People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf

• Decision Date: 13 May 1976
• Parties: , 350 N.E.2d 906 The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Robert F. WAYBURN, Law Guardian, on behalf of Charles L. (anonymous), Respondent, v. Harriet SCHUPF, as Acting Director of Detention Services, Human Resources Administration, Juvenile Center for Boys, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 518

385 N.Y.S.2d 518

39 N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906

The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Robert F WAYBURN, Law Guardian, on behalf of Charles L (anonymous), Respondent, v. Harriet SCHUPF, as Acting Director of Detention Services Human Resources Administration, Juvenile Center for Boys, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 13, 1976.

W. Bernard Richland, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Leonard Koerner, L. Kevin Sheridan and Diane R. Eisner, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Martin Guggenheim, Brooklyn, William R. Sneed and Charles Schinitsky, Brooklyn, for Charles L., respondent, and Robert F. Wayburn, Brooklyn, Law Guardian in person, on behalf of Charles L., respondent.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Jules E. Orenstein, Mineola, Samuel A. Hirshowitz and Gabriel I. Levy, New York City, of counsel), in his statutory capacity under section 71 of the Executive Law.

JONES, Judge.

We hold that the provision of the Family Court Act ¹ that authorizes pretrial detention of a youth charged as a juvenile delinquent when there is a serious risk that he may commit a criminal act before the return date of the petition does not violate the equal protection or due process provisions of our Federal or State Constitutions.

On October 8, 1974 a petition was filed in the Family Court of Kings County alleging that the 15-year-old youth on whose behalf this habeas corpus proceeding was instituted had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, assault in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, and menacing. On October 11, after a hearing, a finding of probable cause was made, and after additional testimony on the question of possible detention was received the court ordered the youth detained pending a fact-finding hearing on the petition to be held on October 23. In ordering the detention the court expressly stated that it had no doubt about the youth's appearance in court on the trial date but that there was a likelihood that he would commit another crime unless detained. ² Thus, the detention was predicated solely on subdivision (b), without reliance on subdivision (a), of section 739 of the Family Court Act, which provides:

' § 739. Release or detention after filing of petition and prior to order of disposition.

'After the filing of a petition under section seven hundred thirty-one or seven hundred thirty-two, the court in its discretion may release the respondent or direct his detention. In exercising its discretion under this section, the court shall not direct detention unless it finds that unless the respondent is detained:

'(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on the return date; or

'(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date do an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.'

Thereafter the present habeas corpus proceeding was instituted and an order of release pending the hearing was issued by a Justice of the Supreme Court who concluded that subdivision (b) of section 739 is violative of the equal protection clause because it authorizes pretrial detention of juveniles charged with criminal behavior while there is no comparable authority for pretrial detention of adults similarly charged (cf. CPL 510.30). Respondent has taken a direct appeal to this court pursuant to CPLR 5601 (subd. (b), par. 2) on the ground that the only issue involved is the constitutionality of the statute.

We are informed that since this appeal was taken to our court relator-respondent has been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and after a dispositional hearing has been placed at the New York training school. Thus, it may be said that any determination we may make has been rendered moot as to Charles L. Because the situation is likely to recur, however, and the substantial issue may otherwise never be reached (in view of the predictably recurring happenstance that, however expeditiously an appeal might be prosecuted, fact-finding and dispositional hearings normally will have been held and a disposition made before the appeal could reach us), both parties urge us to retain the present appeal and we decline to dismiss it on the ground of mootness (People ex rel. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 344 N.Y.S.2d 944, 945, 298 N.E.2d 109, 110).

We turn then to the equal protection and due process contentions.

We agree with the conclusion at Special Term that any pretrial detention impinges on the right to liberty, a fundament right that is recognized in the constitutional sense as carrying a preferred status and so is entitled to special protection. Accordingly, the legislative differentiation here in treatment between youths and adults is to be examined under strict scrutiny and may be justified only by the existence of a compelling State interest to be served by the differentiation, and even then only if no less restrictive means are available to satisfy that compelling State interest. (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342--343, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600; Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 59, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 14, 340 N.E.2d 444, 453.)

We disagree with Special Term, however, that under this strict standard the present statute works an impermissible denial of equal protection or due process. In our view there is a compelling State interest to be served in differentiating between juveniles charged with delinquency and adults charged with crime with respect to preventive detention, and in the very nature of the process there is no less offensive means to achieve the desired objective.

Subdivision (b) of section 739 authorizes pretrial detention to prevent another crime from being committed by the juvenile. This statute reflects the merger of two fundamental concerns of the State--to protect the community prospectively from the perpetration of serious crimes and to protect and shelter children who in consequence of grave antisocial behavior are demonstrably in need of special treatment and care. The cast of the statutory provision is noteworthy. The predicate which triggers the discretionary authority under the statute is a finding that there is a serious risk that the juvenile charged with delinquency may commit another criminal act--an objective fact. The statute omits to specify whether, on the basis of such a predicate finding, detention may be ordered for the protection of the public or for the benefit of the juvenile or both, and requires no supplemental statement by the court of the subjective purpose for which the detention is ordered. Thus, in the present case the record contains no recital by the Family Court Judge of the purpose behind the detention of Charles L.

Our society recognizes that juveniles in general are in the earlier stages of their emotional growth, that their intellectual development is incomplete, that they have had only limited practical experience, and that their value systems have not yet been clearly identified or firmly adopted. In consequence of what might be characterized as this immaturity, juveniles are not held to the same standard of individual responsibility for their conduct as are adult members of our society. That this is so is made manifest by the establishment and continuation of youthful offender procedures (CPL art. 720) and juvenile delinquency proceedings (Family Ct. Act, art. 7), under neither of which is there any accumulation of a criminal record or exposure to second-felony offender sentencing under section 70.06 of the Penal Law.

For the same reasons that our society does not hold juveniles to an adult standard of responsibility for their conduct, our society may also conclude that there is a greater likelihood that a juvenile charged with delinquency, if released, will commit another criminal act than that an adult charged with crime will do so. To the extent that self-restraint may be expected to constrain adults, it may not be expected to operate with equal force as to juveniles. Because of the possibility of juvenile delinquency treatment and the absence of second-offender sentencing, there will not be the deterrent for the juvenile which confronts the adult. Perhaps more significant is the fact that in consequence of lack of experience and comprehension the juvenile does not view the commission of what are criminal acts in the same perspective as an adult. It serves to refer to the common recognition of the high school 'lark', or to the relative indifference which the young attach, for instance, to shoplifting or to 'borrowing' an automobile and the unconcern with which they view the possibility of being apprehended. There is the element of gamesmanship and the excitement of 'getting away' with something and the powerful inducement of peer pressures. All of these commonly acknowledged factors make the commission of criminal conduct on the part of juveniles in general more likely than in the case of adults. Antisocial behavior of the young may be dismissed, or even be expected, as a 'prank', a characterization never applied to similar conduct of an adult. In consequence of these and other like considerations, protection of the public peace and general welfare justifies resort to special procedures designed to prevent the commission of further criminal acts on the part of juveniles as differentiated from adults.

From the other aspect, the State has a recognized interest in making provision for the protection and training of children in difficulty, a concern which is at the heart of the juvenile justice system. (Matter of Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196 197, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415, 247 N.E.2d 253, 254, revd. on other grounds Sub nom. Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.) This objective, for which there is...