People ex rel. Nelson v. Beu
| Decision Date | 11 May 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 30846.,30846. |
| Citation | 85 N.E.2d 829,403 Ill. 232 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. NELSON v. BEU. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from County Court, Cook County; Edmund K. Jarecki, judge.
Proceedings by the People on the relation of Louis E. Nelson, county collector, against Carl W. Beu, wherein the collector filed application for judgment and order of sale of real estate delinquent for nonpayment of general taxes of the city of Chicago, and Carl W. Beu after paying such taxes under protest filed objections. From a judgment overruling objections, the taxpayer appeals.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded with directions.
Adelbert Brown, of Chicago, for appellant.
William J. Tuohy, State's Atty., and Benjamin S. Adamowski, Corporation Counsel, both of Chicago (Joseph F. Grossman and Robert J. Nolan, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
The county court of Cook County overruled certain objections of appellant to the collector's application for judgment and order of sale of real estate delinquent for nonpayment of general taxes of the city of Chicago for the year 1945. This appeal is for the final determination of the correct amounts of such taxes paid under protest, and comes directly to this court pursuant to section 2 of article VI of the constitution of 1870, Smith-Hurd Stats.
In this court the appellant has assigned, briefed and argued eight specific alleged errors. In the lower court the appellant, (objector,) submitted proof consisting solely of public records, viz.: the county clerk's rate card, municipal ordinances and the report of the city comptroller for the year 1944. The appellee, (relator,) submitted and the court received in evidence parol testimony of the comptroller and other municipal employees. The objection of appellant that such was inadmissible to alter, explain away, or enlarge upon recordsrequired by law to be kept, was overruled.
The first assigned error alleged the relief fund levy produced $515,086 in excess of appropriation requirements. This excess was brought about, according to the appellant, because the corporate authorities did not consider the net cash of $513,327.35 in the emergency relief fund as available for 1945 relief fund appropriations. The appellant argues that the statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, chap. 24, par. 9-68) requires the comptroller to submit a tentative budget before December 1, setting forth the estimated current assets and liabilities, which he must revise within fifteen days after the beginning of the new fiscal year upon the basis of information then available. He says the city of Chicago had a policy of neglecting to revise budgets to conform with the known amount of current assets and liabilities at the beginning of the fiscal year, and that this court has held, in People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Frankenstein & Co., 396 Ill. 524, 72 N.E.2d 340;People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Bunge Brothers Coal Co., 392 Ill. 153, 64 N.E.2d 365, and other cases, where the amount of current assets and liabilities can be ascertained with certainty from the records, such known amounts cannot be over-or understated under the guise of estimates causing excessive appropriations and tax levies.
The appellant in his reply brief admits the net amount in the emergency relief fund came from the State instead of from any municipal tax, and takes refuge behind the proposition that since the comptroller's report showed it to be an available balance his statement should prevail. He says because the emergency relief cash must be devoted to the same purpose as the cash raised by taxation according to statutory requirements, and inasmuch as the latter authorizes the city to levy a relief fund tax, that net cash was an appropriable item. The State has assumed the burden of providing additional funds for relief purposes which are allocated to municipalities according to the degree of need evidenced in monthly estimates submitted to the Public Aid Commission which is the supervising agency of the State controlling the distribution and use of the emergency relief funds provided. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, chap. 23, par. 394.) This statute also forbids the allocation of State funds to any municipality which has failed to levy the maximum amount which may be raised by local taxation for local relief. It is clear the taxing authorities did not possess the right under the law to treat the restricted emergency relief fund as an appropriable item for the estimate report of the comptroller cannot in any event change a restricted fund composed of State money into municipal funds subject to appropriation to reduce the local maximum levy demanded by statute as a condition precedent to enjoying such State fund. The county court did not err in overruling this objection of the appellant.
