in his possession, nor did he know of the existence of one. He further testified that, according to his usual practice, his...

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