People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti

Decision Date17 December 1971
Docket NumberNo. 44744,44744
Citation277 N.E.2d 881,50 Ill.2d 156
PartiesThe PEOPLE ex rel. William J. SCOTT, Attorney General, Petitioner, v. John A. GRIVETTI et al., Respondents.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, for petitioner.

Jerome H. Torhsen, Arthur C. Thorpe, Siegal & Sobel and Stonesifer, Schiff, Hardin, Waite, Dorschel & Britton, Chicago, and John Grivetti, Peru, for respondents.

PER CURIAM:

Decision of this case was announced by our order of December 10, 1971, released simultaneously with the opinion of the three-judge Federal court composed of Circuit Judge Sprecher and District Judges Austin and Napoli. Our December 10 order expressed to Judges Sprecher, Austin and Napoli our appreciation for their cooperation in accomplishing an expeditious resolution of the problems concurrently presented to both courts. That order indicated an opinion would be filed setting forth the reasons for the conclusions which we reached. This is that opinion.

This is an original action which presents for our consideration the question of the constitutional validity of the decennial redistricting plan for Illinois House and Senate districts filed with the Secretary of State by the Legislative Redistricting Commission. Six other actions challenging the redistricting of the Illinois legislative districts were pending in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois at the time of commencement of these proceedings. All of the plaintiffs in those actions have been impleaded as respondents in this case, and it appears that all substantive issues before the Federal court are also raised in this proceeding. In view of the recognized state judicial power 'to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan' (Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 1527, 14 L.Ed.2d 477), and because the date for filing of nominating petitions for the House and Senate was fast approaching we expedited the hearing and disposition of this case.

The method of redistricting the State legislative districts is set forth in section 3(b) of article IV of the 1970 constitution, S.H.A. That section provides in relevant part that 'in the year following each Federal decennial census year, the General Assembly by law shall redistrict the Legislative Districts. If no redistricting plan becomes effective by June 30 of that year, a Legislative Redistricting Commission shall be constituted not later than July 10. The Commission shall consist of eight members, no more than four of whom shall be members of the same political party.' With regard to the manner of selection of the Commission, the constitution provides that 'the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives shall each appoint to the Commission one Representative and one person who is not a member of the General Assembly. The President and Minority Leader of the Senate shall each appoint to the Commission one Senator and one person who is not a member of the General Assembly.' Section 3(b) further states that 'not later than August 10, the Commission shall file with the Secretary of State a redistricting plan approved by at least five menbers.' It is also provided that 'an approval redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State shall be presumed valid, shall have the force and effect of law and shall be published promptly by the Secretary of State.'

The 77th General Assembly failed to redistrict itself prior to June 30, 1971 following the decennial census year of 1970. Accordingly, a Legislative Redistricting Commission was constituted. The Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tem. of the Senate each appointed themselves to the Commission and also appointed their respective legislative aides as non-General Assembly members of the Commission. The Minority Leader of the Senate appointed another Senator of his choice to the Commission and also appointed another individual as a non-General Assembly member of the Commission. Thus constituted, the Commission adopted a redistricting plan and filed it with the Secretary of State prior to the August 10, 1971, deadline. It is this plan which is now before us for review.

The five primary issues raised in oral argument and in the pleadings filed by the various parties herein may be summarized as follows: (1) Is section 3(b) of article IV of our constitution violative of the Federal constitution in that it places the selection of the Redistricting Commission under the control of the majority and minority leaders of the House land Senate; (2) Was the Legislative Redistricting Commission properly selected in accordance with section 3(b) of article IV of the constitution; (3) Did the redistricting plan meet the State and Federal 'one man-one vote' constitutional requirement and the further requirement of the Illinois constitution that all districts be compact and contiguous; (4) Is the redistricting plan invalid in that it does not adhere strictly to traditional and political boundaries; and (5) What is the effect of certain 'corrections to the redistricting plan filed with the Secretary of State by members of the Legislative Redistricting Commission on November 5, 1971?

