People ex rel. Maggio v. Casscles

• Decision Date: 26 May 1971
• Citation: 28 N.Y.2d 415,271 N.E.2d 517,322 N.Y.S.2d 668
• Parties: , 271 N.E.2d 517 The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Thomas MAGGIO, Appellant, v. J. Leland CASSCLES, as Warden of Sing Sing Prison, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 668

322 N.Y.S.2d 668

28 N.Y.2d 415, 271 N.E.2d 517

The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Thomas MAGGIO, Appellant, v. J. Leland CASSCLES, as Warden of Sing Sing Prison, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 26, 1971.

E. Robert Giuntini, White Plains, Philip A. J. Giangrande, White Plains, of counsel, for appellant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Burton Herman and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

BURKE, Judge.

Relator was arrested on June 5, 1969 for violation of parole. On June 24, 1969 he was returned to Sing Sing Prison, where, on July 29, 1969, a parole revocation hearing was held. The hearing, which resulted in a revocation, was conducted, of course, without representation of relator by counsel.

In his habeas corpus petition, relator alleged that he was not informed of the charges against him and that he was denied counsel and the opportunity to call witnesses. On the return of the writ, counsel appointed by Justice Galloway requested access to whatever records were relied on by the Parole Board to ascertain if the procedure complied with due process requirements. The court ordered the record of the revocation hearing, reviewed it without allowing relator's attorney the opportunity of evaluating it and held that the relator's allegation was untrue. He found further that relator was not denied due process.

The issue here is whether our decision in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449, 267 N.E.2d 238, ought to be given retroactive application. We held there that a parolee is constitutionally entitled to counsel and to introduce testimony at parole revocation hearings. These constitutional imperative are of sufficient magnitude (see, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 LEd.2d 287) that the decision could be applied retroactively (see e.g., McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 89 SCt. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 89 S.Ct. 35, 21 L.Ed.2d 5; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799). On the other hand, full retroactivity which indiscriminately would order a new hearing for thousands of prisoners affected would impose a purposeless and impossible burden on the parole board.

Although, theoretically, it may be said that, inasmuch as habeas corpus was utilized to raise the question collaterally because other methods of review were unavailable (see Matter of Menechino v. Division of Parole, 26 N.Y.2d 837, 309 N.Y.S.2d 585, 258 N.E.2d 84), the decision was, itself, a retrospective application of a constitutional doctrine (see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628, n. 13, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601; Gideon v. Wainwright, Supar), the question of retroactivity need not be decided on an all-or-nothing basis. Rather, in reaching our decision, we have examined the nature of a parole revocation hearing and the particular evils which our decision in Menechino (supra) was intended to rectify. We conclude that all the protection necessary may be afforded to prisoners by granting new parole hearings only to those who can demonstrate, with the aid of counsel in the Supreme Court, that the determination made at the revocation hearing failed to meet due process standards. Such a procedure in the Supreme Court assures to the prisoner a judicial decision that he had notice of the charges and an opportunity to dispute the facts alleged and develop his explanation or defense.

Perhaps more important than a statement of what a parole revocation hearing is, is a recognition of what it is not. It is not a criminal trial. A parole revocation hearing is in the nature of an administrative proceeding (People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, Supra, p. 382, 318 N.Y.S.2d p. 453, 267 N.E.2d p. 241) to determine whether a parolee has violated the conditions of his parole (Correction Law, Consol.Laws, c. 43, § 212, subd. 7). Our holding in Menechino is designed to assure 'that the board is accurately informed of the facts before it acts' (27 N.Y.2d, at p. 383, 318 N.Y.S.2d, at p. 455, 267 N.E.2d, at p. 242). Thus, although the appointment of counsel is a Sine qua non, we should be more concerned with the testing of the integrity of the factfinding process. If the parole hearing record clearly demonstrates compliance with due process requirements, a new...