The appellant charged error in the action of the county court in not sustaining his contentions that the cash available for 1945 corporate fund judgments was understated to the extent of $493,986 and that the levy for the judgment tax fund was excessive to the extent of producing resources in excess of requirements. The two will be consolidate for determination. These arose, according to the appellant, through the failure of the corporate authorities to consider as appropriable assets the following items ‘Liability of Sundry Warrants to Judgment Tax Fund, $217,119.83’ and ‘Liability of Sundry Warrants to Account for Paying Chicago Judgments, $493,986.63,’ making a total of $711,106.46. This was shown on the comptroller's report for December 31, 1944, wherein it was also shown that the above liabilities were those of the special assessment fund. According to this report that fund had in it, in cash, $3,173,326.80, all of which was specifically committed to the various liabilities stated including the two stated above. The county court allowed the comptroller, over the objection of the appellant, to testify to matters in respect to those two liabilities which would make the payment of them highly contingent upon the happening of events liable to be problematical and long postponed. What the comptroller testified to was not incorporated in any revision of his report. In fact no revision of the report of the comptroller would have been necessary in regard to the two liabilities of the special assessment fund to the judgment funds, for at the time he compiled that report he knew of all the facts he incorporated in his oral testimony. He cannot orally impeach his own report which he considered as a final official public record. According to that report the two items of liability were current assets available for appropriation. The appellee takes the view that the facts here and the facts in People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Siebel, 388 Ill. 98, 57 N.E.2d 378, are so similar that the holding in that case applies here to sustain the overruling of the two objections. In the Siebel case the annual budget of the Sanitary District of Chicago disclosed the corporate fund had either advanced or loaned money to the bond and interest fund. We held the amount so advanced could not be considered as a current asset available for appropriation unless the evidence shows it to be available, and such showing was not made. In the instant case the report of the comptroller showed cash was available to pay the indebtedness of the special assessment fund to the two judgment funds. The county court erred in overruling the two objections.
By objection 12a, the objector-appellant seeks to void $3,940,000 of bonds issued by the city council on February 27, 1945, to fund all outstanding judgments and interest thereon. The 1945 tax levy included $1,188,493.75 for the payment of the first installment of principal and interest of this bond issue. The appellant objects because (1) appropriations were made and also taxes were levied in 1945 to satisfy those judgments in full, authority did not exist for the issuance of these bonds and (2) the tax levy to pay the judgments in full and the tax levy to pay the bond issue installment of principal and interest constituted a double tax against the taxpayers for the same year for the same purpose.
Should all the above facts so alleged be true, the objection would be valid. The appellant states them to be a fact and the original briefs filed do not belie them. However a closer scrutiny discloses they are not all borne out by the record and that a tax levy had not been made during the year 1945 for the purpose of providing funds to pay the judgment debt for the payment of which the bonds were issued.
The total judgment debt of the city on January 1, 1945, including the interest thereon was $6,020,925.14. When broken down between the corporate purposes fund judgment and the judgment tax fund, the accounts stood as follows:
+-------------------------------------+
¦Corporate pruposes fund¦$4,039,315.64¦
+-----------------------+-------------¦
¦Judgments¦$3,374,569.96¦ ¦
+---------+-------------+-------------¦
¦Interest ¦664,745.68 ¦ ¦
+-----------------------+-------------¦
¦Judgment tax fund ¦$1,981,609.50¦
+-----------------------+-------------¦
¦Judgments¦$1,697,963.60¦ ¦
+---------+-------------+-------------¦
¦Interest ¦283,645.90 ¦ ¦
+-------------------------------------+
In disposing of objection 12a we need not consider the status of the judgment tax fund. A tax of $1,250,000 was levied in 1945 for this fund, which, when added to what we found the realizable resources to be, produced a surplus. Whether that particular levy was made is not in dispute.
The comptroller in his annual report to the city council for the year ending December 31, 1944, purported to state the corporate purposes fund balance sheet and therein struck a balance between current assets and current liabilities. The city council in estimate number 1 of par A of the appropriation ordinance for 1945,...
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