People ex rel. Stuckart v. N.J. Sandberg Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1918
• Docket Number: No. 11720.,11720.
• Citation: 282 Ill. 245,118 N.E. 469
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. STUCKART, County Collector, v. N. J. SANDBERG CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

282 Ill. 245

118 N.E. 469

PEOPLE ex rel. STUCKART, County Collector,

v.N. J. SANDBERG CO.

No. 11720.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 19, 1917.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1918.

Appeal from Cook County Court; John H. Williams, Judge.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Henry Stuckart, against the N. J. Sandberg Company for a judgment for taxes against defendant's real estate. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed in part and remanded.Landon & Holt, of Chicago (Robert N. Holt, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Maclay Hoyne, State's Atty., of Chicago (Samuel A. Ettelson, Corp. Counsel, Irwin N. Walker, Orville R. Seiter, Edmund D. Adcock, Ross C. Hall, Walter E. Beebe, Leon Hornstein, and Robert E. Gentzel, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

DUNN, J.

This appeal is from a judgment for the taxes of 1916 against the appellant's real estate in Cook county.

It is objected that the county tax was not properly scaled in accordance with the act of 1901 concerning the levy and extension of taxes, and its amendments (Hurd's Stat. 1916, p. 2229). The county levy ordinance levied $1,514,612.50 for the principal and interest of bonds, $244,334.50 for judgments, and for general purposes $5,172,962.50, which included $325,000 for loss and cost of collection of taxes levied for general county purposes. To raise the amount of the appropriation for general purposes required a rate of .4668 on the $100 valuation. Because of the excess of the taxes certified for extension in a part of the county over 3 per cent. of the assessed valuation, it became the duty of the county clerk to reduce the rates in the manner required by section 2 of the act mentioned. In doing so he made no reduction in the county tax for the reason that he regarded the amounts included in the levy for roads and bridges, for mothers' pensions, and for loss and cost of collection as not included in the minimum rate of 45 cents below which the county tax in a county having the population of Cook county may not be reduced. The amounts levied for roads and bridges require a rate of .0188, that for mothers' pensions .0167, and that for loss and cost of collection .0292, and after deducting these rates from the .4668 there remained for the county's rate .4021. Since this was below the minimum rate, the county clerk made no reduction. Adding to this rate those mentioned for roads and bridges, mothers' pensions and loss and cost, together with the rate required for bonds (.1494) and judgments (.0242) produced a rate of .6404, which was extended as 65 cents against the appellant's property.

The county tax levied for road and bridge purposes was subject to reduction under the law. People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 256 Ill. 332, 100 N. E. 212. The appellee concedes this, but insists that the tax for mothers' pensions could not be included in the aggregate of taxes certified for extension, though it is included in the minimum rate of 45 cents. It is true that it is not subject to reduction (People v. Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Co., 266 Ill. 557, 107 N. E. 779;People v. Chicago, Lake Shore & Eastern Railway Co., 270 Ill. 477, 110 N. E. 720), but it is an ordinary county tax, and was not among those which the statute excludes from consideration as a part of the aggregate of all the taxes certified to be extended. The excess above the rate of 45 cents must, however, be deducted from the other items of tax which are subject to reduction.

The loss and cost item is also to be included in the minimum rate of 45 cents, and the statute does not exclude it from reduction. When it becomes necessary to reduce the rates under section 2, the statute requires all rates not expressly exempted to be reducedproportionately. The county tax must be reduced, but, in counties having a population of over 300,000, not below a rate of 45 cents.

While a reasonable sum may be added to a levy for loss and cost of collection so as to produce the net amount desired, this authority does not increase the limit of the taxing power. A rate may not be extended beyond the limit fixed by the statute. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co. v. People, 200 Ill. 541, 66 N. E. 148. The application of the statute without any saving clause would reduce the levy far below the rate of 45 cents, but the statute says that the rate shall not be reduced below 45 cents on the $100. This limit is the extent of the tax which may be exacted, and the limit is 45 cents, not 45 cents and the loss and cost of collection.

The clerk, in extending the tax, added 10 per cent. to the amount levied for bonded indebtedness to cover the loss and cost of collection, and the appellant objected to this item as excessive. The court sustained the objection, and reduced the amount one-half. This was in accordance with the evidence. The clerk in charge of tax extensions in the county clerk's office presented a statement for the purpose of showing loss and cost of collection for the years from 1912 to 1915, inclusive. It consisted of seven items. They are, ‘Real estate forfeited,’ ‘Real estate judgment refused,’ ‘Real estate error,’ ‘Personal property delinquent,’ ‘Pending and appealed,’ ‘Increased interest on tax levy anticipationloan,’ and ‘Town collectors' fee for collection.’ ‘Real estate forfeited’ does not represent a tax lost. ‘Real estate judgment refused’ does not indicate a loss, but an unauthorized tax. ‘Pending and appealed’ refers to taxes in process of collection, and ‘Interest on anticipation warrants' is not a loss of taxes or any part of the cost of collection. The rate allowed by the court was sufficient to cover the remaining items in any of the years as to which evidence was introduced. The judgment in this respect was in accordance with the evidence.

It is objected by the appellant that the county board levied the full amount of the salaries of the state's attorney and his assistants without taking into consideration the amount to be realized from fees, fines, and forfeitures, as required by law (People v. Jackson, 272 Ill. 494, 112 N. E. 344), and that it also made a levy for the salaries of the clerks of courts, treasurer, sheriff, coroner, and recorder, which are payable only out of the fees of their offices. The levy ordinance, after reciting the appropriation ordinance, which made total corporate appropriations of $10,199,358.49, and the necessity of levying certain amounts for the payment of bonds and judgments, recited that the salaries of the clerks of all courts of record, treasurer, sheriff, coroner, and recorder of deeds were payable, respectively, only out of the fees of the office actually collected. It then recited that certain appropriations were reappropriations payable only out of unexpended cash balances of previous appropriations for the same purpose, and that other appropriations were payable out of the proceeds of certain bonds; that the appropriation of $325,000 for loss and cost of collection of taxes was a reasonable estimate of the loss and cost of collection necessary to be levied for general county purposes; that it was necessary to levy the further sum of $5,497,962.50, which included the sum of $325,000 aforesaid, ‘as the tax sufficient to produce the sum of $5,172,962.50 for general county purposes; that is to say, for the purpose of meeting such deficits in and balances of the remaining items (hereinafter referred to as deficit items) of said appropriation bill as are left over after application of other county assets and receipts as hereinafter provided.’ It was then recited that the salaries of the state's attorney and assistant state's attorneys appropriated for were payable out of a special fund of the state's attorney for the collection of fees, fines, forfeitures, and penalties (hereinafter estimated at the sum of $28,128.81) to the extent that such special fund will permit only the balance of said salaries, if any, to be paid by the county in accordance with the provisions of law in such case made and provided. Therefore it was resolved that there be levied a tax for the payment of principal and interest of bonds as specified, $1,514,162.50, a tax for the payment of judgments as specified, $244,334.98, ‘and a direct annual tax necessary, as aforesaid, as a tax sufficient to produce the sum of $5,172,962.50 for the purpose of meeting the aforesaid deficit items as hereinafter specified and defined of $5,497,962.50, making a total levy for all purposes of $7,256,459.98.’ The meaning of this resolution is that the appropriation for general county purposes was for the purpose of meeting the deficits in and balances of the items remaining, independent of the bonds, the judgments, the salaries of the clerks, treasurer, sheriff, coroner, and recorder, and the appropriations mentioned which were payable from the unexpended cash balances of previous appropriations and the proceeds of bonds, and that the appropriation for the salaries of the state's attorney and assistant state's attorneys was only for the balance of those salaries, if any, after exhausting the fund derived from the state's attorney's collection of fees, fines, forfeitures, and penalties.

The rate for the county tax is properly arrived at by reducing it to 45 cents, adding to this the rate for the payment of bonds and judgments and interest and reducing this sum by the amount which the 10 per cent. loss and cost item on bonds and judgments was excessive.

What has been said about the loss and cost item of the county tax for general purposes applies to the school tax. After reducing the rate for educational purposes in accordance with the law, it was raised to the minimum rate of $1.20, and to this was added 6 cents on the $100 for loss and cost of collection. One dollar and twenty cents was the limit of the amount which the public authorities were entitled to exact from the taxpayer for educational purposes, and the objection to the 6 cents was...