People ex rel. Pauls v. District Court of Elbert County

• Decision Date: 03 May 1909
• Citation: 46 Colo. 1,101 P. 777
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. PAULS et al. v. DISTRICT COURT OF ELBERT COUNTY et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

101 P. 777

46 Colo. 1

PEOPLE ex rel. PAULS et al. v. DISTRICT COURT OF ELBERT COUNTY et al.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

May 3, 1909

Prohibition by the People, on the relation of Emile Pauls and another against the District Court of Elbert County and another.Writ made permanent.

B. C. Hilliard, for petitioners.

Henry Trowbridge, for respondents.

BAILEY J.

This is an original application for a writ of prohibition against the district court of the Fourth judicial district, and the Honorable John W. Sheafor, one of the judges thereof, from proceeding further in an injunction suit there pending wherein the relator Pauls has been enjoined from acting as a county commissioner of Elbert county.Upon the petition filed an alternative writ to show cause issued, to which by way of return the respondent judge interposed an answer and a supplemental answer, and upon the demurrers of the relators to these answers the application is submitted.

The undisputed facts disclosed by the record here are substantially these: One Oloff Olson had been for four years prior to the 11th day of January last one of the commissioners of Elbert county.At midnight of that day his term of office expired by limitation, as did also that of one Horace E. Brooks, another member of said board, who, however was elected and duly qualified to succeed himself.The relator Emile Pauls was chosen to succeed Olson as county commissioner at the general election held in November, 1908 as officially declared by the regular canvassing board, and received his formal certificate to that effect on the 13th day of said November month.On December 10th next thereafter he took the oath of office prescribed by law, and on the 15th day of said last-mentioned month lodged in the office of the county clerk of said Elbert county his official bond, which had been theretofore, and on the 11th day of said December, duly approved by the Honorable John W. Sheafor, one of the judges of the judicial district in which said Elbert county is located, and respondent here.The relator Emile Pauls, in conjunction with the relator Brazelton, who is a duly qualified and acting county commissioner of said Elbert county, met as such board on February 1st of this year, elected the relator Pauls chairman thereof, otherwise organized the same, and transacted much county business, adjourning said February 1st meeting until the 15th day of March following.That said commissioner Brooks refuses to recognize the relator Pauls as a county commissioner, and is doing and attempting to do the public business of said county in conjunction with said Olson, claiming to constitute a quorum of said board.That the commissioner Brazelton refuses to recognize said Olson as a county commissioner, and refuses to act with Commissioner Brooks in conjunction with said Olson in transacting county business.On March 13, 1909, at the suit of said Olson and said Brooks, the respondent enjoined these relators from holding the proposed March 15th meeting, and on the 27th day of the same month further temporarily restrained the relator Pauls from doing or attempting to do any act purporting to be an act of a county commissioner of Elbert county, and the two relators, Brazelton and Pauls, and each of them, from taking possession of the office of the said board and further acting as a board or quorum of a board of county commissioners of said Elbert county, and from doing or attempting to do any act as a board of county commissioners of said county.

On this state of facts, the district court is without jurisdiction in equity.The relator Pauls is already in office, and has begun the actual discharge of the duties imposed upon him by virtue thereof.When Pauls had duly qualified and the hour of midnight on January 11, 1909, had come, Olson was unconditionally out as a county commissioner, and by no process could he be rehabilitated in office.On a like state of facts this court in People ex rel. Williams v. Ried, 11 Colo. 140, 17 P. 302, unequivocally so held.If this be true, then the respondent judge was and is without power or authority to disturb or interfere with him by injunction in the discharge of the duties which devolve upon him in his official capacity.On the other hand, if upon any possible theory, and we confess to being unable to discover one even of plausibility, it is claimed that Pauls is out of office and Olson in, then the respondent judge was equally without jurisdiction, because such contention involves the question of title or right to the office, which may not lawfully be determined in an equitable action.

