People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester Cnty. Corr. Facility

CourtNew York Court of Appeals
Citation140 N.Y.S.3d 170,163 N.E.3d 1087,36 N.Y.3d 251
Docket NumberNo. 73,73
Parties The PEOPLEof the State of New York EX REL. Chance MCCURDY, Appellant, v. WARDEN, WESTCHESTER COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., Respondents.
Decision Date23 November 2020
OPINION OF THE COURT

STEIN, J.

This appeal presents us with a question of statutory interpretation.

Penal Law § 70.45(3) provides that, "notwithstanding any other provision of law, the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from the underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of a residential treatment facility (RTF)." Correction Law § 73(10), in turn, authorizes the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) "to use any [RTF] as a residence for persons who are on community supervision," which includes those on PRS (see Correction Law § 2[31] ). The question before us is whether Correction Law § 73(10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) (see Executive Law § 259–c [14] ) after the six-month period specified in Penal Law § 70.45(3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. We conclude that it does.

I.

In 2007, petitioner pleaded guilty to criminal sexual act in the first degree and was sentenced to five years in prison to be followed by five years of PRS. In 2011, while serving PRS, petitioner was charged with committing additional crimes and ultimately pleaded guilty to attempted sexual abuse in the first degree. For that crime, he was sentenced to three years in prison to be followed by five years of PRS. Petitioner was also adjudicated a level three sex offender, and it is undisputed that he is subject to the restriction contained in SARA, which prohibits him from residing within 1,000 feet of school grounds (see Executive Law § 259–c [14] ; Penal Law § 220.00[14] ).

At the time petitioner was received into DOCCS' custody on his attempted first-degree sexual abuse conviction, he had served sufficient time in a local jail to reach the maximum expiration date of the sentence imposed on that conviction. Therefore, he was designated for release to PRS. However, petitioner was unable to identify SARA-compliant housing. The Parole Board directed that petitioner be transferred to Fishkill RTF, pursuant to Penal Law § 70.45(3), until a residence was approved for him that was verified to be located outside of "school grounds" as defined by SARA. On December 1, 2014, petitioner moved to a SARA-compliant residence in Far Rockaway, New York.

In January 2015, while on PRS, petitioner violated curfew, leading to revocation of his PRS status and imposition of 12 months of delinquency time. However, the Parole Board directed that, if petitioner completed a 90–day drug treatment program, he would be released back to PRS. Petitioner completed the drug treatment program in June 2015, but he again failed to identify SARA-compliant housing. Pursuant to Correction Law § 73(10), DOCCS designated Fishkill RTF as petitioner's residence until he was able to identify adequate housing. In September 2015, petitioner was transferred from Fishkill RTF to Queensboro RTF, which was closer to his proposed future residence in New York City. The following month, while en route to a work crew assignment in New York City, petitioner jumped out of a DOCCS van, stole a bicycle, and fled. He was apprehended, returned to DOCCS' custody, and charged with violating the terms of his PRS.

While awaiting a final parole revocation hearing, petitioner commenced this proceeding against both respondent Warden of Westchester County Correctional Facility and DOCCS, seeking a writ of habeas corpus and arguing that DOCCS lacked the authority to assign him to an RTF following his completion of the 90–day drug treatment program. Petitioner asserted that, in fact, he had never been released to PRS after completing the drug treatment program because RTFs are prisons and, having never been released on PRS, he could not have violated PRS conditions. Petitioner further contended that Correction Law § 73(10), when read in conjunction with Penal Law § 70.45(3), does not confer authority on DOCCS to send a PRS violator to an RTF after the six-month period under Penal Law § 70.45(3) has expired. Petitioner, who is indigent, admitted that DOCCS had no authority to release him in violation of SARA's residency requirement, but maintained that he should be placed at the top of the waiting list for a bed in a SARA-compliant homeless shelter.

