People ex rel. Rhodes v. Miller

• Decision Date: 23 January 1946
• Docket Number: No. 29076.,29076.
• Citation: 392 Ill. 445,64 N.E.2d 869
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. RHODES, County Collector, v. MILLER et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

392 Ill. 445

64 N.E.2d 869

PEOPLE ex rel. RHODES, CountyCollector,

v.MILLER et al.

No. 29076.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 23, 1946.

Appeal from Will County Court; Fred R. Adams, Judge.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Ivan R. Rhodes, County Collector, against Agnes Miller and others, on application for judgment against properties for school taxes levied, wherein the New York Central Railroad Company and others filed objections and the cases were consolidated for hearing.From an order entered in each case overruling the objections, the objecting parties appeal.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Donovan, Bray & Gray and Barr & Barr, all of Joliet, for appellants.

James E. Burke, State's Atty., of Joliet (John C. Cowing, of Joliet, of counsel), for appellee.

THOMPSON, Chief Justice.

The county collector of Will county applied for judgment against the properties of the appellants, New York Central Railroad Company, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, Henry A. Scandreet, Walter J. Cummings and George I. Haight, trustees of the property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, the Alton Railroad Company, Henry A. Gardner, trustee of the Alton Railroad Company, the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company, Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, and Joliet Union Depot Company, for certain school taxes levied in 1943 and paid by appellants under protest.The appellants filed separate objections.They severally objected to the taxes levied for educational purposes by School DistrictsNos. 86 and 204 in excess of $1 on each $100 assessed valuation.The Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company and the trustees of its property also objected to that part of the taxes for educational purposes levied by School DistrictNo. 202 in excess of $1 per $100 assessed valuation.The cases were consolidated for hearing in the county court, and this appeal is from an order entered in each case overruling the objections filed therein.

School DistrictNo. 86, in 1943, levied for educational purposes a tax rate of $1.2883 per $100 assessed valuation;School DistrictNo. 204 a rate of $1.19; and School DistrictNo. 202 a rate of $1.47.Appellants' objections to the taxes in each of the school districts are that the statutory limit of the rate for educational purposes in 1943 was $1, unless a greater rate had been authorized by a vote of the district; that a special election was held in district 86 on May 25, 1929, purporting to authorize an increase in such rate to $1.25, and another special election held on May 23, 1942, at which said rate was purportedly increaed to $1.30; that on November 20, 1937, District 204 held an election to increase the rate of educational purposes to $1.25; and that a special election was held in DistrictNo. 202 on May 1, 1937, purporting to authorize an increase in the educational rate to $1.625; and that said elections and each of them were invalied and did not legally authorize an increase in the tax rates above the statutory limit of $1, as the ballots used were not in the form required by the statute.

There is no dispute as to the facts.The ballots used at each election are substantially in the same form in all material respects.The voters were required in each instance to vote for or against the proposition to authorize the levy of an annual tax for educational purposes at the specified increaed rate.None of the ballots complied with the mandatory requirements of section 16 of the former Ballot Law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, chap. 46, par. 305), now section (7 of article 16 of the Election Code of 1943(Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, chap. 46, par. 16-7).The elections were therefore invalid for want of a proper ballot and did not authorize the additional rates.People ex rel. De Rosa v. Chicago and North Western Railway Co.391 Ill. 145, 62 N.E.2d 460;People ex rel. Henry v. New York Central Railroad Lines, 381 Ill. 490, 45 N.E.2d 860.

Appellants' original brief and argument in this court is devoted exclusively to their contention that the ballots employed in the elections were in such form that the elections vested no authority in the school districts to levy taxes for educational purposes at a rate in excess of $1 per $100 of assessed valuation.Appellee does not specifically admit that these elections were invalid, but such admission appears in appellee's failure to answer this point in his brief and argument.He does not attempt to sustain the tax objected in in School DistrictsNos. 86 and 204; but it is his contention that the taxes objected to in School DistrictNo. 202 are valid and should be sustained because levied subsequent to the effective date of a curative act passed by the legislature in 1943. IllRev.Stat.1943, chap. 122, par. 407.2.By this curative act, which is entitled ‘An Act to validate ballots used in submitting special propositions at school elections,’ it was provided that where in any school district, prior to the time the act became effective, a majority of the legal voters voting on the proposition to increase the tax rate or tax rates have voted in favor of each proposition at an election duly called and held for such purpose and the ballot used to vote upon each such proposition at said election was not in the form as set out in the statute, but the ballot used was in such form that voters could clearly understand the proposition or proposidtions being voted upon and gave each voter an opportunity to vote for or against each proposition, then each such ballot was validated and made legal and the use thereof at such elections legalized with like effect as though the ballots so used were in the statutory form.It was held in People ex rel. De Rosa v. Chicago and North Western Railway Co.391 Ill. 145, 62 N.E.2d 460, that this curative act cannot validate a levy made before the act became effective.The levies in School DistrictsNos. 86 and 204 were each made prior to the effective date of the curative act, and appellee specifically limits his application of the act to the election held in School DistrictNo. 202.This narrows the issues presented on this appeal to the single question as to whether the curative act, which became effective July 17, 1943, validated the election in School DistrictNo. 202 and authorized the levy of $1.47 for educational purposes made by the district on August 20, 1943.

It is argued by appellee that the legislature can validate anything which it might have authorized in advance, and since the legislature had the power to fix the limit of tax rate in school districts and also the power to prescribe the ballot to be used at elections voting upon the proposition to increase the rate...