People ex rel. Vaughn v. Welch

Decision Date21 December 1911
Citation96 N.E. 991,252 Ill. 167
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. VAUGHN v. WELCH et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Lee County Court; Rebert H. Scott, Judge.

Action by the People, on the relation of Frank C. Vaughn, County Collector, against A. Cecil Welch and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.Carl E. Sheldon, for appellants.

Harry Edwards, John E. Erwin, and Frank J. Bowman, for appellee.

COOKE, J.

The county collector of Lee county made application to the county court for judgment and sale of the lands of appellants for the delinquent taxes assessed by drainage district No. 3 of the town of Montmorency, in Whiteside county. Appellants jointly filed 19 objections, which, upon motion of the people, were stricken from the files. Judgment was entered as applied for, and from that judgment this appeal was perfected.

The objections filed by appellants were: (1) That the classification was fraudulently changed after it had been decided upon by the commissioners; (2) that after the classification had been made two of the commissioners ‘signed a paper’ that it was not in accordance with justice and right; (3) that the objectors represent five-sixths of the assessment, and of the five landowners not objecting four had signed a statement that the classification was not in accordance with justice and right; (4) that said drainage district No. 3 had been absorbed by another district; (5, 6) that the assessments were in excess of the benefits; (7) that the assessment is greatly in excess of the amount required, and that the record of the commissioners does not show that such amount of money is necessary; (8, 9) that no itemized statement of the cost of the work and no plans for the proposed work have been filed with the town clerk; (10) that the plans do not provide for the building of bridges in inclosed fields; (11) that the assessment is against persons instead of against lands; (12) that the proposed ditch does not have an adequate outlet; (13) that two of the drainage commissioners, after the assessment was made, signed a statement that the proposed improvement is for a larger ditch than is necessary; (14) that the delinquent list does not show that the assessment is past due; (15) that the assessment was never confirmed; (16) that the delinquent list does not provide for the collection of interest; (17) that the right of way for the ditch has been assessed against the parties owning the lands through which it passes; (18) that the commissioners did not obtain jurisdiction over all the parties owning lands at the time the classification was made; and (19) that none of the lands in Lee county have been legally included within the district.

[1] The principal contention of the appellee in support of the action of the court in sustaining the motion to strike the objections is that the several landowners did not have the right to join in making the objections, for the reason that their interests are not identical and that they have no joint interest in the lands sought to be sold. It appears from the application for judgment and sale that the objectors owned separate tracts of land. They all joined in the objections, and under the holding in People v. Keener, 194 Ill. 16, 61 N. E. 1069, this was a proper method of procedure, provided all the objections made applied to the lands of each of the objectors. In that case, in passing upon the question whether, in such a proceeding as this, different owners may properly join in the objections, we said: ‘Where the objections are identical, and in the absence of anything to show that confusion or embarrassment will be produced by their being permitted to do so, we see no substantial reason for holding that they may not so join. To hold otherwise would often, in effect, produce a multiplicity of suits and cause delay and unnecessary expense without corresponding benefits.’ Unless it should be apparent from the objections themselves, when considered in connection with the application, that confusion or embarrassment would be produced by permitting the objectors to join, the court would not be warranted in sustaining a motion to strike them upon that ground.

[2][3] The court erred in sustaining the motion to strike as to objections 1, 5, 6, 7, and 19. Objection 1 was based upon the charge that, after the commissioners had agreed upon a classification, it had been so fraudulently changed that it was not in accordance with that decided upon or with what the commissioners had determined to be in accordance with justice and right. Drainage district No. 3 was organized under the statute commonly known as the farm drainage act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 42). This act provides, in detail, how the classification of the lands in a district shall be made, requires the commissioners to give notice to all the owners of lands in the district of a meeting at which objections made to the classification may be heard, and provides if the commissioners are satisfied that any injustice has been done in the classification they shall then correct the same in accordance with what is right, but, if not so satisfied, that the classification shall be left as first made and an order entered by the commissioners to that effect. From this final determination of the commissioners on the classification of the lands, any person who has appeared and objected to the classification may appeal to the county court, and upon such appeal the classification as made by the commissioners shall be reviewed by a jury, who shall have the power to correct or confirm the classification, as in their judgment the evidence shall warrant. If, after a classification has been finally made and determined upon, and before any assessment has been made in accordance with it, changes are fraudulently made in the classification, an assessment attempted to be made upon such classification so fraudulently changed is not valid, and this question may be raised by objection to the tax. It is apparent that any change in the classification must in some degree affect every landowner in the district. Appellee relies upon the case of Leonard v. Arnold, 244 Ill. 429, 91 N. E. 534, in support of the contention that objection 1 was properly stricken. But in that case it was complained that in the making of the classification the commissioners fraudulently classified their own lands lower than they should have been, and it was held that the charges of fraud merely went to the motive of the commissioners, and was equivalent to the charge that they had made an improper classification from mistake or want of judgment. The objection here is not based upon the ground that the commissioners committed any fraud in making the classification, but that after the same had been made and decided upon it was fraudulently changed.

[4] Objections 5 and 6 are the same. Under these objections proof should have been admitted. Under the constitutional provision relating to drainage, a special assessment can only be made on property benefited by the proposed improvement, and in no case may the assessment exceed the benefits to be derived from the proposed improvement. Havana Township Drainage District v. Kelsey, 120 Ill. 482, 11 N. E. 256.

[5] Special assessments are levied by virtue of section 26 of the farm drainage act. The act formerly contained a section 27, which provided for an appeal to the county court from any special assessment levied under section 26, but the act was amended in 1901 (Laws 1901, p. 147) by striking out section 27, since which time the property owner has no opportunity to be heard on any matter in reference to the special assessment until application has been made for judgment and sale of his lands for delinquent taxes. People v. Carr, 231 Ill. 502, 83 N. E. 269. As the objectors had the right to insist that the total assessments against their lands for the cost of the proposed improvement should not exceed the benefits, and as this was the first opportunity afforded them to be heard upon that question, the court erred in striking objections 5 and 6.

[6] The only argument made on behalf of appellee in support of this action of the court is that the interests of appellants are not identical under these two objections, and it is urged that as each tract of land is necessarily in a class by itself, on account of its location, soil, contour, etc., the determination of the question of benefits on joint objections would lead to confusion and embarrassment. A determination whether the assessment exceeded the benefits would not involve a consideration of the different characteristics of the various tracts of land in the district. Those matters were considered and adjusted when the classification was made, and if a classification is properly made...

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