People ex rel. v. Illinois Commerce Com'n

• Decision Date: 20 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. 105131.,105131.
• Citation: 899 N.E.2d 227,231 Ill.2d 370
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. Lisa MADIGAN, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

899 N.E.2d 227

231 Ill.2d 370

The PEOPLE ex rel. Lisa MADIGAN, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, Appellee.

No. 105131.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

November 20, 2008.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Jan E. Hughes, Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Nissa J. Imbrock, John E. Muench and Jeffrey A. Berger, of Mayer Brown LLP, and Louise A. Sunderland, Karl B. Anderson, John T. Lenahan, Chicago, for appellee Illinois Bell Telephone Company.

OPINION

Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Plaintiff-Appellant, the Attorney General, electronically transmitted an application for rehearing with the Illinois Commerce Commission after the close of business on the application's due date. The Commission accepted the application, but ultimately denied rehearing. The Attorney General then appealed to the Appellate Court, First District. The appellate court transferred the appeal to the Fourth District, which then dismissed the appeal. The Fourth District relied on the Commission's regulations to determine that the Attorney General's application for rehearing was not timely, and therefore concluded the court lacked jurisdiction. The Attorney General petitioned this court for leave to appeal the dismissal, which we allowed pursuant to Rule 315 (210 Ill.2d R. 315(a)). This case presents the question whether the Commission's regulations require an electronic filing (e-filing) to be transmitted before the Commission's office closes in order to be timely filed and vest the appellate court with jurisdiction to hear a subsequent appeal.

BACKGROUND

On November 10, 2005, Illinois Bell Telephone Company (referred to by both parties as AT & T) requested the Commission to reclassify certain residential local services as "competitive." The details of the underlying request are not necessary to understand the question before this court, as the question here is purely procedural and does not require a discussion on the merits. It is sufficient to note the Commission had jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/13-502 (West 2006)). On August 30, 2006, after discovery and hearings, the Commission issued an order partially approving AT & T's request (original order). That document was dated August 30 and served on the parties the following day. That document was titled "Post Exceptions Proposed Order."

On September 7, the Commission served a second document on the parties. The second document was also dated August 30. Both parties acknowledge that the sole difference between the original order and the September 7 document is that the words "Post Exceptions Proposed" were removed from the title so that the title of the second document contained only the word "Order."

The Commission's docket describes both documents. It describes the original order as a "Final Order." The docket describes the September 7 document as a "Corrected Final Order." The docket entry for both documents is dated August 30. The docket lists no other order between August 30 and September 7.

Pursuant to the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/10-113(a) (West 2006)) all parties had the opportunity to file an application for rehearing within 30 days of the Commission's order.

The parties dispute whether the due date for filing was October 2, 30 days from the service of the Commission's original order dated August 30, or October 10, 30 days from the Commission's "corrected order" served September 7.¹

The parties also dispute whether the Attorney General's application for rehearing was timely filed on October 2. Various Commission documents indicate different filing dates for the Attorney General's application. The Commission's docket entry lists a "filed date" of October 3, 2006. The administrative law judge's recommendation of October 3, 2006, states the Attorney General's application as filed on October 2. The order denying the Attorney General's application for rehearing indicates an October 3 filing.

Although the parties dispute the actual filing date, both parties acknowledge the date and times at which they each transmitted their applications to the Commission. AT & T, using the Commission's e-filing system, transmitted its application at 4:04 p.m. on September 29, 2006. The Attorney General's office transmitted its application for rehearing, at issue in this case, at 5:34 p.m. on October 2, 2006.

The Commission accepted and considered both the Attorney General's and AT & T's applications for rehearing and denied them both on October 12. On October 13, AT & T submitted a petition for review with the Appellate Court, Fourth District, and a second petition for review with that same court on October 23. The Fourth District consolidated those appeals. On October 24 the Attorney General submitted its own petition for review with the Appellate Court, First District. AT & T moved to transfer the Attorney General's appeal to the Fourth District or, in the alternative, to dismiss the Attorney General's appeal based on its untimely filing of its application for rehearing. The cause was transferred to the Fourth District, which dismissed AT & T's appeals as premature. The Fourth District also dismissed the Attorney General's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because it determined that the Attorney General's application for rehearing was not timely filed. The Attorney General then sought leave to appeal in this court.

ANALYSIS

I. Effect of the Commission's September 7, 2006, Order

We first consider the Attorney General's argument that its application was timely because the order served on September 7 constituted an amended order that reset the time period for filing a petition for rehearing.

The Attorney General contends that the Public Utilities Act applies to any and all alterations in a Commission order. The Attorney General cites section 10-113, which authorizes the Commission to "rescind, alter or amend" any order or decision made by it. 220 ILCS 5/10-113 (West 2006). The Act provides that any alteration or amendment shall have the "same effect" as the Commission's original order. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Wisniewski v. Kownacki, 221 Ill.2d 453, 460, 303 Ill.Dec. 818, 851 N.E.2d 1243 (2006).

Although the issue is one of first impression for this court, the United States Supreme Court has considered this precise issue in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 245, 97 L.Ed. 245 (1952).

In Minneapolis-Honeywell a dispute arose over whether the appellant timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The appellant claimed, as in this case, that a second order issued two months after the first renewed the time period from which the parties could petition for certiorari. The appellate court had made no substantive change to the original order and, instead, made a change to the title of the document. The first document was labeled "Decree," while the second document was labeled "Final Decree."

In answering this question, the Supreme Court recognized that "the mere fact that a judgment previously entered has been reentered or revised in an immaterial way does not toll the time within which review must be sought." Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 211, 73 S.Ct. at 248, 97 L.Ed. at 252. "Only when the lower court changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity, in a judgment previously rendered should the period * * * begin to run anew." Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 211-12, 73 S.Ct. at 248-49, 97 L.Ed. at 252. The Court also noted the test is a practical one. "The question is whether the lower court * * * has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality." Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 212, 73 S.Ct. at 249, 97 L.Ed. at 252. Although Minneapolis-Honeywell does not bind this court, we find its reasoning sound and persuasive.

The factual similarity between Minneapolis-Honeywell and the present case is apparent. The only change to the Commission's August 30 order was removal of three words from the document's title. Rather than read "Order" the Commission's original order read "Post Exceptions Proposed Order." As the Court concluded in Minneapolis-Honeywell, "the question of whether the time * * * was to be enlarged cannot turn on the adjective which the court below chose to use in the caption of its second judgment," when the first judgment "was for all purposes final." Minneapolis-Honeywell, 344 U.S. at 212-13, 73 S.Ct. at 249, 97 L.Ed. at 252.

Here, the record and argument before us indicate that the August 30 order was for all purposes final. The September 7 document did not disturb or revise either party's legal rights and obligations that had been plainly and properly settled with finality. The parties understood the August 30 order to be a final order. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the Attorney General acknowledged that the Attorney General had been proceeding with the original order in mind, and suggested that an application for rehearing based on either order would be proper.

Rather than affect the parties' legal rights, the alteration here was de minimus, as removing three words from the document's heading merely corrected a trivial, clerical error. As such, the change did not serve to extend the parties' opportunity to file an application for rehearing.

We further conclude that section 10-113 does not change this analysis. Section 10-113 is a formal procedure the Commission must follow if it intends to rescind, alter or amend one of its decisions. However, the record indicates that the Commission did not rely on section 10-113 when it served the September 7 document. Although served on September 7, the second document was also dated August 30. The Commission's e-docket...