People ex rel. Stewart v. Ramer

• Decision Date: 06 November 1916
• Docket Number: 9067.
• Citation: 62 Colo. 128,160 P. 1032
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. STEWART et al. v. RAMER, Secretary of State. v.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

160 P. 1032

62 Colo. 128

PEOPLE ex rel. STEWART et al. v. RAMER, Secretary of State.

No. 9067.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

November 6, 1916

Mandamus by the People, on the relation of Philip B. Stewart and another, against John E. Ramer, as Secretary of State.Alternative writ made absolute.

William R. Eaton, of Denver, for petitioner.

Fred Farrar, Atty. Gen., and Norton Montgomery, Asst. Atty. Gen for defendant.

WHITE J.

The object of this proceeding is to compel the respondent, as secretary of state, to certify to the several county clerks a certain recommendation of the twentieth General Assembly to the electors of the state to vote at the next general election, for or against a convention to revise, alter, and amend the Constitution.We issued the alternative writ of mandamus, and, upon a service of the same upon respondent, he made return and answer thereto.The return admits the material allegations of the alternative writ, but attempts to justify respondent's acts in the premises upon the ground that the aforesaid recommendation of the General Assembly was not approved, but disapproved, by the Governor of the state, and no action thereon was subsequently taken by the General Assembly or either house thereof.To the return petitioners interposed a demurrer.It is conceded that the law (sections 2145and6155, REvised Statutes of 1908) imposes upon the secretary of state the duty to certify to the county clerks, for submissions to the electors of the state for popular vote at the ensuring election, the recommendation in question, unless it was nullified by the action of the Governor in the premises, and the failure of the General Assembly to pass the same over his disapproval.We are of the opinion that the Governor had no duty to perform in relation to the measure in question, and that his disapproval thereof did not affect its validity.The General Assembly, in making the recommendation, was exercising the power invested in it by section 1 of article 19 of the Constitution.The section expressly declares, inter alia that:

"The General Assembly may at any time by a vote of two-thirds of the members elected to each house, recommend to the electors of the state, to vote at the next general election for or against a convention to revise, alter and amend this Constitution; and if a majority of those voting on the question shall declare in favor of such convention, the General Assembly shall, at its next session, provide for the calling thereof."

The reasons which are urged against the validity of our conclusion are drawn from the provisions of section 39, art. 5, of the Constitution.

It will be observed that article 5 relates to ordinary legislation, while article 19 prescribes a method of calling constitutional conventions and of proposing amendments to the Constitution.It is not, therefore, by the former article, but by the latter, that the act of the General Assembly, in initiating the proposal for a constitutional convention must be tested.It has been expressly so ruled.Thus in Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441, 448, 36 P. 221, 223, we said:

"Article 19 is sui generis; it provides for revising, altering and amending the fundamental law of the state, and is not in pari materia with those provisions of article 5 prescribing the method of enacting ordinary statutory laws."

The act of the General Assembly in proposing an amendment to the Constitution or recommending that the electors vote on calling a constitutional convention is initiatory only.In...