People ex rel. Michaels v. Bowen

• Decision Date: 02 February 1938
• Docket Number: No. 24188.,24188.
• Citation: 367 Ill. 589,12 N.E.2d 625
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. MICHAELS v. BOWEN, Director of Department of Public Welfare, et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

367 Ill. 589

12 N.E.2d 625

PEOPLE ex rel. MICHAELS

v.BOWEN, Director of Department of Public Welfare, et al.

No. 24188.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 15, 1937.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 2, 1938.

Original petition by the People, on the relation of Dorothy Michaels, for a writ of habeas corpus against A. L. Bowen, Director of the Department of Public Welfare, and others. The writ was allowed, a return thereto was made, and the Attorney General moves to quash the writ.

Writ quashed, and prisoner remanded to custody.John G. Friedmeyer, of Springfield, G. E. Price, of Lincoln, Neb., and A. M. Fitzgerald, of Springfield, for petitioner.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., and A. B. Dennis, of Danville, for respondents.

SHAW, Justice.

James Michaels was convicted in the circuit court of Randolph county September 26, 1928, under an indictment charging him with the crime of robbery, while armed, etc. He was sentenced to the penitentiary under the Indeterminate Sentence Act for a term of from one year to life. That judgment was affirmed in this court June 19, 1929. Michaels began serving his sentence October 14, 1929. On November 1, 1932, he was released from the penitentiary on a writ of habeas corpus issued by the circuit court of Sangamon county. December 22, 1933, this court, in a mandamus proceeding, entered an order requiring the circuit court of Sangamon county to expunge its records and directing the warden to take Michaels into custody. He was apprehended in California and returned to prison November 23, 1934. The parole board heard the case October 19, 1930, and entered an order as follows: ‘We are of opinion that parole should be denied, and that he should be given a ‘final’ of October, 1939.' Upon his return to the penitentiary on November 23, 1934, the parole board declared Michaels and ‘escape’ and demoted him to grade ‘E.’ February 13, 1935, the board revoked all former orders made by it his case. January 16, 1936, the board was notified by the penitentiary authorities that Michaels had been restored to grade ‘A,’ effective as of April 14, 1930. In February, 1936, an order was entered by the board denying him a parole and fixing October 14, 1941, as ‘final.’ This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the release of Michaels, who is now confined in the penitentiary at Statesville. The writ has been allowed, a return thereto has been made, and the Attorney General has moved to quash the writ.

The petition alleges, among other things, that prior to his release under the order of the circuit court of Sangamon county of November 1, 1932, and also subsequent to November 23, 1934, Michaels had earned time by good conduct, in diminution of his sentence, and that the parole board exceeded its authority, as well as violated the statute, by its action of February 13, 1935, in depriving Michaels of the right to time earned for good conduct. The proposition set out in the so-called first count of the petition is the claim that the parole board changed Michael's indeterminate sentence of from one year to life to a determinate sentence to expire in October, 1939, and that earned credits for good time would make his sentence expire in 1936, and by reason thereof he is entitled to be discharged. Under the second count it is charged the parole board unlawfully, and without any authority, changed the definite sentence which it imposed in 1930 to expire in October, 1939, to a sentence which would terminate in October, 1941, and that, under those circumstances, Michaels is entitled to be discharged. It is contended that the Legislature intended, by the Parole Act, that a prisoner, after serving the minimum sentence, is entitled to know when his sentence will expire; that while the parole board is given some discretion when it makes a determination of the expiration of a sentence, once the order is made it is a final the conclusive determination of the maximum term which the prisoner shall serve; that he is then vested with all rights of discharge and credits for good behavior as though the sentence for a fixed term had been pronounced by a court. The point is further urged that the term ‘final,’ as used by the board in the entry made by it in the first order, was in legal effect the fixing of the sentence for a period of ten years, and having once thus set the ‘final’ the board has completed the quasi-judicial act it had authority to perform, and that such act had the same legal effect as though the trial court had, in pronouncing judgment, sentenced the prisoner to a definite ten-year term. The relator further urges that, under the records of the board, the ‘final’ of October, 1939, would have entitled the prisoner to his release on July 29, 1936, under the progressive merit system of rating earned time for good conduct, and the board's subsequent action changing the ‘final’ to 1941, was, in effect, an increase in what had become a definite sentence, and, therefore, this is a violation of the constitutional rights of the prisoner.

Michaels was imprisoned under the Indeterminate Sentence Act (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 38, § 802; Ill.Rev.Stat.1935, c. 38, par. 796, p. 1260) which provides, in substance, that, except for certain designated crimes, the sentence of the court shall be a general sentence of imprisonment and the courts are prohibited from fixing the amount or duration of such imprisonment. The statute also states that the term of commitment shall be for not less than the minimum nor more than the maximum term provided by law for the offense of which the person stands convicted and, further, that ‘It...