People ex rel. Nordlund v. S. B. A. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 March 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39558,39558
• Citation: 34 Ill.2d 373,215 N.E.2d 233
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. Leland J. NORDLUND, County Collector, Appellant, v. S. B. A. COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 233

215 N.E.2d 233

34 Ill.2d 373

The PEOPLE ex rel. Leland J. NORDLUND, CountyCollector, Appellant, v.S. B. A. COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 39558.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 24, 1966.

William R. Nash, State's Atty., Rockford (William H. Gates, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for appellant.

Pedderson, Menzimer, Conde & Stoner, Rockford (L. W. Menzimer, Rockford, of counsel), for appellee.

SOLFISBURG, Justice.

This case arises on an application of the county treasurer and ex-officio county collector of Winnebago County for judgment for delinquent taxes assessed for the year 1963, filed in the Winnebago County division of the circuit court of the 17th Judicial Circuit, and for the adjudication of the objections filed and claims for refund of taxes paid under protest on the basis that the property was so excessively overvalued as to amount to constructive fraud.

The defendant, S.B.A. Company, the owner of two pieces of real estate referred to as tract I and tract II, objected to their assessment and sought a refund of taxes paid under protest.After a hearing the trial court reduced the assessments, and ordered a partial refund to the defendant.The collector appeals this order directly to this court because the case involves the revenue.

The two tracts involved are situated in Rockford.Tract I is occupied by a concrete and stell warehouse building built in 1949, containing 47,100 square feet.In 1963 the original assessment of $126,230 was reduced by the board of review to $110,230.It is agreed that assessments in Winnebago County are based on 60% of fair market value, and therefore the final assessment was based upon a full value of approximately $183,700.

An officer of the defendant thought the property was worth $104,000 in 1963 with a reproduction cost of $170,000.William Franzen, a qualified appraiser testified for defendant that in his opinion the full fair cash market value of tract I was $173,500.

As to tract II the property was assessed by the assessor at $48,330 and reduced by the board of review after hearing to $34,500.Defendant's only qualified expert, Franzen, was of the opinion that the fair cash market value of tract II was $43,000.Deputy assessor Wood testified that the reproduction cost of the building on tract II was $110,000 and the fair cash market value was $57,000.

The trial court, after hearing, sustained the defendant's objections on the ground of constructive fraud, found that the assessed value of tract I should be $106,110, and should be $28,700 for tract II, and ordered tax refunds of $137.03 on tract I and $192.91 on tract II.

In summary the difference of opinion as to assessed value and full value are as follows:

                  Tract I
                                         Assessed  Appraised
                                          Value      Value
                Board of Review ........ $110,230  $183,700
                Trial Court ............  106,110   177,000
                Defendant's Appraiser ..  104,100   173,500
                                 Tract II
                Board of Review ........ $ 34,500  $ 57,500
                Trial Court ............   28,700    47,800
                Defendant's Appraiser ..   25,800    43,000
                

The collector's theory is that the court cannot be an assessing officer; that the objectors did not prove actual or constructive fraud by clear and convincing evidence that the assessed value of property may not be impeached merely because of a difference of opinion as to value between the assessing officer and the court; and that an assessment is not fraudulent merely because it is excessive, if the assessor has acted from proper motives.

The defendant taxpayer argues that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding of constructive fraud, and to deny a taxpayer judicial review of his assessment deprives him of due process of law.

We have consistently held that the taxation of property is a legislative rather than a judicial function, and under section 1 of article IX of the Illinois constitution, S.H.A., the courts, in the absence of fraud, have no power to review or determine the value of property fixed for purposes of taxation by the appropriate elected or appointed administrative officers.People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans, 31 Ill.2d 477, 202 N.E.2d 543;People ex rel. Callahan v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co., 8 Ill.2d 66, 132 N.E.2d 544;People ex rel. Tedrick v. Allied Oil Corporation, 388 Ill. 219, 57 N.E.2d 859;Spencer & Gardner v. People, 68 Ill. 510.

We know of no authority, and none has been cited to us, which suggests that it is a deprivation of due process to attribute such finality to administrative determination of assessments where there is a clear method for the taxpayer to attack an assessment on the basis of actual or constructive fraud.People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans, 31 Ill.2d 477, 479, 202 N.E.2d 543;People ex rel. Rhodes v. Turk, 391 Ill. 424, 63 N.E.2d 513.

We are also unconvinced...