People ex rel. Tilley v. New York, C. & St. L.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1936
• Docket Number: No. 23532.,23532.
• Citation: 364 Ill. 456,4 N.E.2d 867
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. TILLEY, County Collector, v. NEW YORK, C. & ST. L. R. CO.

364 Ill. 456

4 N.E.2d 867

PEOPLE ex rel. TILLEY, County Collector,

v.NEW YORK, C. & ST. L. R. CO.

No. 23532.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 14, 1936.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1936.

Appeal from Shelby County Court; Arthur J. Steidley, Judge.

Action by the People, on the relation of Samuel L. Tilley, County Collector, against the New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company. From a judgment overruling objections made by defendant to a tax extended, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.John J. Baker, of Shelbyville, and Pope & Driemeyer, of East St. Louis (W. J. Stevenson, of Cleveland, Ohio, of counsel), for appellant.

Kenneth F. Kelly, State's Atty., of Shelbyville, for appellee.

HERRICK, Chief Justice.

This cause is brought here by appeal to review a judgment of the county court of Shelby county overruling objections made by appellant to a tax extended at a rate of eight cents on each $100 of assessed valuation of its property in that county, in addition to the rate of 25 cents extended for general county purposes, to pay principal and interest on bonds issued by the county pursuant to a vote of the people at a special election held August 13, 1934.

The facts are undisputed. The special election was called by a resolution adopted by the board of supervisors of Shelby county under the provisions of an act of the General Assembly entitled, ‘An Act to enable counties * * * to fund, retire and purchase their outstanding bonds and other evidences of indebtedness,’ etc., approved and in force February 13, 1865, as subsequently amended, and hereinafter referred to as the act of 1865 (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 113, § 1 et seq., Ill.Rev.Stat.1935, c. 113, § 1 et seq., p. 2520 et seq.), to vote on the issue of $150,000 of bonds to fund due and unpaid claims against the county. Included in the resolution, in the notice of election and in the form of the ballots used thereat, was also the question of whether an additional annual tax of eight cents on each $100 of assessed valuation of taxable property in the county for each of the years 1934 to 1947, inclusive, should be levied to prointerest on the bonds, such additional annual vide for the payment of the principal and tax of eight cents to be in addition to the tax of 25 cents per $100 of assessed valuation of taxable property permitted to be levied annually for county purposes without an election, and to be in addition to all other taxes authorized or permitted to be levied annually for any county purpose within the constitutional limitation, and to be in addition to the constitutional limitation of 75 cents per $100 of valuation of taxable property in the county. The affirmative of the proposition to issue the bonds and levy the additional tax was carried. The bonds were issued and the levy made. Appellant does not here question the validity of the bonds nor the obligation of the county board to levy and collect a tax for their payment, but the sole issue presented is whether the tax to be collected for payment of the bonds and interest shall come within the limitation of 25 cents fixed by section 25 of the Counties Act (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 34, § 25, Ill.Rev.Stat.1935, c. 34, par. 25, p. 984), or shall be in addition to such limitation.

Appellant calls our attention to the rule enunciated in People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., 360 Ill. 180, at page 188, 195 N.E. 631, to the effect that in determining the meaning of a grant of power to levy taxes strict construction will be given to that which is relied upon to confer the power but the construction will be liberal in all that tends to protect the taxpayer. We are in accord with that principle and have given it due consideration in the review of the present case.

Section 25 of the Counties Act confers upon the county board authority ‘to cause to be annually levied and collected, taxes for county purposes, including all purposes for which money may be raised by the county by taxation, in counties having less than 135,000 inhabitants not exceeding twenty-five (25) cents on the one hundred dollars' valuation * * * except taxes authorized as additional by a vote of the people of the county,’ etc.

The contention of appellant respecting the validity of the 8-cent levy is based upon the claim that sections 27, 27 1/2 and 28 of the Counties Act (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 34, §§ 27, 27a, 28, Ill.Rev.Stat.1935, c. 34, pars. 30, 30(1), 31, p. 986), under which appellee seeks to sustain the levy, contain no authority for submitting the question of voting on such tax levy at a special election but that the pertinent statutes permitted the submission of such question only at a general election, and the levy as made being without statutory sanction was therefore void.

Section 27 of the Counties Act provides, in substance, for voting on the assessment of taxes ‘the aggregate of which shall exceed the taxes which are authorized to be levied without a vote of the people as provided in Section 25 of this Act,’ at the next election for county officers or at any judicial election, with a proviso following that ‘if such additional rate required is for the purpose of building a court house, or any other public building for the county, a special election may be held for such purpose.’

Section 27 1/2 of the Counties Act provides, in substance, that ‘whenever the county board shall deem it necessary to assess taxes the aggregate of which shall exceed the constitutional limit of seventy-five cents per one hundred dollars valuation,’ the board may submit the question of assessing such additional rate ‘to a vote of the people at any general or special election called by the county board for that purpose,’ followed in the succeeding paragraph by the same identical proviso contained in section 27.

It is to be noted that in the first paragraph of section 27 1/2 express provision is made for voting on the assessment of taxes exceeding the constitutional limit of seventy-five cents on the $100 of assessed valuation at either a general or special election. This section in toto was enacted by the Legislature in 1929 while section 27 was enacted prior to that year but was aended in 1929. Both sections were in effect in 1934 at the time the election was called and held. It is logical, therefore, to assume that the provision for submitting the question of voting at either a general or special election under section 27 1/2 was used advisedly.

The appellant argues, however, that the language of section 27 1/2 should be strictly construed, and that under both sections 27 and 27 1/2 special elections might be called to vote on the proposition of levying taxes in addition to the statutory and constitutional limitations, respectively, only when the additional rate required is for the purpose of building a courthouse or other public building for the county; that the provisos to both these sections show an intent of the Legislature, as expressed in those sections, so to limit the power to call a special election only for the special purposes declared in the provisos. To grant appellant's contention would require the term ‘special’ to be deleted from section 27 1/2. It does not follow that because provision for holding an election under section 27 exclusive of the purposes stated...