People ex rel. White v. Busenhart

Decision Date27 September 1963
Docket NumberNo. 42,Nos. 37601,A,37618,42,s. 37601
Citation29 Ill.2d 156,193 N.E.2d 850
PartiesThe PEOPLE ex rel. Clark WHITE et al., Appellants, v. J. C. BUSENHART et al., Appellees. TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS OF TOWNSHIPppellees, v. Gerald A. SCHROEDER et al., Appellants.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Alfred M. Loeser and Stephen Lee, Chicago, for appellants.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield (William C. Wines and Edward A Berman, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for Busenhart et al.

Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Philip W. Tone, Albert J. Horrell and A. Howard Borde, Chicago (Thompson, Raymond, Mayer & Jenner, and Horrell & Borde, Chicago, of counsel), for Trustees of Schools of Tp. No. 42 et al.

HOUSE, Justice

This is an appeal by defendants, Gerald A. and Clara Johnson Schroeder, from certain orders entered in an eminent domain action, and an appeal by the Schroeders and others from an order denying their petition for leave to file a taxpayer's complaint for injunction against the condemnor school authorities. The appeals were consolidated by this court.

The litigation had its inception in the filing of condemnation proceedings by Township School Trustees for the use and benefit of School District No. 57, Cook County, Illinois, and is before this court the third time. The Schroeders' traverse was denied, the cause was heard and the jury returned a verdict of $267,083.33. The Trustees' motion for a new trial was allowed and, after granting leave to appeal, we reversed the order granting a new trial and remanded for entry of a judgment upon the verdict, but refused to review the ruling on the traverse. Trustees of Schools of Township No. 42, Board of Education of School District No. 57, Cook County v. Schroeder, 23, Ill.2d 74, 177 N.E.2d 178.

On October 18, 1961, the trial court, in accordance with our mandate, entered judgment for the amount of the verdict and costs, and on October 23, 1961, entered a further order finding that the judgment award had been paid to the county treasurer and that fee-simple title was vested in the Trustees, and empowered the Trustees to take possession of the condemned tract. The Schroeders' notice of appeal when the cause camp up the second time stated that the appeal was not only from the latter two orders which found fee-simple title in the Trustees, but also from the earlier order denying the traverse. However, the only issue there presented and argued was that the traverse should have been sustained on the ground that their land could not be taken because it was protected by the prohibition against taking property by eminent domain within 40 rods of an owner's dwelling. That issue was passed upon adversely to the Schroeders and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. (Trustees of Schools of Township 42 v. Schroeder, 25 Ill.2d 289, 184 N.E.2d 872.) While a petition for rehearing was pending on the second appeal the Schroeders' present counsel entered the case and filed a motion asking leave to file an additional petition for rehearing and for a stay order, which was denied by this court. They also filed various pleadings in the trial court, the essence of which were to vacate the judgment of October 18, 1961, and the order for possession dated October 23, 1961, to quash a writ of possession theretofore issued and to contest the issuance of a supplemental writ of possession prayed by petitioners.

On October 4, 1962, following the filing of our mandate in the second appeal (25 Ill.2d 289, 184 N.E.2d 872), the trial court entered orders directing the issuance of a supplemental writ of possession commanding the eviction of the Schroeders and the removal of their personal belongings from the property, restraining them from interfering with the condemnor's use of the property, dismissing a pending contempt proceeding against them and denying all other pending petitions and motions not specifically allowed or denied. This third appeal is from those orders.

In the eminent domain feature of this appeal the Schroeders seek to raise the following issues: (1) That the court had no 'jurisdiction' to enter judgment for the taking of a fee-simple title; (2) that the property is exempt from condemnation because of its location within 40 rods of the owners' dwelling; (3) that the ordinance (resolution) authorizing condemnation was void for lack of a quorum at the time of its passage; (4) that there was abandonment he appeal bond as directed; and (5) that the appeal bond was void.

