People ex rel. Wilson v. Wabash Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1938
• Docket Number: No. 24550.,24550.
• Citation: 368 Ill. 497,14 N.E.2d 650
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. WILSON, County Collector, v. WABASH RY. CO. et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

368 Ill. 497

14 N.E.2d 650

PEOPLE ex rel. WILSON, County Collector,

v.WABASH RY. CO. et al.

No. 24550.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 20, 1938.

Tax proceeding by the People, on the relation of L. E. Wilson, county collector, against the Wabash Railway Company and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff and an order of sale, the objectors appeal.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, with directions.Appeal from Christian County Court; W. B. McBride, Judge.

J. E. Hogan, of Taylorville, for appellants.

John W. Coale, State's Attorney, of Taylorville, for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

The county court of Christian county overruled objections of the Wabash Railway Company to certain taxes levied against its property in the year 1935 and entered judgment and order of sale. The objector appeals.

The levies objected to are: $4,500 for salary of the state's attorney; $4,000 for interest on county tax anticipation warrants; $8,860.20 for outstanding orders with the county clerk; certain items in the levy of the village of Palmer and the levies of certain school districts, hereinafter mentioned.

By section 4 of the Fees and Salaries Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 53, § 19, the salary of the state's attorney is required to be paid out of the fees, fines, forfeitures, and penalties collected by him and paid into the county treasury to the extent the fund will reach. Any balance above that amount is to be raised by general taxation. The county board has no authority to levy the full amount of the salary of the state's attorney. It may levy only the amount of the estimated deficiency in the collections of the state's attorney's office. People ex rel. v. Hines, 290 Ill. 519, 125 N.E. 336;People ex rel. v. Chicago Great Western Railroad Co., 279 Ill. 176, 116 N.E. 664;People ex rel. v. Jackson, 272 Ill. 494, 112 N.E. 344.

The state's attorney of Christian county receives $400 of his salary from the state treasury. The county budget for the fiscal year shows an item of $500 fees expected to be received from the state's attorney, aggregating $900 anticipated from sources outside the levy. It is to be remembered that the board, in calculating the amount of the deficiency necessary to be levied, had the right to take into consideration the probable loss and cost in collection, the delay in collecting the full amount levied, as hereinafter mentioned, and interest on any anticipation warrants which might be issued to provide for payment of the salary. A sum equal to such amounts could be included in the levy. The presumption is that the taxing officials properly discharged their duties and that the tax is just. The burden of overcoming this presumption rests upon the objector, and it may be overcome only be clear and explicit testimony. Gates v. Sweitzer, 347 Ill. 353, 179 N.E. 837, 79 A.L.R. 1151;People ex rel. v. Hassler, 262 Ill. 133, 104 N.E. 177. There is no showing here that the board did not take the proper elements into consideration in determining the amount of the levy, or that their estimate of the deficiency was grossly excessive. The mere circumstance that, in estimating in advance the amount that may be necessary for any purpose, a larger amount is levied than that actually required affords a taxpayer no right to refuse to pay his taxes unless the amount levied is so grossly excessive as to show a fraudulent purpose. Courts will not interefere with the decision of taxing bodies on the question of the amount to be levied where it does not clearly appear that they have abused the discretion vested in them. People ex rel. Batman v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 366 Ill. 408, 9 N.E.2d 310;People ex rel. v. N. J. Sandberg Co., 277 Ill. 567, 115 N.E. 741. If the particular levy was more than actually needed, the amount of the excess was necessarily so small that the maxim ‘De minimus non cureat praetor’ applies. The trial court did not err in overruling the objection to this item.

The budget and the levy for the fiscal year 1936 each contain an item of $4,000 for interest on anticipation tax warrants. While a detailed estimate of all receipts and expenditures is required to be contained in the budget, the statute nowhere authorizes a separate levy to pay interest on tax anticipation warrants. We have repeatedly held that such warrants may be issued only against taxes already levied, and the statute in mandatory terms requires that they shall show upon their face that they are payable solely from such taxes when collected and not otherwise. Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 146 1/2, § 2. Such warrants do not constitute an obligation of the taxing body issuing them, but the holder must look solely to the specific fund set apart for their payment. When the warrants are issued and sold or accepted, the transaction is closed on the part of the taxing body, leaving no future obligation upon it, either absolute or contingent. Berman v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 360 Ill. 535, 196 N.E. 464, 99 A.L.R. 1029;People ex rel. v. Nelson, 344 Ill. 46, 176 N.E. 59. Upon the negotiation of tax anticipation warrants they become a lien upon the taxes to be collected from the respective levies, and an appropriation, pro tanto, of such taxes, when collected, to the extent necessary to discharge the amount of the warrants. People ex rel. Gill v. Hamilton, 366 Ill. 455, 9 N.E.2d 243;Fuller v. Heath, 89 Ill. 296. The manifest purpose of the statute limiting the amount of the warrants that may be issued to a certain percentage of the levy is to provide for the payment of interest thereon out of the remainder, and neither the principal nor interest can be lawfully paid otherwise than from such respective funds when collected. The purpose of requiring detailed estimates of all receipts and expenditures in the budget is to enable the county board to make the levy for each fund large enough to cover the interest on any part of the fund which it may become necessary to anticipate. It follows that the creation of another fund with which to pay such interest results in double taxation, because the interest has already been provided for in the levy for the fund out of which it is solely payable.

In People ex rel. Gill v. Otis, 367 Ill. 136, 10 N.E.2d 672, the itemized calculations of estimated receipts and expenditures in the appropriation bill were carried verbatim into the levy. Among the appropriations were items for interest on tax anticipationwarrants. There was also included an appropriation from sources other than the levy, more than sufficient to pay the tax anticipation warrants. The amount of the levy was the difference between the total of the estimated expenditures for all purposes and the amount appropriated from sources other than the tax levy. We upheld the levy, but the ruling in that case has no application here. The trial court erred in overruling the objection to the levy for interest on tax anticipation warrants.

The item ‘Outstanding orders with county clerk’ manifestly refers to unpaid warrants drawn for claims approved by the board. It is not subject to the criticism that it is indefinite and uncertain. In People ex rel. v. Wabash Railway Co., 360 Ill. 173, 195 N.E. 665, and People ex rel. v. Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Co., 231 Ill. 498, 83 N.E. 113, we condemned levies ‘for payment of outstanding indebtedness at close of fiscal year,’ and ‘unpaid claims,’ as indefinite and not limited to claims allowed for...