People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Corr. Facility

• Decision Date: 23 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 76,76
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York EX REL. Raymond NEGRON, Respondent, v. SUPERINTENDENT, WOODBOURNE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

36 N.Y.3d 32

160 N.E.3d 1266

136 N.Y.S.3d 819

The PEOPLE of the State of New York EX REL. Raymond NEGRON, Respondent,

v.SUPERINTENDENT, WOODBOURNE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Appellant.

No. 76

Court of Appeals of New York.

November 23, 2020

OPINION OF THE COURT

GARCIA, J.

This appeal concerns the scope of a provision of the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) which mandates that the Board of Parole (the Board) impose a condition restricting entry upon school grounds on certain offenders (see Executive Law § 259–c [14] ). The issue is whether that condition is mandatory for any parolee who has been designated a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) or only for those level three offenders who are serving a sentence for an offense enumerated in the statute. We hold that the condition is mandatory only for those level three sex offenders serving a sentence for an enumerated offense and therefore affirm.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse in 1994 and, as a result, was designated a level three sex offender, the highest risk classification under SORA (see Correction Law § 168–l [6][c] ). Level three sex offenders must register once a year for life and verify their residence with local law enforcement every 90 days (see Correction Law § 168–h [2]-[3] ; see generally People v. Cook, 29 N.Y.3d 121, 125–126, 53 N.Y.S.3d 238, 75 N.E.3d 655 [2017] ). A level three sex offender is permitted to petition annually to modify the designation ( Correction Law § 168–o ).

Petitioner remained a level three sex offender when he was convicted of attempted second-degree burglary in 2005 and sentenced to a prison term of 12 years to life. In 2016, the Board granted petitioner parole and prescribed as a mandatory condition that he not knowingly enter school grounds. The authority for the mandatory school grounds condition is found in Executive Law § 259–c (14), which provides that:

"notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, where a person serving a sentence for an [enumerated offense] and the victim of such offense was under the age of eighteen at the time of such offense or such person has been designated a level three sex offender ... is released on parole or conditionally released pursuant to subdivision one or two of this section, the board shall require, as a mandatory condition of such release, that such sentenced offender shall refrain from knowingly entering into or upon any school grounds" (emphasis added).

Although petitioner's conviction did not qualify as an enumerated offense under the statute, the Board determined that, because of his level three sex offender designation, he was nevertheless subject to the mandatory condition.¹

The practical effect of the school grounds condition is to prevent the parolee from residing within 1,000 feet of a school (see People v. Diack, 24 N.Y.3d 674, 682, 3 N.Y.S.3d 296, 26 N.E.3d 1151 [2015] ; Penal Law § 220.00[14][b] ). At the time he was set to be released on parole, petitioner was unable to secure housing compliant with this restriction. As a result, he was transferred to Woodbourne Correctional Facility for placement in a residential treatment facility.²

Petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding against the Superintendent of the Woodbourne Correctional Facility, arguing that the mandatory school grounds condition did not apply to him, and his detention was therefore unlawful, because at the time of his scheduled release to community supervision he was not serving a sentence for one of the offenses enumerated in Executive Law § 259–c (14). Supreme Court denied the petition without a hearing.

On appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously reversed ( 170 A.D.3d 12, 94 N.Y.S.3d 703 [3d Dept. 2020] ).³ That Court determined that the term "such person" in Executive Law § 259–c (14) plainly and unequivocally refers to a person serving a sentence for an offense enumerated in the statute ( 170 A.D.3d at 16, 94 N.Y.S.3d 703 ). Accordingly, the court held that:

"the school-grounds restriction provided in Executive Law § 259–c (14) applies either to (1) an offender serving a sentence for one of the enumerated offenses whose victim was under 18 years old, or (2) an offender serving a sentence for one of the enumerated offenses who was designated a risk level three sex offender" ( id. ).

Petitioner was not serving a sentence for an enumerated offense, and therefore the Appellate Division granted the petition to the extent of annulling that part of the Board's determination that found petitioner subject to the mandatory school grounds restriction. The Appellate Division granted respondent leave to appeal.