All of these points could have been raised in the second appeal, in fact (2) above was conclusively adjudicated against the Schroeders, and they are now barred. The rule has long been recognized that no point which was raised, or could have been raised in a prior appeal on the merits, can be urged on a subsequent appeal, and those not raised are considered as waived. (Semple v. Anderson, 4 Gilm. 546; Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kirchoff, 149 Ill. 536, 36 N.E. 1031; Jackson v. Glos, 249 Ill. 388, 94 N.E. 502.) 'Where an order or decree is reversed and the cause is remanded by this court, with specific directions as to the action to be taken by the trial court, the only question properly presented on appeal is whether the order or decree is in accordance with the mandate and directions of this court.' (People v. National Builders Bank of Chicago, 12 Ill.2d 473, 476-477, 147 N.E.2d 42, 44.) Despite the rule, the prayer of the petition for the taking of a fee-simple title, and the failure to even include the question in the traverse, the Schroeders contend that it goes to the jurisdiction of the court and can be raised either directly or collaterally. In Chicago Housing Authority v. Berkson, 415 Ill. 159, 112 N.E.2d 620, the right of the condemnor to acquire property by eminent domain was questioned and alleged to be jurisdictional. It was there said, 415 Ill. at pages 161 and 162, 112 N.E.2d at page 621: '* * * (T)he objection was waived by failure to raise it at the appropriate time. The objection goes only to the right of the condemnor to acquire property by eminent domain. It does not affect the general jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of an eminent domain action.' There, the condemnor's right to acquire by eminent domain was attacked, while here only the extent of the estate to be taken is alleged to be grounds for going behind the judgment. We are of the opinion that the fee-simple-title question is barred. The assertion of abandonment is without merit. The time limitation of 150 days commences when the amount of the award has been finally determined. (County Board of School Trustees of Du Page County v. Boram, 26 Ill.2d 167, 186 N.E.2d 275.) Here the amount of compensation was not finally determined until our judgment on the first appeal was entered and the mandate issued. Rehearing was denied September 25, 1961. Judgment in accordance with the mandate was entered October 18, 1961, and the amount of the award was deposited the same day. Obviously the deposit was timely made.

The trial court's rulings were correct and the supplemental writ of possession in favor of the school authorities was properly authorized to issue.

We now turn to the appeal in the taxpayers action. A petition was filed by the Schroeders and 12 other taxpayers, residents of the school district, while the second appeal in the condemnation action was pending on rehearing, for leave to file a taxpayer's complaint for injunction. Objections to the petition were filed by respondent Noble J. Puffer, Superintendent of Schools of Cook County, and separate objections were filed by a number of other respondents to both the petition and the tendered complaint. After due proof of notice, the cause was heard on the petition, the proposed complaint and the objections, and the trial court entered its order denying leave to file the complaint.

The petition for leave is provided for in the statute regulating suits to restrain and enjoin the disbursement of public monies. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 102, pars. 11 to 16.) Section 4 (par. 14) provides in part: 'Upon such hearing, if the court or the judge thereof shall be satisfied that there is reasonable ground for the filing of such suit in equity, the court or judge may grant the petition and order the complaint to be filed and processs to issue.' Under this section it is also within the court's discretion to grant leave to file a complaint as to certain portions of the proposed disbursement or to deny leave entirely.

One of the purposes of the act was to provide a check upon the indiscriminate filing of taxpayers' suits. (Hill v. County of La Salle, 326 Ill. 508, 515, 158 N.E. 112.) It has been held that in the exercise of discretion under the statute in a taxpayer's action, the facts well pleaded in the petition and complaint must be considered as true. (Lund v. Horner, 375 Ill. 303, 31 N.E.2d 611; Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d 160; ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • People v. Wilson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 24, 1993
    ...appeal on the merits, can be urged on a subsequent appeal, and those not raised are considered waived." (People ex rel. White v. Busenhart (1963), 29 Ill.2d 156, 159, 193 N.E.2d 850; Kazubowski v. Kazubowski (1970), 45 Ill.2d 405, 259 N.E.2d 282.) As such, our determination in defendant's i......
  • Tillman v. Pritzker
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 20, 2021
    ...leave-to-file statute] was to provide a check upon the indiscriminate filing of taxpayers’ suits." People ex rel. White v. Busenhart , 29 Ill. 2d 156, 161, 193 N.E.2d 850 (1963). The circuit court's decision whether to permit the filing of a taxpayer action under section 11-303 is reviewed ......
  • PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Inv. Co.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 30, 1981
    ...574, 25 Ill.Dec. 629, 387 N.E.2d 285, cert. denied (1979), 443 U.S. 904, 99 S.Ct. 3096, 61 L.Ed.2d 872; People ex rel. White v. Busenhart (1963), 29 Ill.2d 156, 193 N.E.2d 850; People ex rel. McLaren v. DeBoice (1941), 377 Ill. 634, 37 N.E.2d 337; People v. National Builders Bank (1957), 12......
  • Kazubowski v. Kazubowski
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 24, 1970
    ...a prior appeal on the merits can be urged on subsequent appeal and those not raised are considered waived. (People ex rel. White v. Busenhart, 29 Ill.2d 156, 159, 193 N.E.2d 850. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kirchoff, 149 Ill. 536, 542, 36 N.E. 1031.) The rule obtains when a question sough......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT