People ex rel. McWard v. Wabash R. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 November 1946
• Docket Number: No. 29680.,29680.
• Citation: 70 N.E.2d 36,395 Ill. 243
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. McWARD, County Collector, v. WABASH R. CO. et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

395 Ill. 243

70 N.E.2d 36

PEOPLE ex rel. McWARD, County Collector,

v.WABASH R. CO. et al.

No. 29680.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 20, 1946.

Appeal from Christian County Court; John W. Preihs, Judge.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of E. R. McWard, County Collector, against the Wabash Railroad Company and others for a judgment for taxes. From a judgment overruling objections filed by defendants to certain taxes extended for the year 1942, the defendants appeal.

Affirmed in part, and reversed in part and remanded with directions.

Hogan & Coale, of Taylorville, for appellants.

Thomas Sweeney, State's Atty., of Taylorville (Brenda Sweeney, of Taylorville, of counsel), for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Christian county overruling the objections of appellants to certain taxes extended for the year 1942. The taxes involved in the appeal are the county tax, the town tax of the towns of Bear Creek, May and Taylorville, the road and bridge tax of the towns of Bear Creek, Buckhart, King, May, Ricks, Stonington and Taylorville, the village tax of the villages of Harvel, Morrisonville and Stonington and the school tax of school districts Nos. 61 and 76.

The first objection involves five items in the county levy for general corporate purposes. The first item objected to is ‘aid to the poor $2000.’ This item is attacked because it is alleged that the burden of supporting paupers is on the townships and not on the county. A similar item levied for ‘support of county poor $4000’ was held invalid in People ex rel. Thies v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern R. Co., 356 Ill. 272, 190 N.E. 280. It was error to overrule the objection to this item.

The next item of county tax objected to is ‘Election expense for Ballots, Poll Books and fees of Judges and Clerks, $6000.’ The objection made to this tax is that it is not sufficiently itemized and specific to comply with section 156 of the Revenue Act of 1939, Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, c. 120, s 637, which provides that where county taxes are to be raised for several purposes, the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately. The right of a taxpayer to have stated separately the purposes for which public money is appropriated or a tax levied is a substantial right of which he may not be deprived. People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 389 Ill. 434, 59 N.E.2d 843;People ex rel. Toman v. Signode Steel Strapping Co., 380 Ill. 633, 44 N.E.2d 555. The object of statutes requiring a separate statement of the purposes for which taxes are levied is to give her taxpayer information and also an opportunity, if he desires it, to object to unjust and illegal levies and assessments. People ex rel. Toman v. Estate of Otis, 376 Ill. 112, 33 N.E.2d 202;People ex rel. Nash v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 359 Ill. 435, 194 N.E. 560. On the other hand, it is equally well settled that itemization requirements of a taxing statute must receive a practical and common-sense construction, People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Bunge Brothers Coal Co., 392 Ill. 153, 64 N.E.2d 365;People ex rel. Toman v. Belmont Radio Corp., 388 Ill. 11, 57 N.E.2d 479;People ex rel. Toman v. Estate of Otis, 376 Ill. 112, 33 N.E.2d 202, and that there is no valid objection to levying a single sum for several purposes which are embraced within some general designation giving the necessary information to the taxpayer. People ex rel. Oller v. New York Central R. Co., 388 Ill. 382, 58 N.E.2d 51. While it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a tax is levied for a single or a multiple purpose, we think this item was sufficiently itemized and specific to comply with the statute, and included only one purpose, namely, defraying the expense of holding elections, and that the expense of ballots and pollbooks and the fees of judges and clerks of elections are all embraced in the one general purpose. Courts will not adopt strained constructions in order to invalidate a tax. People ex rel. Frick v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. Co., 361 Ill. 470, 198 N.E. 212.

