People ex rel. Titzel v. Hill
Decision Date | 04 June 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 20614.,20614. |
Citation | 176 N.E. 360,344 Ill. 246 |
Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. TITZEL v. HILL, Warden. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Proceedings by the People, on the relation of Walter R. Titzel, Jr., for writ of habeas corpus to be directed to Henry Hill, Warden of Joliet Penitentiary.
Prisoner's discharge ordered.William W. Smith, Milton D. Smith, and Everett Jennings, all of Chicago, for relator.
Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., John A. Swanson, State's Atty., of Chicago, and Q. J. Chott, of Chicago (Merrill F. Wehmhoff, of Springfield, John P. Madden, of Gillespie, and J. J. Neiger, of Rock Island, of counsel), for respondent.
DE YOUNG, J.
An original petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of George Barker from the Illinois state penitentiary at Joliet was filed in this court in the name of the people of the state, on the relation of Walter R. Titzel, Jr., against Henry Hill, the warden and general superintendent of the penitentiary. The writ was issued, but service of the writ and the prisoner's personal presence in open court were waived. The respondent's return to the writ was followed by the petitioner's answer and traverse and his motion to discharge Barker from custody. The cause is submitted upon the record so made.
The relator alleges that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus charging that Barker and two other persons were unlawfully restrained of their liberty by William Blaul, lieutenant of police of the city of Chicago, and seeking their release from custody, was presented to the Honorable John P. McGoorty, one of the judges of the criminal court of Cook county; that the respondent Blaul, in his return to the writ issued upon that petition, stated that, if a continuance were granted until such time as the court might deem reasonable, an indictment would be sought against Barker; that, upon the petition and the return thereto, Judge McGoorty, on October 16, 1930, entered an order reciting that Barker theretofore had been convicted in the same court of the offense of grand larceny and sentenced to imprisonment in the state reformatory at Pontiac; that, while serving his sentence, he was released from the reformatory, on a writ of habeas corpus, by the order of the circuit court of Peoria county; that this order was void because the court had no jurisdiction to enter it, and that parole officers were present in court and ready to return Barker to the reformatory; that, after making the foregoing recitals, Judge McGoorty, by the same order, discharged Barker from the custody of the police, but, in addition, commanded a parole officer to return him to the reformatory; that, in obedience to this order, Barker was taken to the reformatory where he was imprisoned until November 19, 1930, when, pursuant to a later order entered by Judge McGoorty, he was transferred to the penitentiary at Joliet, where he since has been confined; that the order of October 16, 1930, except to the extent that it discharged Barker from custody, was neither based upon nor germane to the issue presented by the habeas corpus proceeding; and that the order was void.
It is further alleged in the present petition that on February 16, 1918, Barker was convicted in the criminal court of Cook county of larceny and sentenced to the reformatory to serve not less than one nor more than ten years; that he became a prisoner on March 5, 1918, and on June 17, 1919, the parole board permitted him to go and remain outside the walls of the reformatory under a parole agreement dated that day; that Barker remained on parole until December 24, 1926, when he was unlawfully returned to the reformatory; that on January 25, 1927, the parole board decided that he had not violated his agreement, and ordered him to continue on parole, and on February 12, 1927, he was again released from the reformatory; that the maximum punishment for the offense of which Barker was convicted was ten years; that he continued to serve his sentence during the period of time he was paroled from the reformatory, and that his sentence expired on March 5, 1928; that afterwards, on September 10, 1928, by direction of the parole board, a warrant for his arrest was issued, and on March 2, 1929, he was returned to the reformatory on the charge that he had gone to California without the consent of the parole board; that later, on March 20, 1929, the parole board by its order of that day, sustained the charge and declared Barker a parole violator; and that he was thereafter held and imprisoned in the reformatory.
The relator further alleges that on June 18, 1929, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in Barker's behalf in the circuit court of Peoria county; that in this petition Barker's conviction and sentence to the reformatory, his release on parole, his return to the reformatory and second release on parole, his subsequent return to the reformatory, and the parole board's finding that he had violated his parole, were alleged, and it was charged that Barker's departure for California was after the maximum period of his sentence had expired; that he went to California for the purpose of obtaining suitable and remunerative employment; that since his second release on parole he had conducted himself as a law-abiding citizen, and that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the warden of the reformatory; that the circuit court of Peoria county issued a writ of habeas corpus upon the foregoing petition; that in obedience to the writ the respondent, the warden of the reformatory, made a return thereto, and produced Barker in open court; that issues were joined, and on September 7, 1929, the circuit court of Peoria county, possessing jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties to the habeas corpus proceeding, adjudged that Barker was at the time unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the warden of the reformatory, and ordered his discharge from the latter's custody; that the circuit court of Peoria county, by its order, finally determined and settled that Barker was unlawfully restrained of his liberty; that, notwithstanding that Barker had served the maximum term for which he was originally sentenced by the criminal court of Cook county, and...
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