Supreme Court converted the habeas corpus proceeding to a CPLR article 78 proceeding and granted the petition solely to the extent of ordering DOCCS to immediately transfer petitioner back to Queensboro RTF and place him in a SARA-compliant New York City Department of Homeless Services facility, or on a waitlist—based on the July 2015 date that he was last transferred to an RTF—for such facility if no space was immediately available. The court concluded that conversion to an article 78 proceeding was necessary in light of petitioner's concession that he was not entitled to immediate release because he had not obtained a SARA-compliant residence and DOCCS lacked the authority to release him in violation of SARA. Turning to the merits, the court determined that Correction Law § 73(10) did not authorize DOCCS to assign petitioner to Fishkill RTF following completion of the 90–day drug treatment program. The court reasoned that, because Penal Law § 70.45(3) limits DOCCS's authority to impose transfer to an RTF as a condition of PRS only "for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from the underlying term of imprisonment," DOCCS's reliance on Correction Law § 73(10) as authority to use an RTF as a residence for the otherwise homeless petitioner beyond that six-month period rendered the language of section 70.45(3) meaningless. Thus, the court held that DOCCS's July 2015 determination to assign petitioner to an RTF was "a nullity" and petitioner could not "be found ... in violation of that illegally imposed condition."

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding ( 164 A.D.3d 692, 83 N.Y.S.3d 520 [2d Dept. 2018] ).1 The Court concluded that there was no conflict between Penal Law § 70.45(3) and Correction Law § 73(10) ( 164 A.D.3d at 694, 83 N.Y.S.3d 520 ). In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that the Correction Law definition of "community supervision" encompasses individuals serving time on PRS, and that DOCCS is authorized, pursuant to Correction Law § 73(10), " ‘to use any [RTF] as a residence for persons who are on community supervision’ " ( id. ). In contrast, Penal Law § 70.45(3) "permits DOCCS to require an offender subject to a term of [PRS] to spend the first six months of [that PRS term] in [RTF] housing as a transitional period prior to re-entry into the community" ( id. [emphasis added]). Thus, the Court held, "construing the relevant statutes together," the six-month limitation provided in Penal Law § 70.45(3) does not curtail DOCCS's authority pursuant to Correction Law § 73(10) to temporarily place an offender in an RTF while the offender is serving PRS if such person is unable to locate SARA-compliant housing ( id. ). The Court cautioned that "it is clear that DOCCS's authority to keep such an offender in [RTF] housing ends when the offender successfully identifies or otherwise obtains SARA-compliant community housing" ( id. at 694–695, 83 N.Y.S.3d 520 ).

This Court subsequently granted petitioner's motion for leave to appeal ( 32 N.Y.3d 1084, 90 N.Y.S.3d 632, 114 N.E.3d 1085 [2018] ).

II.

"[T]he clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text;" thus, "the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( People v. Anonymous, 34 N.Y.3d 631, 636, 123 N.Y.S.3d 41, 145 N.E.3d 924 [2020] ; see Desrosiers v. Perry Ellis Menswear, LLC, 30 N.Y.3d 488, 494, 68 N.Y.S.3d 391, 90 N.E.3d 1262 [2017] ). We are also guided by the principles that " ‘a statute ... must be construed as a whole and that its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other’ " ( Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v. Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d 712, 721, 955 N.Y.S.2d 835, 979 N.E.2d 1162 [2012], quoting People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192, 199, 422 N.Y.S.2d 33, 397 N.E.2d 724 [1979] ). Particularly relevant to this appeal, "[c]ourts must ‘harmonize the various provisions of related statutes and [ ] construe them in a way that renders them internally compatible’ " ( Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Day, 96 N.Y.2d 149, 153, 726 N.Y.S.2d 54, 749 N.E.2d 733 [2001], quoting Matter of Aaron J., 80 N.Y.2d 402, 407, 590 N.Y.S.2d 843, 605 N.E.2d 330 [1992] ).

It is not disputed that, when petitioner reached the maximum expiration date of his sentence and was released to community supervision, he was subject to the residency restriction of SARA set forth in Executive Law § 259–c (14). In that regard, Penal Law § 70.45(3) requires the Board of Parole to "establish and impose conditions of [PRS] in the same manner and to the same extent as it may establish and impose conditions in accordance with the [E]xecutive [L]aw upon persons who are granted parole or conditional release; provided that, notwithstanding any other provision of law," the Board may require, as a condition of PRS, that a person on PRS be transferred to an RTF for up to the first six months after release from the underlying determinate term of imprisonment. An RTF is defined as a

"correctional facility consisting of a community based residence in or near a community where employment, educational and training opportunities are
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