Appellants also objected to the following items of the county levy: ‘Fees of County Officers: Sheriff $9000; County Clerk $7,500; Circuit Clerk $900.’ The objection was that the tax for these items was levied in violation of section 10 of article X of the constitution, Smith-Hurd Stats., which provides that the compensation of county officers shall be paid only out of fees collected by the office. This section of the constitution provides that the county board, except as provided in section 9 of said article, (which refers to certain county officers of the county of Cook,) shall fix the compensation of all county officers, with the amount of their necessary clerk hire, stationery, fuel and other expenses, and that in all cases where fees are provided for, said compensation shall be paid only out of, and shall in no instance exceed, the fees actually collected; and further provides that all fees or allowancesby them received, in excess of their said compensation, shall be paid into the county treasury.

The compensation of county officers, as the term ‘compensation’ is used in section 10 of article X of our constitution, consists of the salary of the officer and the amount of necessary clerk hire, stationery, fuel and other expenses of his office, while the term ‘fees' is used in said section to designate the sums prescribed by law as charges for services rendered by county officers in their official capacity and has no application to the personal compensation of officers. The compensation of the officer may be fixed by the county board in a lump sum, including both salary and expenses, in which event he may retain as his compensation the whole amount of such sum out of fees collected; People ex rel. Heuer v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 377 Ill. 470, 36 N.E.2d 925;People v. Frick, 367 Ill. 446, 11 N.E.2d 955; or the salary may be fixed in one item and the expenses of his office as other items, in which latter case, the county officer is entitled to retain from the fees collected by him the entire salary, but can retain on account of expenses only so much as will reimburse him for the amounts actually expended for the reasonable and necessary expenses of his office, not in excess of the amounts fixed by the county board for such purpose. People ex rel. Heuer v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 377 Ill. 470, 36 N.E.2d 925;People v. Frick, 367 Ill. 446, 11 N.E.2d 955.

The legislature by the adoption of the Fees and Salaries Act in 1872 divided the counties of the State into three classes and prescribed the fees to be paid to the county officers for the various acts and services rendered by them in the line of their official duty. Christian county is in the second class. The sheriff, the county clerk and the circuit clerk in the counties of the second class must receive their compensation only out of fees earned by them as such officers, but the county is required by statute to pay them fees for certain services. The sheriff is allowed a per diem for attending court and a fee for patrolling public highways, each to be paid out of the county treasury. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 53, par. 37.) In all criminal cases where the defendant is acquitted or otherwise legally discharged, without payment of costs, the sheriffs fees are paid from the county treasury to an extent sufficient, with the fees collected by him during the year, to make his salary or compensation with the amount of his necessary clerk hire, stationery, fuel and other expense. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 53, par. 37.) The fees of the circuit clerk in all criminal cases, when the cost cannot be collected from the defendants on their conviction, or when the defendants shall be acquitted, shall be paid from the county treasury to an extent sufficient, with the fees collected by him during the year, to make his compensation or salary. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 53, par. 32.) The county clerk is allowed a fee, to be paid from the county treasury, for each lot or tract of land forfeited and so stamped on the collector's books. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 120, par. 646.) The statute also allows county and circuit clerks a per diem for attending court and the county clerk a per diem for attending the sessions of the county board, but makes no provision for the manner of their payment. However, we think it must be conceded that such per diems are earnings of the offices of the respective clerks, and, at least insofar as necessary to make up the salary of the clerk and the expenses of his office for clerk hire, etc., are payable out of the county treasury. The same is true as to the provision for the payment of the fees allowed the sheriff for summoning jurors. The legislature having thus, both expressly and by implication, authorized the payment of fees of the sheriff, county clerk and circuit clerk out of the county treasury, the county board had an undoubted right to levy to pay fees of these officers, and this would, in no way, violate any provisions of the constitution.

Appellants direct another objection to two items in the county levy for general corporate purposes, the first item providing $5000 for ‘Bridge Repairs' and the second $3000 for ‘Maintenance of County Highway Garage and Office Buildings.’ The objection directed against these items is that they are not proper items in the county levy for general corporate purposes, but are items proper only to be included in the county highway tax levied for the purpose of improving, maintaining and repairing State-aid roads, under section 14 of an act adopted by the legislature in 1921, entitled ‘An Act in relation to State highways.’ Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 121, par. 304.

Counties, aside from their powers and duties in connection with the construction and repair of State-aid roads and bridges therein, are authorized by section 36 of the Roads and Bridges Act to construct and...