People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Mattes

• Decision Date: 17 March 1947
• Docket Number: No. 29836.,29836.
• Citation: People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Mattes, 396 Ill. 348, 71 N.E.2d 690 (Ill. 1947)
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. SCHLAEGER, County Collector, v. MATTES.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

396 Ill. 348

71 N.E.2d 690

PEOPLE ex rel. SCHLAEGER, CountyCollector,

v.MATTES.

No. 29836.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 1947.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1947.

Appeal from County Court, Cook County; Edmund K. Jarecki, judge.

Action by the people, on relation of Victor L. Schlaceger, County Collector, against Harold C. Mattes to recover corporate fund taxes.From a judgment sustaining objections of defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

William J. Tuohy, State's Atty., of Chicago (Jacob Shamberg, Gordon B. Nash and Joseph H. O'Connor, Jr., all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Scott, MacLeish & Falk, of Chicago (Robert S. Cushman and John J. O'Brien, Jr., both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

FULTON, Justice.

By this direct appeal, the revenue being involved, the appellant seeks reversal of a final judgment entered by the county court of Cook county, sustaining objections of appellee and refusing judgment for all the 1942 corporate fund taxes of the county of Cook in excess of 32 cents on each $100 of assessed valuation.

The formal objection filed by appellee quite clearly sets forth the issue in controversy:

‘1.That the County of Cook levied $9,000,000 for corporate fund purposes for the year 1942 and the County Clerk extended a tax rate thereon of $.386319 on each $100 of assessed valuation under the purported authority of Laws of 1941, Vol. I, page 516(Senate Bill 618) which amended section 25 of the Counties Act, which amendment was passed by the General Assembly prior to 6:00 P.M. on June 30, 1941;

‘2.That after 11:30 P.M. of the same day the General Assembly passed another amendment to Section 25 of the Counties Act(Laws 1941, Vol. I, page 520) which limited the maximum tax rate for county corporate purposes to $.32 on each $100 of assessed valuation (House BillNo. 383) and that the last amendment is controlling.

‘3.That the 1942 corporate fund taxes of the County of Cook are excessive, illegal and void in the amount of $.066319 on each $100 of assessed valuation, being the difference between the legal rate of $.32 and $.386319, the rate extended.’

The intent and purpose of section 25 of the Counties Act is to fix a limitation on the rate to be extended for county purposes.Prior to the legislative session of 1941, section 25 provided for ‘Taxes for county purposes * * * in counties having 500,000 or more inhabitants not exceeding twenty-five (25) cents on the one hundred dollars' valuation for the year 1929, not exceeding thirty-two (32) cents on such valuation for the year 1930 and each even numbered year thereafter, and not exceeding twenty-eight (28) cents on such valuation for the year 1931 and each odd numbered year thereafter.’Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 34, par. 25.

At the 1941 session of the legislature there were introduced four different bills, each amending in some particular said section 25.

Senate BillNo. 116 sought to amend section 25 by giving the county boards power to erect and operate radio broadcasting stations for police purposes.It retained in section 25 the same tax rates for counties having a population of 500,000 or more inhabitants that were in the law prior to the legislative session of 1941.It was passed and approved by the Governor on May 12, 1941.Laws 1941, p. 512.

House BillNo. 840 sought to amend section 25 in the matter of poor-relief expenses.It retained the same tax rates in the law which existed prior to the legislative session of 1941.It was finally passed on June 20, 1941, and approved by the Governor on July 1, 1941.Laws 1941, p. 508.

House BillNo. 383 sought to amend section 25 by excepting from the county-corporate tax limits taxes authorized for county library systems.It also included the added power to maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations for police purposes.It also retained in section 25 the same tax rates for counties that were in the law prior to the legislative session of 1941.It was finally passed by the House on June 30, 1941, at a session which commenced at 11:30 p.m. on June 30, and was approved by the Governor on July 21, 1941.

Senate BillNo. 618 sought to amend section 25 in the matter of the tax rate for county purposes and to change the rate in counties having 500,000 inhabitants or over.The bill provided for a tax ‘Not exceeding twenty-five (25) cents on the one hundred dollars' valuation for the year 1929, not exceeding thirty-two (32) cents on such valuation for the year 1930 and each even numbered year thereafter, but, for the year 1942, at such rate of thirty-two cents (32) or at a rate which when extended will produce an amount not to exceed $9,000.000 whichever; may be the greater; and not exceeding twenty-eight (28) cents on such valuation for the year 1931 and each odd numbered year thereafter including the year 1941 and for the year 1943 and each odd numbered year thereafter at the rate of twenty-five (25) cents or at a rate that will produce when extended an amount not to to exceed $7,300,000 whichever may be the greater.’(Laws of 1941, p. 517.)The bill was passed by the General Assembly at the afternoon session on June 30, 1941, and sent to the Governor who returned the bill without his signature so that it became a law through lapse of time and later than July 21, 1941.

It is the contention of the appellant that Senate Bill 618 is a new and specific enactment in regard to the county corporate tax rate for the year 1942.He asserts that the situation present in the instant case is a direct parallel to the situation in the case of People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23,136 N.E. 505, and upon which he primarily relies.In the Lloyd case two amendments to section 46 of the Criminal Code were passed by the 51st General Assembly in session during the year 1919.One amendment changed the pre-existing law as to the penalty for conspiracy and the other amendment excepted farmers from the operation of section 46.It was there contended that when the Governor signed the amendment exempting farmers, the new penalty for conspiracy provided in the other amendment was repealed.Final legislative action on both bills took place on the same day.This court refused to adopt that theory and held that the General Assembly intended to enact two separate and unrelated laws, one relating to the penalty and the other...