People ex rel. Pollastrini v. Whealan
| Decision Date | 21 October 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 21926.,21926. |
| Citation | 187 N.E. 491,353 Ill. 500 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. POLLASTRINI v. WHEALAN et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Thomas Taylor, Judge.
Petition by the People, on the relation of Mario Pollastrini, for a writ of mandamus to be directed to Emmett Whealan and others. Judgment awarding the writ was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District, and the County of Cook brings error.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (Hayden N. Bell, Robert S. Cushman, Louis H. Geiman, and John E. Peddersen, all of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Victor Frohlich, of Chicago, for defendant in error.
The people of the state, on the relation of Mario Pollastrini, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court of Cook county against the president of the board of commissioners, the comptroller, and the treasurer of that county. The writ was sought to coerce the certification of the relator's salary as a deputy bailiff for two specific periods, the issuance of warrants therefor, and the payment of the warrants so issued. The respondents' answer was followed by a replication. Evidence was heard and the court awarded the writ commanding the respondents charged with the duty to issue warrants in accordance with the prayer of the petition. The respondents prosecuted an appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District and that court affirmed the judgment. The county of Cook, not a party to the cause, prosecutes this writ of error.
The relator, Mario Pollastrini, was employed as a deputy bailiff in the office of the sheriff of Cook county. His employment began prior to September 1, 1931, and had not been terminated when this suit was instituted on March 22, 1932. The fiscal year of the county of Cook begins on the first Monday of December and ends on the Sunday preceding the first Monday of December of the succeeding year. The salary of the relator for the fiscal year beginning on the first Monday of December, 1930, was fixed at $180 per month, payable in semimonthly installments of $90 each. The annual appropriation bill for the same fiscal year was passed by the board of commissioners of Cook county within the first quarter of that year and included the relator's salary at the rate specified. Section 4 of this appropriation bill provided that the salaries or rates of compensation of all officers and employees of the county, when not otherwise provided by law, should be in accordance with those fixed in the resolutions theretofore adopted by the board of commissioners and should not be changed during the year for which the appropriations were made. Oh June 29, 1931, after the appropriation bill had become effective, the board of commissioners adopted a resolution requiring every officer and employee of the county to take a vacation of not less than two weeks and to forego his salary or compensation during that period. The relator did not observe the provisions of the resolution but continued to perform his duties without interruption. His salary for the first half of September, 1931, amounting to $90, was withheld, and upon his demand, payment of the semimonthly installment was refused.
For the fiscal year beginning on the first Monday of December, 1931, the salary of every deputy bailiff in the sheriff's office, of the relator's class or grade, was fixed at $146.88 per month. The board of commissioners, by the annual appropriation bill, which was passed on March 5, 1932, and published in a Chicago newspaper seven days later, made provision for the relator's salary at this rate. The bill or ordinance, in its first section, is expressly declared to be the ‘annual appropriation bill of the county of Cook for the current fiscal year commencing on the first Monday of December, A. D. 1931.’ The fourth section contains the same prohibition as the preceding annual appropriation bill against a change in salary or rate of compensation during the year for which the appropriations are made. The relator demanded a salary at the rate of $180, instead of $146.88, per month for the period from the first Monday of December, 1931, the beginning of the fiscal year, to March 13, 1932, the day after the annual appropriation bill was published, and payment at the higher rate was refused. To compel compliance with his two demands, the relator filed his petition for a writ of mandamus.
At the threshold of our inquiry, the question of the right of the county of Cook to prosecute this writ of error is presented. The county was not a party to this cause in the circuit or Appellate Court. The right of appeal, which is statutory, is given only to parties. A writ of error is not so limited in its application. It is the beginning of a new suit for the correction of errors of inferior courts and may be prosecuted as a matter of right in all civil cases by any person who is either a party or privy to the record, or is damaged by the judgment, or will be benefited by its reversal, or is competent to release error. Anderson v. Steger, 173 Ill. 112, 50 N. E. 665;People v. O'Connell, 252 Ill. 304, 96 N. E. 1008;People v. Harrigan's Estate, 294 Ill. 171, 128 N. E. 334. The judgment rendered by the trial court requires the issuance of warrants for the salary claimed. These warrants, if sustainable, must necessarily be satisfied out of the county's funds. Manifestly, the county will be benefited by a reversal of the judgment. The county of Cook therefore has the right to prosecute a writ of error for a review of the record; and since a construction of a provision of the Constitution is invoked, the writ of error was properly sued out of this court.
Section 7 of article 10 of the Constitution provides that: ‘The county affairs of Cook county shall be managed by a board of commissioners of fifteen persons, ten of whom shall be elected from the city of Chicago, and five from towns outside of said city, in such manner as may be providedby law.’ By section 9 of the same article, it is provided that the number of the deputies and assistants of the clerks of all the courts of record, the treasurer, sheriff, coroner, and recorder of deeds of Cook county ‘shall be determined by rule of the circuit court, to be entered of record, and their compensation shall be determined by the county board.’ Section 61 of the act entitled ‘An Act to revise the law in relation to counties' (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 34, § 64, Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 34, par. 66) applies only to Cook county. The ninth subsection provides that: ‘The salaries or rate of compensation of all officers and employees of said county, when not otherwise provided by law, shall be fixed by the board of commissioners and shall be fixed prior to the adoption of the annual appropriation, and shall not be changed during the year for which the appropriation is made.’ The fourth section of the annual appropriation bill for the fiscal year beginning on the first Monday of December, 1930, repeats the foregoing provision of subsection 9 of section 61, prohibiting changes in salaries or rates of compensation during the period specified.
The Constitution vests the management of the county affairs of Cook county in a board of commissioners. This general provision, however, does not confer unrestricted power in the conduct, management, or supervision of the several county offices. The number of deputies and assistants in the county offices enumerated in section 9 of article 10 of the Constitution is determined, not by the board, but by ‘rule of the circuit court.’ The express power constitutionally conferred upon the board of commissioners respecting such deputies and assistants is to fix their compensation. When that duty is performed in any given year, a change in the salary or rate of compensation during the year for which the appropriation is made is forbidden by statute. The legislative purpose not to...
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