People ex rel. Murphy v. Maxwell
| Decision Date | 23 February 1904 |
| Citation | 69 N.E. 1092,177 N.Y. 494 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. MURPHY v. MAXWELL, Superintendent of Schools. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
Application by the people, on the relation of Kate M. Murphy, for mandamus to William H. Maxwell, city superintendent of schools to compel defendant to recognize the relator as a teacher. From an order of the Appellate Division (83 N. Y. Supp. 1098) which reversed an order granting a peremptory writ, relator appeals. Reversed.
Conrad Saxe Keyes, for appellant.
John J. Delany, Corp. Counsel (James D. Bell, of counsel), for respondent.
In February, 1891, the relator was appointed a teacher in one of the public schools of the then city of Brooklyn. At that time there was a by-law of the board of education of the city which provided: ‘Should a female principal, head of department or teacher marry, her place shall thereupon become vacant, but her marriage shall not operate as a bar to her reappointment, should it be deemed to the best interests of the school to retain her services.’ After the consolidation of the city with the city of New York, the borough school board adopted or continued that by-law. On January 21, 1902, the relator married. Thereupon she notified the local committee of the school in which she taught, and applied for reappointment or continuance in her position. She asserts that she was reappointed by the borough board, but this fact was put in issue by the affidavits submitted on behalf of the respondent. Still, as she alleged, and the allegation was not denied, no one was appointed in her place, and she continued to discharge all the duties of her position as teacher, and no action has been taken by the board of education to dismiss her from her employment. Under the by-laws of the city board of education, it was the duty of the respondent to certify to the auditor the names and salaries of the teachers; and, without such certification, teachers were unable to draw their pay. On an affidavit stating those facts, the relator applied to the Special Term for a peremptory writ of mandamus, directing the respondent to recognize her as a teacher of the public schools and to certify her name to the auditor, that she might be paid her salary. As already stated, the affidavits on behalf of the respondent controverted none of the facts stated by the relator, except those referring to her reappointment. The Special Term granted the peremptory writ as asked for by the relator, on the ground that her employment could not be terminated without affirmative action taken by the borough board of education to dismiss her. On appeal the Appellate Division reversed the order of the Special Term, holding that the relator's marriage ipso facto terminated her employment, but directed that an alternative writ issue to determine the controversy as to her reappointment. The Appellate Division thereafter allowed an appeal to this court, and certified three questions for determination: First. Is the by-law of the former borough school board of Brooklyn, above recited, a reasonable regulation? Second. Is the aforesaid by-law in conflict with section 1114 of the charter of 1897 of the city of New York (Laws 1897, c. 378, p. 403), providing for the removal of members of the educational and teaching staff after trial and hearing upon charges, and prescribing the grounds of such removal? Third. Can such by-law operate to vacate the position of women principals and teachers, without the taking of affirmative action by the board of education or the borough school board, as prescribed by the charter of the city of New York, looking to their removal?
It is not necessary, nor would it be profitable, to discuss the question whether a by-law providing that a female teacher shall by marriage vacate her employment is reasonable or not, nor, if it be assumed that such a by-law would be reasonable, to consider whether the particular by-law in this case, which, in effect, provides that by marriage a female teacher's employment shall cease, or not, at the option of the borough board, is reasonable, as we are of opinion that under the charter the board had no power either to...
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...482, 485, L. R. A. 1916C, 789, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 266;Jameson v. Union Dist. Board (1914) 74 W. Va. 389, 81 S. E. 1126;People v. Maxwell (1904) 177 N. Y. 494, 69 N. E. 1092. See, also, Blair v. United States ex rel. (1916) 45 App. D. C. 353;State ex rel. v. School Directors (1923) 179 Wis. 28......
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