People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr

• Decision Date: 30 May 1905
• Citation: People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, 181 N.Y. 463, 74 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1905)
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. EDWARD C. STEARNS et al., Respondents, v. WILLIAM MARR, as President of Iron Moulders' Union No. 80, et al., Defendants, and KYRAN POWERS et al., Appellants.

181 N.Y. 463

74 N.E. 431

PEOPLE ex rel. STEARNS et al.

v.MARR, et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 30, 1905.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by the people, on the relation of Edward C. Stearns and others, against William Marr, president of the Iron Moulders' Union No. 80, and others. From an order of the Appellate Division (84 N. Y. Supp. 965) affirming an order of the Special Term (84 N. Y. Supp. 36) adjudging defendants in contempt for violation of an injunction, they appeal. Modified.Theodore E. Hancock and D. B. Keeler, for appellants.

Edgar F. Brown, for respondents.

VANN, J.

During the spring of 1903 the relators employed a large number of workmen in operating their foundry at Syracuse, many of whom were members of the Iron Moulders' Union No. 80, an unincorporated association organized in the interest of mechanics who were iron moulders by trade. On the 15th of May, 1903, a strike was declared by said union, and the most of its members employed by the relators ceased to work, and tried to induce those who remained to cease work also, as well as to dissuade others who had not been thus employed from accepting employment at said factory. A picket line was established, threats made, intimidation practiced, and, finally, violence was resorted to. An action was commenced by the relators to recover damages from the union for interfering with their business, and to restrain its members from the use of force, threats, or fear in order to keep away those who wished to work. After notice and a hearing, a temporary injunction was issued by a justice of the Supreme Court restraining ‘the Iron Moulders' Union No. 80, its each and every member, said defendants and each of them, their agents, servants, representatives, and coadjutors, and all persons connected with them or either of them, * * * from assaulting, menacing, threatening, or intimidating, whether by manner, attitude, speech, numbers, or other act or means, the men and workmen in plaintiffs' employ, or who come to plaintiffs for employment, and from interfering with said plaintiffs' business by any unlawful means for the purpose of preventing any person or persons who now are or may hereafter be in plaintiffs' employment from continuing therein, or who being desirous of entering said employment from doing so or continuing therein.’ Subsequently a motion was made to punish John Lillis, Kyran Powers, Otto Benz, and Michael Strozik for contempt in violating said injunction, and, upon the hearing, a referee was appointed to take the evidence of the parties and their witnesses, and report the facts with his opinion. After taking much testimony, and upon due deliberation, the referee reported that Lillis, Benz, and Powers were guilty of contempt in violating said order, but that Strozik, owing to his ignorance of the English language, did not know enough about the terms of the injunction to warrant his punishment. The referee found that the injunction had been served personally upon said Lillis, who was a defendant in the action, and that Benz and Powers, who were not defendants, and upon whom the injunction had not been served, knew of the existence and the terms thereof when they disobeyed it. The report of the referee was confirmed by the Special Term, and the three persons named were adjudged guilty of contempt, and punished by fine and imprisonment. An appeal was taken to the Appellate Division, where the order of the Special Term was affirmed unanimously as to Powers and Lillis, but one of the justices dissented as to Benz, upon the ground that the evidencedid not ‘satisfactorily establish that he was guilty of contempt.’

An act in willful contempt of a court of justice or its process is an offense against the people of the state. Government by law cannot exist without courts, and courts cannot enforce the law unless disobedience of their orders is properly punished. The wrong done to a party by the violation of an order made by a court for his protection is of less importance than the wrong done to the public by obstructing the course of justice and bringing dishonor upon the law itself. This is not a case of mere civil contempt, where a fine is imposed mainly to indemnify a party for a private injury, and incidentally to vindicate the authority of the court as an agency of public justice. We are now dealing with a criminal contempt, not in the interest of a party merely, but in the interest of the public, to compel obedience to a lawful mandate of the Supreme Court, and to punish resistance thereto as in the nature of a crime. There are three parties to every proceeding to punish for a criminal contempt, the plaintiff, the defendant, and the people. If a fine is imposed, it goes into the public treasury when paid, and is for ‘punishment rather than indemnity; and, if imprisonment is added, it is in the interest of public justice, and purely as a penalty, and not at all as a means of securing indemnity to an individual.’ People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer 101 N. Y. 245, 248,4 N. E. 259, 54 Am. Rep. 691. While the court may be set in motion by a person who has been injured, it acts to punish the wrong to the public, rather than to redress the private injury.

All of the appellants knew that the injunction had been issued, one of them because it was personally served upon him, and the others because they were present at a meeting held by the strikers, when the existence and contents of the order were stated, and advice was given by one of the leaders to keep within the law. There was also evidence tending to show that they discussed the terms of the injunction with different persons, talked about what they could and could not do in view of its command, stated who their attorney was when the motion to vacate would be heard, and the like. Neither in their answering affidavits nor in their testimony as witnesses before the referee did they deny that they knew of the existence and the terms of the injunction. They confined their testimony mainly to a denial that they had used threats or violence, and upon this question there was a conflict in the evidence. The referee found that on the 2d of July, 1903, Ludwig Werner, an employé of the plaintiffs, as he left their factory, was assaulted by some of the strikers. He went across the street, and was followed by Benz and others. In a threatening manner, and with intent to intimidate Werner and prevent him from continuing in the employment of the plaintiffs, Benz said to him, ‘If you go into that shop again, we will kill you.’ When the order to show cause was served, Benz was told that he frightened Werner ‘pretty badly,’ and he replied: ‘That is what I wanted to do; I guess I have a right to talk; Stearns can't stop me from talking.’ On the 26th of June, 1893, Albert Thurston, who was in the employ of the plaintiffs, left their factory, when Powers took hold of his arm and said, ‘If you come back here again, you will get your punching.’ On july 3d, as said Thurston was entering the factory to work, he was again stopped by Powers, who said: ‘If you go down there to work you will get your God-damned head plunked. You keep out of here.’ On the same day at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, as Thurston and one Ernest Seib were leaving the factory, they were met by some strikers, one of whom asked if they intended to keep on working for Stearns. They said they did, and were thereupon assaulted, beaten, and kicked by seven or eight strikers. Powers and Lillis were present, and both incited the crowd to attack Thurston, Lillis saying, ‘Now is your time,’ while Powers said, ‘Slug him one.’ The referee further found that these acts were done for the purpose of intimidating Thurston and Seib and preventing them from continuing to work for the plaintiffs. These facts find ample support in the evidence, and, after the concurrent action of the courts below, they are not open to review by this court. We are compelled to accept them as they were found by the referee and affirmed by the Supreme Court both at Special Term and in the Appellate Division.

The injunction permitted the use of all peaceful methods to induce workmen to leave the plaintiffs and join the strikers, but it forbade force, threats, and intimidation. Both Benz and Powers used threats, and Powers and Lillis instigated an assault. ‘A person who directly or indirectly counsels, commands, induces or procures another to commit’ an assault is guilty of assault himself, and subject to punishment as a principal. Pen. Code, § 29. When peaceable persuasion ended and...