As the Third Department noted, in an earlier case raising the same issue, the Fourth Department reached a different conclusion as to the scope of Executive Law § 259–c (14). The Fourth Department held that the SARA-residency requirement applies in two separate circumstances: (1) where the offender about to be released is serving a sentence for an enumerated offense and the victim of the sex offense was under the age of eighteen; or (2) where the offender has been adjudicated a risk level three sex offender regardless of the underlying conviction (see People ex rel. Garcia v. Annucci, 167 A.D.3d 199, 204, 89 N.Y.S.3d 491 [4th Dept. 2018] ; see also People ex rel. Rosario v. Superintendent, Fishkill Corr. Facility, 180 A.D.3d 920, 120 N.Y.S.3d 411 [2d Dept. 2020] ).

"It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature" ( Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208, 391 N.Y.S.2d 544, 359 N.E.2d 1338 [1976] ). Generally, courts "look first to the statutory text, which is the clearest indicator of legislative intent" ( Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v. Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d 712, 721, 955 N.Y.S.2d 835, 979 N.E.2d 1162 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[W]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning" ( State of New York v. Patricia II., 6 N.Y.3d 160, 162, 811 N.Y.S.2d 289, 844 N.E.2d 743 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Anonymous v. Molik, 32 N.Y.3d 30, 37, 84 N.Y.S.3d 414, 109 N.E.3d 563 [2018] ). The plain reading of the text, and the manner in which it was amended, support the conclusion that the offender must be serving a sentence for an enumerated offense for SARA's mandatory condition to apply.⁴

The crux of the dispute over the language of Executive Law § 259–c (14) is the meaning of the phrase "such person" in the clause "such person has been designated a level three sex offender." As a rule, " ‘such’ applies to the last antecedent, unless the sense of the passage requires a different construction" ( Sims' Lessee v. Irvine, 3 Dallas [3 U.S.] 425, 444 n*, 1 L.Ed. 665 [1799] ; see Colon v. Martin, 35 N.Y.3d 75, 78–79, 125 N.Y.S.3d 346, 149 N.E.3d 39 [2020] ["the word ‘such,’ when used in a statute, must ... refer to some antecedent, and will generally be construed to refer to the last antecedent in the context"]; Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, § 18 at 146 [2012]). The parties agree that the relevant antecedent begins "a person"—the dispute is over whether the reference is to the general antecedent, "a person serving a sentence" or the particularized antecedent, "a person serving a sentence for [an enumerated offense]" ( Executive Law § 259–c [14] ; see generally University Med. Ctr. of S. Nevada v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 1197, 1199–1200 [9th Cir. 2004] ). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in a case involving a similar issue of statutory construction, "[n]o bright-line rule governs this area of the English language. ‘Such’ can refer exclusively to preceding nouns and adjectives. It can also refer to surrounding verbs, adverbial phrases or other clauses. Context is typically determinative" ( United States v. Krstic, 558 F.3d 1010, 1013 [9th Cir. 2009] ).

Reading the disputed language in context, it is clear that "such person" refers to the particularized antecedent (see Littlefield v. Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, 951 F.3d 30, 37 [1st Cir. 2020] ["Normal usage in the English language would read the word ‘such’ as referring to the entire antecedent phrase"]). The provision begins (naturally enough for one that defines the Board's authority to determine "which inmates ... serving a sentence may be released on parole") by identifying a group of offenders by the type of sentence being served ( Executive Law § 259–c [14] ). That group is further defined by additionally requiring that the victim of the crime was a minor or that the person who committed it had been designated a level three sex offender (see id. ).⁵ If the offender falls within the defined group, the Board must impose as a mandatory condition of parole "that such sentenced offender shall refrain from knowingly entering into or upon any school grounds" (id [emphasis added]). The reference to "such sentenced offender" reinforces the conclusion that the provision applies only to those serving a sentence for an enumerated offense. The natural reading of the text is consistent with the purpose of the statute, namely, to identify those offenders who pose the highest risk to children among the population of offenders being released from sentences resulting from sex crime convictions (see L 200 ch 1 [protection afforded is to prohibit offenders from "entering upon school grounds or other facilities where children are cared for"]).

The history of the statute's amendment further supports this interpretation. The mandatory school grounds condition of Executive Law § 259–c (14), when originally enacted as part of SARA in 2000, applied only to those offenders serving a sentence for an enumerated offense committed against a minor. This would include some, but certainly not all, level three sex offenders. In 2005, the...