People ex rel. Ross v. Chicago, M., St. P.&P.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 November 1942
• Docket Number: No. 26726.,26726.
• Citation: 381 Ill. 58,44 N.E.2d 566
• Parties: PEOPLE et rel. ROSS, County Collector, v. CHICAGO, M., ST. P. & P. R. CO. et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

381 Ill. 58

44 N.E.2d 566

PEOPLE et rel. ROSS, County Collector,

v.CHICAGO, M., ST. P. & P. R. CO. et al.

No. 26726.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 21, 1942.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 12, 1942.

Proceeding for judgment for delinquent taxes by the People on the relation of Lula M. Ross, County Collector of Carroll county against the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded with directions.Appeal from Carroll County Court; Orion M. Grove, Judge.

M. L. Bluhm, and R. W. Spangenberg, both of Chicago, and John D. Turnbough, of Mt. Carroll, for appellants.

J. L. Brearton, State Atty., of Savanna, for appellee.

SMITH, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Carroll county, overruling objections of appellants to judgment for delinquent taxes for the year 1939. There are two objections involved on this appeal. The first relates to the equalized value of the property of appellants in the county and the debasing factor used by the Tax Commission in arriving at the equalized assessed valuation of appellants' property. The second objection relates to certain items included in the levy for general county purposes.

The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts. The full value of appellants' property throughout the State was found and fixed by the Tax Commission in accordance with the plan adopted and followed by the commission in the case of Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State Tax Commission, 374 Ill. 75, 28 N.E.2d 100. The commission then determined that the full value of appellants' property in Carroll county for the year 1939 was $3,837,302. No question is raised as to the action of the Tax Commission in fixing the full value of the property, nor in the allocation or apportionment of such value to appellants' properties located in Carroll county.

Having found the full value of the property by this method, the commission then determined that the average equalized assessed value of all property throughout the State, for the year 1939, was 35 per cent of the total full value of the property assessed, as fixed by the various local assessing authorities. The commission further found that the assessed value of all property in Carroll county for said year, as fixed by the local assessing officials in such county, was fifty per cent of the full value of the property assessed. In determining the equalized valuation of appellants' property, certified to the county clerk of Carroll county, the commission applied to the full assessed value, as determined by it, an equalizing factor of 50 per cent. The taxes here involved were extended on the equalized assessed valuation of 50 per cent of the full value of appellants' property, located in Carroll county, as fixed by the Tax Commission.

The parties to this case have stipulated that the Tax Commission, in assessing the property of appellants in Carroll county, and throughout the State, for the year 1939, and in equalizing the assessment thereof, proceeded in the same manner and followed the same methods followed by the commission, as set forth in the opinion in the case of Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra. Appellants paid that portion of the taxes which would have been produced had the property been equalized and assessed at 35 per cent of its full value, and objected to the taxes produced by extending the rates upon the excess over 35 per cent of the full value of the property, as fixed by the commission.

Appellee admits that under the holding of this court in Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra, the taxes extended on an equalized assessed value in excess of 35 per cent of the total value of appellants' property in the county of Carroll, as fixed by the Tax Commission, were excessive and illegal. While it is admitted that the courts have authority to set aside an entire valuation, if erroneously or improperly made, it is contended that the valuation fixed by the assessing authorities cannot be set aside in part and approved in part. It is argued that this would result in the court fixing the assessed value on which taxes are to be extended, which is beyond the power of the courts. It is further contended, that if the valuation has not been fixed according to law, by the assessing officers, then in the absence of fraud, the court cannot sustain an objection to the excess, but can only determine whether the taxing authorities have complied with the law in fixing the valuation. Appellee insists that the courts can give no relief from an excessive valuation on an application for judgment for delinquent taxes in the absence of proof of fraud in making such valuation. The contention that fraud must be alleged and proved in order to entitle a taxpayer to obtain relief from an excessive valuation on application for judgment for delinquent taxes, is correct. However, appellee misconstrues the authorities as to the proof necessary to establish fraud in such cases. The objection in this case is that the assessment of appellants' property, certified to the county clerk and on which the taxes were extended, was illegal and excessive in that the Tax Commission ‘intentionally, willfully and fraudulently, equalized said assessmenton the basis of 50 per cent of the actual full market value thereof, as found by the State Tax Commission, although at the time of making and equalizing said assessment, the said Tax Commission well knew that property in general, throughout the State of Illinois, was, for the year 1939, as well as several years prior thereto, including the year 1938, intentionally and systematically assessed by virtue of a well defined and recognized custom at a general average of not more than 35 per cent of the actual full market value thereof.’ It is further alleged that this resulted in discrimination in the assessment in violation of section 1 of article IX of the...