Upon an application identical with this, involving similar facts and precisely the same office, the court in People ex rel. HinckleyandOthers v. District Court of Lake County, Owers, Judge, 29 Colo. 277, 68 P. 224, 93 Am.St.Rep. 61, speaking through Mr. Justice Campbell, then Chief Justice, said:

'The only question here is whether the district court has jurisdiction in the action there pending to hear and determine the questions in issue; for, if such jurisdiction exists, it had, and has, the power to make a wrong, as well as a right, decision.The inquiry, then, is not whether the plaintiff or the opposing claimant has the better right to the office in dispute, with that we have nothing to do, but it is: May the title or right to a public office be determined by injunction?

'The mere statement of the case shows that the district court in the character of action before it was entirely without jurisdiction in what it has already done, and also lacks the power to decide the question which the plaintiff really seeks to have adjudicated.While plaintiff Quinn protests that he is not endeavoring to have the title to the office which he claims determined in that proceeding, yet in the very nature of things the district court could not take a step in the case without entering upon an investigation of that very question.That a court of equity has not jurisdiction to try a disputed title to a public office is too clear for argument.That determination can be made only in an action in the nature of quo warranto, or in an election contest, as prescribed by statute.What must the district court necessarily decide before it can grant even a temporary writ?Certainly, it must investigate and determine either as a matter of fact or law that at least a prima facie case of the right to the office is shown to be in the plaintiff.To this extent, therefore, there would be a decision that he had the better right to the office, and upon a final hearing, either upon a demurrer to the complaint, or upon a trial of the facts if the issue upon them is made, the court, before it can issue a permanent injunction, must necessarily hold that the plaintiff's title is superior to that of his adversary.This cannot be done in an equitable action.'

To be sure, the respondent here disclaims, as did the plaintiff in that case, any intention to determine the right to the office in dispute, but, protest as he may, what is the effect of his injunctive writ, except to place into office the man Olson, who, upon the undisputed facts, has neither right to nor claim upon it either de jure or de facto, and to enjoin out of the office the relator Pauls, who again upon the undisputed facts has been duly elected thereto, has received the proper certificate to that end, and has taken the prescribed oath and possession of the office, having first given the required bond, duly approved by the authorized authority, which authority happens in this case strangely enough to be identical with that which now seeks to enjoin him out.

It is keenly to be regretted, in the light of the authority of the Hinckley Case, supra, supported by such sound reasons, so lucidly and luminously stated, that trial courts still decline to apprehend and follow it, but persist in undertaking to adjudicate these questions in equitable suits, making applications like this one not only possible, but absolutely necessary for public protection, to the hindrance, annoyance, and humiliation of all concerned.Upon a consideration of the admitted facts only, and it manifestly is the duty and right of the court to consider such facts, wherever they appear in the pleadings and proceedings, we find no difficulty whatever in reaching the confident conclusion that the district court was and is without jurisdiction to issue any restraining order in the case below, or to go further with it.

It is contended by counsel for respondent that, even if there is no jurisdiction in the district court to issue and maintain the injunction in question, in no event, should the writ of prohibition issue under the practice and decisions of this court.

In the case of People ex rel. Alexander and Others v. District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Dixon, Judge, 29 Colo. 208, 68 P. 251, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Gabbert, most aptly says:

'The people of the state by constitutional provision have vested this court with the authority to issue extraordinary remedial writs.One object of this was to provide a remedy whereby questions publici juris could be speedily determined by the highest court of the commonwealth.The writ of prohibition is not one of right, but may issue in extraordinary cases in the exercise of a sound discretion, and we must be governed by the exigencies of each particular case.'

Thus it will be seen that this court is to be governed, in the issuance of this extraordinary writ, by the circumstances and conditions of each particular case.No inflexible rule can be made to fit every emergency.Each case must rest upon its own peculiar facts, and the court should be guided, in the exercise of its discretion, by the needs and deserts...