People ex rel. Radium Dial Co. v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 15 June 1939
• Docket Number: No. 24935.,24935.
• Citation: 21 N.E.2d 749,371 Ill. 597
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. RADIUM DIAL CO. v. RYAN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

371 Ill. 597

21 N.E.2d 749

PEOPLE ex rel. RADIUM DIAL CO.

v.RYAN.

No. 24935.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 15, 1939.

Original proceeding by the People, on the relation of the Radium Dial Company, for a writ of mandamus requiring Edward T. Ryan, clerk of the Circuit Court of LaSalle County, to issue a writ of certiorari and writs of scire facias to review an award of compensation by the Industrial Commission to Catherine Wolfe Donohue, employee, without the giving of a bond by relator.

Writ denied.Duncan & O'Conor, of Ottawa, and Moses, Kennedy, Stein & Bachrach, of Chicago (Andrew J. O'Conor, of Ottawa, and Walter Bachrach and Arthur Magid, both of Chicago, of counsel), for petitioner.

Taylor E. Wilhelm, State's Atty., of Ottawa, and Leonard J. Grossman, of Chicago, for respondent.

GUNN, Justice.

The Radium Dial Company, a corporation, filed its petition in this court for a writ of mandamus against Edward T. Ryan, clerk of the circuit court of LaSalle county, for the purpose of requiring him to issue a writ of certiorari and writs of scire facias to review the award of the Industrial Commission without giving a bond, as required by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Smith-Hurd Stats. c. 48, § 156(f)(2); State Bar Stat.1935, chap. 48, par. 219(f)(2).

Catherine Wolfe Donohue brought a proceeding against the relator under the Occupational Diseases Act of 1911, as amended (Smith-Hurd Stats. c. 48, § 87; State Bar Stat.1935, chap. 48, par. 199), for disablement alleged to have been caused by radium poisoning, and on July 6, 1938, an award was made by the arbitrator and confirmed by the commission. The total amount found to be owing at the time of the hearing was $5661. The commission, in its decision and award, fixed the amount of the bond to be filed in the circuit court for the review by certiorari at the sum of $10,000. The relator paid the costs of the transcript, as required by law, and filed a praecipe with the clerk for writs of certiorari and scire facias to review the award, but did not offer a bond in the sum of $10,000, to be approved by the clerk of the court, as required by the statute above cited. The clerk refused to issue the writ without the giving of a bond as so required. The relator then filed a petition in the circuit court to require the said clerk of the circuit court, respondent herein, to accept the record and issue the said writs without the giving of the bond provided by statute. This petition was denied. The present petition is filed in this court for the purpose of compelling the respondent to issue the said writs without the giving of bond, so that the said cause may be reviewed by the circuit court of LaSalle county in the manner above provided by the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act.

The relator alleges that it is unable to give a bond, or has been unable to get security, and that there are a number of other cases of like kind pending against it and that the arbitrator and the commission proceeded without jurisdiction to enter the award, because, it is claimed, Catherine Donohue terminated her employment with relator in August, 1931, and because the decision of the commission shows that she suffered disability from occupational disease on April 25, 1934. The legality of the proceedings before the arbitrator and the Industrial Commission could have been reviewed in the manner provided by statute, and such question decided by the circuit court, had the relator furnished the bond required by law. The relator contends no bond should be required, on the theory that the commission was wholly without jurisdiction to make the award, and that to refuse a review of a void proceeding, unless bond is given, would deprive the relator of the constitutional right of a judicial review of the actions of an administrative board.

The question presented is whether an award of the Industrial Commission, claimed to be void for want of jurisdiction, may be reviewed by the circuit court in the manner provided by statute, without the employer giving bond-not that there is no judicial review provided by law.

The provision of the Occupational Diseases Act (Smith-Hurd Stats. c. 48, § 87(b)(4); State Bar Stat.1935, chap. 48, par. 199(b)(4) has been construed to include within the Occupational Diseases Act all the applicable provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Zurich Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 331 Ill. 576, 163 N.E. 466;Raymond v. Industrial Comm., 354 Ill. 586, 188 N.E. 861. The Workmen's Compensation Act provides that any employer coming under the provisions of the act shall file a sworn statement of his financial condition satisfactory to the commission, or furnish security guaranting the payment by the employer of the compensation authorized by the act, or he must insure his liability to pay compensation in some insurance carrier satisfactory to the Industrial Commission. (Smith-Hurd Stats. c. 48, § 163; State Bar Stat.1935, chap. 48, par. 226.) Failure to comply with these requirements constitutes a misdemeanor punishable with a fine of not less than $100 or more than $500 for each day of such neglect or refusal (par. 226) and unreasonable delay in the payment of compensation authorizes a penalty equal to fifty percent of the amount of the award. (par. 219(k). When an award becomes final and it is not paid, provision is made for having a judgment entered against the employer in the circuit court, including costs and attorneys' fees, which, unless set aside, shall have the same effect as though rendered in an action tried and determined in the circuit court. (par. 219(g). All of these provisions become a part of the act relating to occupational diseases by reference and, in effect, become conditions under which such an employer may be business.

The Workmen's Compensation Act has been held a reasonable exercise of police power (Zurich Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra); that it does not violate the guaranty of a jury trial (Grand Trunk Western Railway Co. v. Industrial Comm., 291 Ill. 167, 125 N.E. 748); is not arbitrary or wanting in uniformity (Marshall Field & Co. v. Industrial Comm., 285 Ill. 333, 120 N.E. 773); is not class legislation (Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 77, 115 N.E. 822) that, when accepted, it becomes a binding, legal contract and no constitutional rights are violated by its enforcement (Keeran v. Peoria, Bloomington & Champaign Traction Co., 277 Ill. 413, 115 N.E. 636); and that it does not impair the freedom of contract. Chicago Railways Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 112, 114 N.E. 534. It is thus seen that it complies with substantially all constitutional requirements applicable. It should be liberally construed (Scholl v. Industrial Comm., 366 Ill. 588, 10 N.E.2d 360, 112 A.L.R. 1254) and all provisions must be construed as a whole and read together to determine the legislative intent. Illinois Zinc Co. v. Industrial Comm., 366 Ill. 480, 9 N.E.2d 212. No reason is suggested why the provisions of the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act, which are similar to those of the Workmen's Compensation Act, except in so far as the subject matter itself requires difference, should not receive the same construction, especially when the act is to be administered by the Industrial Commission.

No cases have been cited which go to the extent that to require a bond to review an award or other action of an administrative board deprives one of any rights under the State of Federal Constitutions. On the contrary, where a review of an administrative order is granted by law, or where an ineffective appeal may be disastrous, many conditions precedent which might be deemed harsh have been upheld as not in violation of the constitution.

A number of cases are cited by the relator, which do not control the present situation. Courter v. Simpson Construction Co., 264 Ill. 488, 106 N.E. 350, simply held that the common law writ of certiorari applied to compensation cases if no proper remedy for a judicial review was provided. Otis Elevator Co. v. Industrial Comm., 302 Ill. 90, 134 N.E. 19;Commerce Comm. v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., 309 Ill. 165, 140 N.E. 868, and Illinois Commerce Comm. v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railway Co., 332 Ill. 243, 163 N.E. 664, go no further than to lay down the familiar rule that due process of law...