People ex rel. Sammons v. Hill

Decision Date08 October 1931
Docket NumberNo. 20705.,20705.
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. SAMMONS v. HILL, Warden.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Original petition by the People, on the relation of William Sammons, for a writ of habeas corpus directed to Henry Hill, Warden of the State Penitentiary, seeking the release of James Sammons.

Prisoner remanded.Everett Jennings, W. W. Smith, and Milton D. Smith, all of Chicago (Franklin J. Stransky and Michael J. Ahern, both of Chicago, of counsel), for petitioner.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., and John A. Swanson, State's Atty., and Q. J. Chott, both of Chicago (Merrill F. Wehmhoff, of Springfield, John P. Madden, of Gillespie, and J. J. Neiger, of Rock Island, of counsel), for respondent.

DE YOUNG, J.

An original petition in the name of the people of the state on the relation of William Sammons, alleging that James Sammons was illegally imprisoned in the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet and seeking his release by means of a writ of habeas corpus directed to Henry Hill, the warden and general superintendent of the penitentiary, was filed in this court. The writ was issued, the respondent made a return thereto, and the petitioner filed an answer and traverse to the return, and also a motion to discharge the prisoner from custody. The cause is submitted upon the record thus made.

On June 26, 1903, an indictment, consisting of a single count, was returned in the criminal court of Cook county, charging James Sammons, John Lynch, and Hugh Reily with the robbery of Michael Larner, while they were armed with a dangerous weapon with the intent, if resisted, to kill and main Larner. A jury trial followed, and on February 8, 1904, each of the defendants was found guilty. The verdict with respect to Sammons were as follows: We, the jury, find the defendant James Sammons guilty of robbery, in manner and form as charged in the indictment, and we the jury further find that at the time that the defendant committed the said robbery, he was armed with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and maim if resisted, in manner and form as charged in the indictment.’ On February 13, 1904, the motions of Sammons and his two codefendants for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied and each was ‘sentenced to the penitentiary of this State, at Joliet, for the crime of robbery, etc., whereof he stands convicted * * * until discharged by the State Board of Pardons as authorized and directed by law, provided such term of imprisonment in said penitentiary, shall not exceed the maximum term for the crime for which the said defendant was convicted and sentenced.’

Sammons, Lynch, and Reilly were also indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for the murder of Patrick Barrett, and on February 25, 1904, a jury found them guilty as charged, and fixed the punishment of Sammons and Lynch at death and of Reilly at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life. Judgments were rendered on the several verdicts, and the court fixed June 17, 1904, as the day on which Sammons and Lynch were to be executed. On June 16, 1904, the Governor commuted Sammons' sentence to life imprisonment in penitentiary, and on the next day, the Governor's commutation and the mittimus issued upon Sammons' conviction for robbery were delivered to the warden of the penitentiary and Sammons began his term of imprisonment on that day.

Nineteen years later, on June 20, 1923, a second commutation was granted by which the term of Sammons' imprisonment upon his conviction for murder was reduced to fifty years. The Division of Pardons and Paroies of the Department of Public Welfare, on July 23, 1923, entered an order for his temporary and conditional parole from the penitentiary, and on January 28, 1926, ordered his final discharge ‘for and on account of his conviction’ for murder. The second order was approved by the Governor and Sammons was given his liberty.

Subsequently, on November 26, 1930, the Division of Pardons and Paroles entered an order expunging and holding for naught the order of July 23, 1923, granting Sammonsa temporary and conditional parole and the order of January 28, 1926, granting him a final discharge upon his conviction for murder. By the same order of November 26, 1930, the warden was directed to issue a warrant for Sammons' return to the penitentiary. The warrant was issued, Sammons was apprehended, and he was returned to the penitentiary on the next day, November 27, 1930. No commutation of the sentence imposed upon Sammons for robbery was ever granted and no order of any character was ever entered by the Division of Pardons and Paroles, or its predecessor, with respect to that conviction.

A number of contentions are made in support of the petitioner's motion to discharge the prisoner from the custody of the respondent. These contentions may be reduced to three: First, that the criminal court of Cook county, by the judgment rendered May 28, 1904, imposing the death sentence upon Sammons, abandoned or abrogated its prior judgment of February 13, 1904, sentencing him to the penitentiary for robbery, or, in any event, that the latter sentence was absorbed by or merged in the sentence for murder; second, that even if the sentence for robbery remained effective, the maximum punishment that could be inflicted for that offense was imprisonment in the penitentiary for the period of fourteen years, which necessarily began on June 18, 1904, when Sammons became a prisoner, and expired on June 18, 1918, long prior to his parole from the penitentiary; and, third, that the successive orders of the Division of Pardons and Paroles admitting Sammons to parole and granting him a final discharge from custody are valid and binding and that the subsequent order expunging and holding the earlier orders for naught is void and that there is no legal warrant or authority for Sammons' detention in the penitentiary to serve any portion of either sentence. The respondent answers the petitioner's contentions by insisting: First, that the sentence for robbery was not abandoned or abrogated by or merged in the subsequentconviction for murder; second, that Sammons was convicted of robbery in the aggravated form for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment in the penitentiary for life; and, third,...

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11 cases
  • People ex rel. Carlstrom v. Shurtleff
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 14, 1934
    ...that case on October 8, 1931, and Sammons was remanded to the penitentiary. Reference is made to the opinion in that case (People v. Hill, 345 Ill. 103, 177 N. E. 723) for a more detailed statement of the facts leading up to the filing of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this cou......
  • Davidson v. Nygaard
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1951
    ...which it has been entered, and consider it in regard to the law regulating the rights of the parties.' See also People ex rel. Sammons v. Hill, Warden, 345 Ill. 103, 177 N.E. 723; Casey v. State, 19 Ala.App. 317, 97 So. 165; People v. Barnnovich, 16 Cal.App. 427, 117 P. 572; 1 Bishop New Cr......
  • People v. Brand
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 20, 1953
    ...People v. Woods, 393 Ill. 586, 66 N.E.2d 881; People ex rel. Ewald v. Montgomery, 377 Ill. 241, 36 N.E.2d 343; People ex rel. Sammons v. Hill, 345 Ill. 103, 177 N.E. 723. The test of the sufficiency of a verdict is whether the jury's intention can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. P......
  • People v. McGowan
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 20, 1953
    ...People v. Woods, 393 Ill. 586, 66 N.E.2d 881; People ex rel. Ewald v. Montgomery, 377 Ill. 241, 36 N.E.2d 343; People ex rel. Sammons v. Hill, 345 Ill. 103, 177 N.E. 723. Since the informations in the instant case both alleged that the plaintiffs in error knowingly had the policy tickets in......
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