People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham
| Decision Date | 29 September 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 47402,47402 |
| Citation | 336 N.E.2d 1,61 Ill.2d 353 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE ex rel. Robert H. RICE, State's Attorney, Petitioner, v. Joseph F. CUNNINGHAM et al. Judges, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, Robert H. Rice, State's Atty., Belleville , for petitioner.
Theodore A. Gottfried, Springfield (Stephen P. Hurley, Mt. Vernon, Robert E. Davison, Springfield, Michael J. Rosborough, Mount Vernon, Joshua Sachs, Elgin, and Richard Wilson, Springfield, of counsel), for respondents.
We granted leave to petitioner, the State's Attorney of St. Clair County (hereinafter the State), to file an original action for Mandamus (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110A, par. 381(a)) seeking to compel respondents, three judges of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, to convene as a panel and hear evidence on the circumstances involved in the commission of multiple murders of which additional respondents, Daniel Lee Lott and Willie B. Cotton, had been found guilty following a jury trial. The principal respondents in this action are Lott and Cotton, since under the circumstances the respondent judges are merely nominal parties. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110A, par. 381(d).) We are advised that evidence was presented at trial to indicate that the murders occurred during the course of an armed robbery. The purpose of convening the three-judge panel was to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005--8--1A.
Following the jury trial, the State filed a motion requesting that a three-judge panel be assigned to the case and that a hearing be held to determine the applicability of the death penalty. The trial judge notified the chief judge of the circuit that a three-judge panel should be convened. The defendants filed separate motions in opposition to the convening of the panel and maintained that the provisions of the death penalty statute were violative of the State and Federal constitutions.
The three-judge panel convened, and on March 13, 1975, issued the following order:
'The Court finds that the statute 1005--8--1A is invalid under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Illinois, and assigns the following reasons:
(1) That the creation of a special three-judge panel is an attempted exercise of judicial authority by the Legislative branch. The sole power to create courts lies in the judiciary.
(2) The statute and the procedures of 1005--8--1A are so vague that they fail to set proper standards by which a court can sentence a defendant to the death penalty.
(3) We find that the statute does not violate Article I, Section 11 of the Illinois State Constitution.
For the above-stated reasons we declare this section invalid and order this to be in the form of a declaratory judgment, and the panel hereby remands the defendants to the trial judge for sentencing pursuant to statute.'
The imposition of sentences as ordered by the three-judge panel has been stayed pending disposition of this action.
Respondents maintain that Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and that the State improperly seeks to use it for the purpose of an interlocutory appeal. We have held in comparable circumstances, however, that, under its supervisory and administrative powers and duties as provided in the Constitution, this court may consider the issuance of a writ of Mandamus when the matters involved are of a compelling and general importance, even though the normal criteria for awarding such a writ are not present. People ex rel. Carey v. Strayhorn, 61 Ill.2d 85, 89, 329 N.E.2d 194; People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Power, 54 Ill.2d 154, 157, 295 N.E.2d 472.
The death penalty statute provides:
'In any case in which the defendant is convicted of murder, the State shall seek imposition of the death penalty in all cases where any of the following circumstances obtain:
(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the course of performing his official duties; or
(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or its successor agency, killed in the course of performing his official duties, or was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or
(3) such person has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under Section 9--1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, or under any law of the United States or of any State which is substantially identical to Subsection (a) of Section 9--1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts; or
(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; or
(5) the person committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder; or
(6) the murdered individual was killed in the course of a robbery, rape, aggravated kidnapping, arson or when death occurs following the commission of indecent liberties with a child by a party to the crime;
where any of the above circumstances exist, following the conviction of murder under Section 9--1 of the 'Criminal Code of 1961,' the trial judge shall in all cases, before sentencing the defendant notify the chief judge of the circuit to assign 3 circuit judges to the case, one of whom should be the judge who presided over the defendant's trial if that judge is able to serve. The 3 judge court shall then hear evidence on the foregoing circumstances and if a majority of the judges of such court determines that any of the above facts occurred, then the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless a majority of the judges of such court determines that there are compelling reasons for mercy and that the defendant should not be sentenced to death. At the hearing, the State shall have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the facts requiring imposition of the death penalty.
If the 3 judge court does not find as provided in this Section, after a hearing, that the defendant committed a murder which is beyond all reasonable doubt within one or more of the classifications set forth in this Section, the defendant shall be sentenced under Section 5--5--3 of the Unified Code of Corrections.
If the 3 judge court sentences the defendant to death and an appeal is taken by the defendant, the appellate court shall consider the appeal in two separate stages. In the first stage, the case shall be considered as are all other criminal appeals and the court shall determine whether there were errors occurring at the trial of the case which require that the findings of the trial court be reversed or modified. If the appellate court finds there were no errors justifying modification or reversal of the findings of the trial court, the appellate court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the sentence of death by the 3 judge court was the result of discrimination. If the appellate court, in the second stage of the appeal, finds any evidence that the sentence of death was the result of discrimination, the appellate court shall modify the sentence to life imprisonment.
In determining whether there is evidence of discrimination in sentencing the defendant to death, the appellate court shall consider whether the death sentence, considering both the crime and the defendant was disproportionate or the result of discrimination based on race, creed, sex or economic status.
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for any indeterminate term with a minimum of not less that 14 years.
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the sentencing provisions of this Section is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death shall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence such person to imprisonment in the penitentiary for any indeterminate term with a minimum of not less than 14 years.
No sentence of death imposed under this Section shall be executed unless there has been a final adjudication that the sentence is constitutional. For purposes of this Section, 'final adjudication' means the completion of the ordinary appellate process in a single case and does not contemplate the exhaustion of all available remedies.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005--8--1A.
The State contends that the provision for a three-judge panel is merely a procedural requirement for application of the death penalty and does not effect the creation of a special court. The State argues that the legislature has inherent power to establish rules of procedure governing civil and criminal cases subject only to two limitations. The first is an express constitutional prohibition against legislative rulemaking, as exemplified by the constitutional provision stating that the Supreme Court shall provide by rule for direct appeal from the circuit court (Ill.Const. (1970), art. VI, sec. 4(b)). The second limitation derives from the principle of separation of powers which prohibits legislative interference with an inherent judicial function. Respondents maintain that the...
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