As to the first issue, certain of the respondents contend that section 3(b) of article IV of our constitution is violative of the first amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States in that it places control over the redistricting process in the hands of the major party leaders and excludes any participation by representatives of other political parties or independent voters; I.e., there is a denial of access to reapportionment proceedings to all persons who are not affiliated with, or members of, the two major parties. On its face section 3(b) neither restricts membership on the Commission to particular political parties or persons claiming particular interests nor does it exclude them. More importantly, however, there has been no showing in this case of how the provisions in question have any legally harmful effect on respondents. Respondents imply that unless they take part in the selection of the Legislative Redistricting Commission their interests will not be represented on the Commission with the result that any redistricting plan adopted by the Commission inevitably will discriminate against them. This argument is highly speculative and abstract and, in our opinion, does not provide any basis for a legal remedy. If every group having particular political viewpoints or alleging particular interests was required to be directly involved in the selection of the Commission or directly represented on the Commission itself, it is obvious that the group selecting the Commission and the Commission itself would reach almost boundless and unworkable proportions. It must also be remembered that section 3(b) places initial responsibility in the legislature to adopt a redistricting plan. At this stage the redistricting process is entirely under the control of a body elected by all the people. Only when the legislature fails to fulfill its duty to redistrict does the smaller, eight member Legislative Redistricting Commission come into being to accomplish that task. In our opinion, this is neither an unreasonable nor discriminatory method of attempting to provide a solution to legislative nonfeasance. Also, in drawing the districts, the Commission is clearly bound by section 3(a) of article IV which provides that 'legislative Districts shall be compact, contiguous and substantially equal in population.' If the Commission complies with this constitutional mandate, a matter which is subject to judicial review, then all voters of the State of Illinois will thereafter have an equal voice in electing State legislators. We conclude that section 3(b) of article IV of the constitution on its face is not violative of the first amendment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and does not infringe upon any constitutionally protected interests of the respondents in this case.

It is also argued that section 3(b) of article IV of the constitution reflects an improper delegation of legislative power. The answer to this contention is that we are not here concerned with a State legislative enactment which purports to delegate functions of a legislative nature, but rather with a provision of our State constitution which expressly directs the redistricting of the legislature by the Legislative Redistricting Commission is accordance with specified standards. It is clear that no real delegation of power question under either the State of Federal constitutions is involved in this case.

It is further contended that the Legislative Redistricting Commission created by section 3(b) of article IV was illegally composed in that three of the persons having appointive power appointed not only themselves but also their legislative aides to the Commission.

We agree, for the purpose of section 3(b) of article IV is, in our judgment, completely clear. As originally proposed to the 1970 Constitutional Convention by the committee on the legislature, it provided for a redistricting commission composed of eight members of the legislature, two of whom were to be appointed by the majority leader, and two by the minority leader in each house. That proposal was predicated on the fact that the original committee recommendation excluded the legislature from the reapportionment process. On first reading, however, the procedure was changed to give the legislature the first opportunity to reapportion. Thereafter an amendment, co-sponsored by others, was offered by Delegate Perona, the substantive effect of which was to reduce the legislative representation on the eight-member commission to four, to be selected in the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • November 30, 2021
    ...in an Illinois case citing the Illinois Constitution. See Wis. State AFL-CIO, 543 F. Supp. at 635 (citing People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti, 50 Ill.2d 156, 277 N.E.2d 881 (I1971) ). Just as we cannot allow an atextual approach, such as least-change, to supersede the Constitution's text, we c......
  • Rybicki v. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS OF STATE OF ILL.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • January 12, 1982
    ...by the Illinois courts, see, e.g., People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 307 (1895); People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti, 50 Ill.2d 156, 277 N.E.2d 881 (1971) cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921, 92 S.Ct. 2460, 32 L.Ed.2d 806 (1972), this provision was most recently construed by th......
  • Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • August 25, 2016
    ...Following each of the other four decennial censuses, the formation of a redistricting commission has been necessary. People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti,50 Ill. 2d 156 (1971); Schrage v. State Board of Elections, 88 Ill. 2d 87 (1981); People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 147 Ill. 2d 270 (1992); Cole......
  • Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 12, 2016
    ...each of the other four decennial censuses, the formation of a redistricting commission has been necessary. People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti, 50 Ill.2d 156, 277 N.E.2d 881 (1971) ; Schrage v. State Board of Elections, 88 Ill.2d 87, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483 (1981) ; People ex rel. Burr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT