People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission v. Town of Emeryville

Decision Date13 November 1968
Docket NumberS.F. 22591
Citation69 Cal.2d 533,446 P.2d 790,72 Cal.Rptr. 790
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 446 P.2d 790 The PEOPLE ex rel. SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TOWN OF EMERYVILLE, Defendant and Respondent.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Clayton P. Roche, L. Donald Boden and E. Clement Shute, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and appellant.

C. E. Fletcher, City Atty., Breed, Robinson & Stewart, and James R. McCall, Oakland, for defendant and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

On behalf of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (hereinafter BCDC), the Attorney General brought suit to enjoin certain fill operations by the Town of Emeryville on the ground that Emeryville had not obtained a BCDC permit as directed by the McAteer-Petris Act. (Gov.Code, § 66604.) The trial court concluded that Emeryville was not required to secure a permit because its fill operations were assertedly exempted under the 'grandfather clause' in the BCDC enabling legislation. (Gov.Code, § 66632.1.) 1 The court entered judgment for Emeryville and dissolved an injunction which had theretofore restrained the town from conducting further fill activities. This appeal followed.

I

In view of the urgency of the litigation we ordered the cause transferred to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 20.) At that time we issued an order enjoining all fill operations by the town pending final determination of the appeal. We deemed the stay basic to the maintenance of this court's appellate jurisdiction because resumption of fill activities would have imperiled the value of appellant's right of appeal.

Emeryville insists that this court lacked jurisdiction to stay its fill activities since there was no process or order which this court could supersede or suspend once the trial court had dissolved its restraining order. While the town's position is supported by older cases (see, e.g., In re Imperial Water Co. No. 3 (1926) 199 Cal. 556, 557--558, 250 P. 394), the preferable rule, which we henceforth follow, was recently declared in Deepwell Homeowners' Protective Assn. v. City Council (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 63, 65--66, 48 Cal.Rptr. 321, 323: 'So, too, the rule now is that in aid of their appellate jurisdiction the courts will grant supersedeas in appeals where to deny a stay would deprive the appellant of the benefit of a reversal of the judgment against him, provided, of course, that a proper showing is made. On principle, it would be a terrible situation if in a proper case an appellate court were powerless to prevent a judgment from taking effect during appeal, if the result would be a denial of the appellant's rights if his appeal were successful.'

A trial court's familiarity with the evolving circumstances of a case normally constitutes it the appropriate forum to weigh the relative hardships on the parties, including the likelihood that substantial questions will be raised on appeal, and its refusal to grant or to continue an injunction during appeal is entitled to great weight. But where, as here, difficult questions of law are involved and the fruits of a reversal would be irrevocably lost unless the status quo is maintained, justice requires that an appellate court issue a stay order to preserve its own jurisdiction. While this power should be sparingly employed and reserved for the exceptional situation, the propriety of its exercise in this case cannot be seriously disputed: had Emeryville been permitted to resume its fill activities, it would have been able, as a practical matter, to render this appeal moot.

The town contends, however, that the stay order issued by this court was beyond its inherent powers because the writ, injunctive in effect, is not specifically authorized in the judicial article of the state Constitution. Before the 1966 amendment the relevant provision of the state Constitution read: 'The said (Supreme) court shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.' (Former art. VI, § 4.) The present provision reads: 'Those courts (of record, other than municipal) also have original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition.' (Art. VI, § 10.)

Emeryville argues that the 1966 amendment deprived this court of the power to issue an injunctive order staying its fill operations. In this connection the town notes that the California Constitution Revision Commission said of the proposed change that it meant 'by use of the phrase 'in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition,' to preclude the creation of new forms of relief unrelated to the traditional three writs named.' (Proposed Revision of the California Constitution (February 1966) at p. 90.)

A distinction must be drawn however, between writs 'on the merits,' such as mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, which themselves grant the substantive or procedural relief sought by the petitioner; and purely auxiliary writs such as supersedeas, which have the sole function of preserving the court's jurisdiction while it prepares, usually in the context of an appeal, to rule on those merits. The quoted language of the Constitution Revision Commission relates to the former only; indeed, in that regard the 1966 amendments gave the courts more power rather than less: 'The Commission deliberately broadened the constitutional language relating to jurisdiction in extraordinary writ proceedings. In place of the restrictive language formerly appearing in the Constitution, the language used in Section 10 is phrased in such a way as to permit the courts to grant 'extraordinary relief in the nature of' the historical common law writs.' (Cal. Judicial Council, 1967 Rep. to the Governor and the Legislature, p. 75.)

By contrast, no explicit constitutional grant is necessary to authorize issuance of such auxiliary writs as supersedeas, long recognized to be an attribute of the inherent power of the courts to preserve their own jurisdiction. (Ohaver v. Fenech (1928) 206 Cal. 118, 123--124, 273 P. 555, and cases cited.) 'Among the many procedural phrases deleted from the former Constitution, the Commission deleted references to the appellate courts' power to issue 'writs in aid of appellate jurisdiction'--I.e., the writ of supersedeas. This action was taken upon the ground that Any such stay in aid of appellate jurisdiction constitutes an exercise of the inherent power of the courts having that jurisdiction.' (Italics added.) (Cal. Judicial Council, op. cit. supra, at pp. 76--77.) The elimination of such surplusage, which was one of the primary tasks of the commission, thus has no substantive significance. We are not unmindful that the stay order in this case is injunctive in nature, since it operates directly to restrain the fill activities of the town; but its office remains similar to that of a writ of supersedeas--to preserve the status quo pending determination of the appeal--and its issuance is therefore controlled by the same principles.

Furthermore, in the newly enacted chapter governing civil appeals (Code Civ.Proc. § 901 et seq.; Stats.1968, ch. 385), the Legislature affirms the inherent power of appellate courts in this state to issue injunctive stay orders in aid of jurisdiction: 'The provisions of this chapter shall not limit the power of a reviewing court or of a judge thereof to stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to issue a writ of supersedeas or to suspend or modify an injunction during the pendency of an appeal Or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo, the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered, or otherwise in aid of its jurisdiction.' (Italics added.) The stay order issued by this court, therefore, was not beyond our inherent powers. 2

II

The Attorney General contends that, as of September 17, 1965, the date the BCDC enabling legislation took effect, Emeryville had not sufficiently finalized its underlying plan to have a 'project' within the scope of the 'grandfather clause.' We find it unnecessary to decide, however, whether the town had a 'project' as of the effective date for the reason that subsequent occurrences dispel any notion that Emeryville may now avoid the BCDC permit requirement. We hold that fundamental changes necessitated in the underlying plan of Emeryville after the effective date clearly bring its fill activities within the jurisdiction of the BCDC.

For several years the Town of Emeryville has contemplated the filling and development of submerged lands within its geographic limits. The area in dispute is held in trust by the town under a tideland grant from the State of California. (Stats.1919, ch. 515; as amended, Stats.1959, ch. 921.) In 1959 the Legislature expanded the uses to which the tidelands could be devoted; pursuant to that expanded authority Emeryville thereafter commenced diking and filling, and also began to consider plans for the ultimate use of 144.5 acres to be filled.

Prior to September 17, 1965, Emeryville had purchased a bulldozer and hired a dredge that commenced construction of one of two access roads leading to the main fill area. At that time the town had no firm plans to acquire and was under no contractual obligation to buy or to receive fill; the fill was accepted gratuitously from contractors under no duty to deliver it. The dredge, according to city council resolution, was hired 'on a day-to-day basis at the discretion of the City Engineer. * * *' By September 1965, the Powell Street Causeway had been substantially completed as a result of the town's filling and diking activity. As of the effective date of the act, Emeryville had expended or incurred obligations to a total of $55,000 for equipment purchase and rental,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
124 cases
  • State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lara
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • October 29, 2021
    ...the rate hearing, not during it, and the case he cites is inapposite. (Cf. People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Com. v. Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 538, 72 Cal.Rptr. 790, 446 P.2d 790 [deletion of procedural language from constitution did not limit Court's inhe......
  • Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Com.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • September 25, 1975
    ...to be achieved' by the McAteer-Petris Act is depicted with remarkable clarity.' (People ex rel. S.F. Bay, etc., Comm. v. Town of Emeryville, 69 Cal.2d 533, 544, 72 Cal.Rptr. 790, 797, 446 P.2d 790, 797.) 'Standards for the issuance of building and land use prermits couched in general health......
  • Armstrong v. County of San Mateo
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • August 26, 1983
    ... ... Laddish, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and appellant State Bd. of ... 37, citing, inter alia, People ex rel. S.F. Bay Etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville ... ...
  • County of Orange v. Heim
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • February 21, 1973
    ...834; see also Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal.2d 199, 208--209, 282 P.2d 481; People ex rel. S. F. Bay etc. Com v. Town of Emeryville, 69 Cal.2d 533, 549, 72 Cal.Rptr. 790, 446 P.2d 790.) Moreover, as we shall hereinafter have occasion to point out, no dredging and filling could commen......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT