People Ex Rel. William T. Johnson v. Peacock

• Decision Date: 21 March 1881
• Citation: 1881 WL 10462,98 Ill. 172
• Parties: THE PEOPLE ex rel. William T. Johnson, Collector, etc.v.JOSEPH PEACOCK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

98 Ill. 172

1881 WL 10462 (Ill.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. William T. Johnson, Collector, etc.

v.JOSEPH PEACOCK.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Springfield Mar. 21, 1881.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. MASON B. LOOMIS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. CONSIDER H. WILLETT, for the appellant:

Sec. 177, of the Revenue act, as amended in 1879, was not in force to apply to the taxes of 1879. People ex rel. v. Thatcher, 95 Ill. 109. But must govern after it took effect.

Back taxes, like current taxes, become delinquent each year by force of sec. 177, if such back taxes remain due and unpaid on the 10th day of March. We admit the rule to be, that no statute will be so construed as to give it a retrospective operation, unless intention manifestly appears. Breese v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 221; Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82; In re Tuller, deceased, 79 Id. 99; Price v. Mott,52 Pa. St. 315; City of Oakland v. Whipple, 44 Cal. 303; State v. Atwood, 11 Wis. 422.

We do not ask for any but a prospective operation of the law. The object of the section is to compel prompt payment of taxes, and has the like force upon back or current taxes. The language used is unequivocal, and demands a construction which makes this “one per cent per month” apply to all unpaid taxes.

Is not the statute remedial and governed by the construction put upon remedial statutes?

The legislature may change its revenue laws, imposing new conditions upon the collection of taxes already delinquent. Negus v. Yancey, 22 Ia. 57; Sully v. Kuehl, 30 Id. 275; Litchfield v. Webster Co. 101 U. S. 773.

That this one per cent per month is a penalty, and not interest, see Bouvier's Dic., title “Interest”; 2 Black. Com. 454; Madison Co. v. Bartlett, 1 Scam. 67; Phinney v. Baldwin, 16 Ill. 108; Willis v. Legus, 45 Id. 289; Popper v. Holmes, 44 Id. 360.

Such penalties are legal. Bristol v. Chicago, 22 Ill. 587; Scammon v. Chicago, 44 Id. 269; Cooley on Tax. 313.

If this statute is to be construed as interest, then it follows that this one per cent is special legislation, and unconstitutional.

Mr. EDWARD ROBEY, and Mr. GEORGE L. THATCHER, for the appellee:

The authority for the addition is sec. 177, introduced into the Revenue chapter by amendment, July 1, 1879.

Construing this section with the residue of the chapter, we see that the court did not err in refusing to add interest at one per cent a month, from May 1, 1880, to back taxes and forfeitures included in the warrant of 1879. The authority for adding those back taxes is sec. 129, supplemented by sec. 229. Section 129 requires the addition of the “back tax, interest, penalty and printers' fees remaining due on such real property, with one year's interest at ten per cent on the amount of tax due.” It is to be observed that all the interest due on the tax at the time of this extension is to be included in the amount, besides this “one year's interest;” and the conclusion follows, that this “one year's interest” is for the year to come. This is “one year's interest,” and the year must commence and end at some time. These words “one year's interest,” were wholly unnecessary, except to express an idea,--as the express words and expressed intent can not be rejected, and as all the back taxes, and all the interest due at the time of the issue of the tax books are to be included, without reference to any judgment. People v. Smith, 94 Ill. 229. And “one year's interest” is to be added to that. People v. Gale, 93 Ill. 127. And as there is no way in which these taxes can be collected by compulsion until the lands are offered for sale in the next year, it appears that this “one year's interest” is for this “one year's” forbearance of the money.

Section 177 is evidently intended to be confined to the taxes of the current year. Under it, they become delinquent in March succeeding the issue of the warrant, and bear interest at one per cent a month “ till forfeited;” then the tax and this interest are charged up against the land, under section 129, “with one year's interest at ten per cent of the amount of the tax due,” and after that, section 177 has nothing to do with this back tax, which is carried forward and pays interest under section 129. Hence the court did not err as appellant avers.

The counsel for the people insist that this imposition of one per cent is a penalty and not interest. If so, the statute must be construed strictly; and as there has been a penalty of like character imposed under section 129, the statute will not be liberally construed to impose two penalties on the same land.

In People v. Thatcher, 95 Ill. 109, p. 113, this court holds that this section 177, of 1879, has no application to taxes levied before its passage.

Mr. JUSTICE MULKEY delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is an appeal from a judgment and order of sale rendered by the county court of Cook county, at its July term, 1880, of certain real estate belonging to appellee, for the taxes, interest and costs thereon for the years 1873 to 1879, inclusive. This property had been regularly forfeited to the State for the taxes thereon for the several years mentioned previous to 1879.

Upon the hearing of the case, it was insisted by the collector that the court should, under the 177th section of the Revenue act, include in its judgment interest on the total amount of taxes from the 1st of May, 1880, at the rate of one per cent a month. The court, however, refused to allow this claim on the back taxes, but allowed it on the taxes of 1879, and we think properly. So much of the 177th section of the Revenue act just referred to as provides that “unpaid taxes shall bear interest after the first day of May, at the rate of one per cent a month until paid,”...