People ex rel. Suddeth v. Rednour

Decision Date28 September 1965
Docket NumberNo. 39091,39091
Citation211 N.E.2d 281,33 Ill.2d 278
PartiesThe PEOPLE ex rel. Peter W. SUDDETH, Appellant, v. Bert REDNOUR, Superintendent of the Illinois Security Hospital, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

J. Edward Jones, Blue Island, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Fred G. Leach and William A. Bomp, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for appellee.

KLINGBIEL, Chief Justice.

This is a direct appeal from an order of the circuit court of Randolph County which quashed a writ of habeas corpus and remanded the relator, Peter W. Suddeth, to the custody of respondent, the superintendent of a State hospital. Section 5 of article VI of the Illinois constitution, as amended, S.H.A., gives us jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Relator was indicted in the criminal court of Cook County for the crime of attempted rape. However, on June 27, 1963, before he could be tried, a jury empaneled on his motion found him to be insane and he was placed in custody of the Department of Mental Health and confined in a security hospital, all as provided in sections 12 and 13 of division II of the Criminal Code then in effect. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, pars. 592, 593.) In January, 1964, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Randolph County, the place of his confinement, wherein he alleged that he had recovered his sanity and prayed for a jury trial to determine both his sanity and his capacity to stand trial for the criminal charge pending against him. The writ issued, directed to the superintendent of the hospital where relator was confined, and in his return it was denied that relator had recovered his sanity.

On the return date relator appeared in court with counsel of his choice. At that time a petition for a change of venue on the grounds of prejudice of the presiding judge was denied, as were relator's motions for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and for a jury trial. Thereafter, the court heard the evidence and, at its conclusion, found that relator was still insane, quashed the writ, and recommitted him to the security hospital. In general, the evidence adduced on behalf of relator tended along the lines that he was capable of understanding the nature of the criminal charge pending against him, and of co-operating with his counsel in the conduct of a defense. For the respondent, doctors testified that relator was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of his commitment to the security hospital, that he had not recovered from his mental illness, and that he was 'not ready' to stand trial on the criminal charge.

It is first contended by the relator that he was entitled to a trial by jury under the provisions of article 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38, art. 104.) This contention is denied by respondent, as well as relator's alternative assertions that he was entitled to a trial by jury by virtue of section 5 of article II of the Illinois constitution, and that the denial of such right in this case also deprived him of due process of law. Under the view we take of the primary contention, these constitutional questions are not reached and will not be decided. People v. Dixon, 28 Ill.2d 122, 125, 190 N.E.2d 793; People v. Chiafreddo, 381 Ill. 214, 219, 44 N.E.2d 888.

As noted before, relator was adjudicated to be insane and committed to the security hospital in accordance with sections 12 and 13 of division II of the then existing Criminal Code. And had those sections remained in effect at the time of the instant proceeding, their explicit language makes it clear that a jury trial on the issue of whether relator had so recovered as to be subject to criminal proceedings was mandatory, unless waived. (See: Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, pars. 592, 593; People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 562, 107 N.E.2d 861. Cf. People v. Geary, 298 Ill. 236, 131 N.E. 652.) However, those sections were repealed and superseded by article 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which took effect January 1, 1964, after relator had been committed, thus giving rise to the present controversy.

Article 104 is comprised of three sections, the first of which defines an 'incompetent' as a 'person charged with an offense who is unable because of a physical or mental condition: (a) To understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; or (b) To assist in his defense; * * *.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38, par. 104-1; emphasis added.) Thereafter, section 104-2, which is titled 'Proceedings to Determine Competency,' provides in part: '(a) If before a trial, or after a judgment has been entered but before pronouncement of sentence, or after a death sentence has been imposed but before execution of that sentence, the court has reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent the court shall suspend the proceedings and shall impanel a jury to determine the defendant's competency. If a jury is waived by the defendant, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's competency. (b) If during the trial the court has reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent the court shall suspend the proceedings and shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's competency and shall at the election of the defendant impanel a jury to determine that issue. * * * (f) If the defendant is found to be incompetent he shall be committed or remain subject to the further order of the court in accordance with Section 104-3 of this Code.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38, par. 104-2.) The concluding section, bearing the title 'Commitment of incompetent,' then directs in pertinent part: '(c) When reasonable grounds exist to believe that an incompetent is now competent the court in the county wherein the incompetent is confined or the court in which incompetency was found shall conduct a hearing in accordance with this Article to determine the person's present mental or physical condition. * * * If the court, following such hearing, finds the person to be competent the proceedings pending against him shall be resumed.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, chap. 38, par. 104-3(c); emphasis added.

Because there is no express mention of a jury trial in section 104-3(c), it is the contention of respondent that such omission is indicative of a legislative intent not to require a jury where the proceeding is one to determine whether a person previously adjudged to be imcompetent has since become competent. We do not believe this conclusion follows, particularly when we look to the express language of the section and heed those rules of construction which require us to consider a statute in its entirety in arriving at the legislative intent, (City of Chicago v. Vokes, 28 Ill.2d 475, 482, 193 N.E.2d 40.) and to consider the object to be obtained and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or another. Carrigan v. Liquor Control Commission, 19 Ill.2d 230, 233, 166 N.E.2d 574.

Section 104-2 deals exclusively with the procedure to be followed for determining competency within the purview of the article, and it is the express direction of section 104-3(c) that the hearing to determine whether or not a person has become competent shall be conducted 'in accordance with this Article.' It is only section 104-2 to which the quoted words could have reference, and it is the sweep of such section that, with an exception not applicable here, a person is entitled to have a jury determine the issue of his competency unless waived. (See: Committee Comments, Smith-Hurd Anno.Stat., chap. 38, par. 104-2, p. 41.) When section 104-3(c) was reached, the legislature did not repeat itself as to the procedure to be followed, but merely directed that the hearing contemplated by that section would be in accordance with the procedures already established in section 104-2. (Cf. Richards v. Board of Education, 21 Ill.2d 104, 113, 171 N.E.2d 37; Thillens, Inc. v. Department of Financial Institutions, 24 Ill.2d 110, 117, 180 N.E.2d 494.) Necessarily, in our opinion, the legislature must have intended to confer the right to a jury trial by the language it employed. The overall purpose of article 104 is to implement the constitutional guarantees of due process of law by insuring that persons mentally or...

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