People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson

• Citation: 155 Ill. 451,40 N.E. 307
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. WOODYATT v. THOMPSON, County Clerk.
• Decision Date: 02 April 1895
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

155 Ill. 451

40 N.E. 307

PEOPLE ex rel. WOODYATT

v.THOMPSON, County Clerk.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 2, 1895.

Appeal from circuit court, Lee county; John D. Crabtree, Judge.

Petition for mandamus by the people of the state of Illinois, on the relation of William H. Woodyatt, against James H. Thompson, county clerk of Lee county. The writ was denied, and the petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

George Hunt, E. S. Smith, and S. H. Bethea, for appellant.

S. P. Shope and D. P. Phelps, for appellee.

CARTER, J.

This suit involves the constitutionality of an act of the 38th general assembly, approved June 15, 1893, making an apportionment of the state into senatorial districts. A petition in the name of the people, on the relation of William Woodyatt, by Charles B. Morrison, as state's attorney of Lee county, for a writ of mandamus, was filed on the 15th day of October, 1894, in the circuit court of Lee county, against the appellee, James H. Thompson, as county clerk of that county, to compel him to make and deliver to the supervisors of the several townships notices for the election of one senator and three representatives at the November election, 1894, for the territory which, under the apportionment act of 1882, would be the nineteenth senatorial district, composed of the counties of Lee and Whiteside. By the act of 1893, making a new apportionment of the state into senatorial districts for the election of senators and representatives to the general assembly, and repealing the act of 1882, Lee county was placed with Dekalb, Kendall, and Grundy counties, to form the Twenty-Ninth district. The petition alleges that the districts formed by the act of 1893 are not formed of contiguous and compact territory, and do not contain as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants, as required by the constitution of the state. It further alleges that, according to the federal census of 1890, the state contained 3,826,351 inhabitants; that the senatorial ratio, ascertained as provided by the constitution, is 75,026, that number being the quotient of the total number of inhabitants divided by 51, the number of districts to be formed; that of this total number of inhabitants Cook county had 1,191,922, and was entitled to 15 senatorial districts, each having an average population of 79,461, leaving an average of only 73,178 for each of the 36 districts outside of Cook county. Many inequalities in population and wide departures from perfect compactness of territory, of the several districts, are pointed out in the petition, applying, perhaps, to as many as one-third of the total number of districts in the state. The inequalities in population of the districts outside of Cook county, of which complaint is made, vary between 62,007 (the lowest) and 88,454 (the highest) number of inhabitants in any district. But, as applied to adjoining districts, the differences in population which it is alleged might have been greatly reduced are not so great, amounting, however, in many instances, to upward of 24,000. It is also alleged that the districts in Cook county could and should have been formed of contiguous and compact territory, all containing substantially an equal number of inhabitants, but that, as formed by the act of 1893, they are not compact in territory, and are grossly and unnecessarily unequal in population, and inequalities in numbers and departures from perfect compactness of territory substantially as great as those pointed out in the districts outside of Cook county are set forth in the petition. As the objectionable features complained of appear almost as fully in the Twenty-Ninth district, where the relator resides, composed of the counties of Lee, Dekalb, Kendall, and Grundy, when compared with the adjoining Twenty-Fifth district, consisting of Will county alone, it is unnecessary to state the contents of the petition with further detail in respect to other districts. The differencein population between these two districts is 24,376; and it is alleged that if Grundy county, with a population of 21,024, had been joined to Will county, to form the Twenty-Fifth district, leaving the Twenty-Ninth composed of Lee, Dekalb, and Kendall, these districts would have been more compact in territory, and an approach made towards equality in population of 6,704; and that, by reason of the facts stated applicable to these and other districts mentioned, the act of 1893 is unconstitutional and void; and that the said county clerk should have been compelled to deliver the notices of the election for the election of a senator and three representatives from the Nineteenth senatorial district, formed by the act of 1882, instead of from the Twenty-Ninth district, formed by the act of 1893.

The answer admits the general allegations of the petition, but denies that the districts are not formed of contiguous and compact territory, and denies that the relator is deprived of equal rights of representation in the general assembly by the act of 1893, or that the rights of any citizen have been infringed thereby, and alleges that the districts contain as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. The answer further sets forth that the defendant has issued notices of election in the Twenty-Ninth district, as formed by the act of 1893, and denies that Lee county forms a part of any other district; avers that the general assembly has a discretion in the formation of districts as to population, limited only to the extent that the population of a district shall not vary from a senatorial ratio more than one-fifth of such ratio; that the passage of the act is a determination by the legislature that the several districts are formed of contiguous and compact territory, and as nearly equal in population as practicable; and that such determination is conclusive of those questions. The trial court overruled petitioner's demurrer to the answer, and rendered judgment dismissing the petition, and for costs, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted by the petitioner.

Counsel for appellant say that the only question involved is the constitutionality of the apportionment act of 1893, while counsel for appellee insist that the validity of the act of 1882 is equally involved. As the relator seeks relief under the act of 1882, on the assumption that it is still in force as a valid and constitutional act, it seems clear that if the act of 1893 be found invalid, the act of 1882 must be subjected to the same constitutional test, and, if it also be found invalid, judgment must go against the relator to the same extent as if the act of 1893 should be found to be valid. Indeed, a plausible argument is made by counsel for appellee on the theory that it clearly appears that both acts are subject to the same vice, and that this court should proceed no further, but affirm the judgment, on the ground that, if one act be void, both are, and that, even if relator should succeed in having the act of 1893 set aside, he must still fail in his suit to establish the legal existence of the alleged Nineteenth district, formed by the act of 1882; that the court can be called upon to determine the constitutionality of a statute only when such determination is necessary in the decision of a cause; and that it is unnecessary in this case, because, whether the relator succeeds or fails in his attack on the act of 1893, he must lose his case, both acts, if either should fall, going down together, before the same onset. This view was taken by Mr. Justice Elliott, of the supreme court of Indiana, in a separate opinion, in a similar cause in that court; but a majority of the court held that the constitutionality of the apportionment act there brought in question was fairly presented for decision. Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N. E. 836, and 33 N. E. 119.

While we recognize the well-settled and long-established rule that courts will not go out of their way to pass upon the constitutionality of a statute assailed, but will decide the case upon other grounds, when other grounds exist, and the cause can be properly determined without considering whether the act be valid or invalid, we are of the opinion that the question of the validity of the apportionment act of 1893 is not only fairly presented, but is necessarily involved in the decision of the case, and that, if the act is found to be invalid, the question whether or not the act of 1882 is unrepealed and constitutional would then arise. Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178,32 N. E. 836, and 33 N. E. 119. We are not disposed to evade the principal and really important questions raised by giving undue importance to technical objections, urged in the argument, whereby the case might possibly be decided, but its purpose defeated. Nor will the court look away from the record or the issues as made by the parties, to some ultimate and extrinsic purpose of the suit, to avoid any valid technical objection which, under our forms of legal procedure, should control the decision. But we shall not spend time on the preliminary questions raised, going to the competency of the petitioners to bring the suit, and to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain it. We are disposed to hold that the suit is properly brought, and that the court has jurisdiction. It would be a legal anomaly if the legislature could enact a statute in clear conflict with the express limitations fixed by the constitution in a matter of vital importance to all the people of the state, and the courts have no jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of such statute when directly involved in a pending case. It is not meant to be here said that the act or acts in question is or are in clear conflict with the limitations expressly fixed by the constitution, but only that the courts have jurisdiction to determine whether it is so or not, and, if such conflict be found to exist, to declare such act or acts void, and that this jurisdiction is not...