People ex rel. Yearian v. Speirs

• Decision Date: 24 April 1886
• Citation: 10 P. 609,4 Utah 385
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF UTAH TERRITORY, EX REL., WILLIAM H. YEARIAN, v. ADAM SPIERS, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

10 P. 609

4 Utah 385

THE PEOPLE OF UTAH TERRITORY, EX REL., WILLIAM H. YEARIAN, v. ADAM SPIERS, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

Supreme Court of Utah

April 24, 1886

Original application to the supreme court for a writ of prohibition. The opinion states the facts.

Mr John R. McBride, for the relator.

Mr. Le Grand Young, for the respondent.

BOREMAN J. POWERS, J., concurring. ZANE, C. J., dissented. ZANE, C J., and POWERS, J., concurred.

OPINION

BOREMAN, J.:

This is an application for a writ of prohibition. The petitioner was arrested on a warrant issued by the defendant, a justice of the peace, upon a complaint charging him with having resorted to a house of ill-fame for lewdness. Upon being taken before the justice the petitioner applied to have the matter submitted to the grand jury, which was then in session, but the justice decided that he had jurisdiction of the case, and required the petitioner to enter into bond in the penalty of $ 1000 for his appearance to answer the charge in the justice's court, and a time for the trial was fixed. Prior to the time set for the trial the petitioner, upon his affidavit, made application for a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the justice from further proceeding in the case, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, and excess of jurisdiction, in the justice of the peace to hear, try, and determine the matter. An alternative writ was issued, returnable into this court. The defendant filed his demurrer and answer to the petition. The demurrer and the case made by the petition and answer were argued together by the counsel for the respective parties, and we shall consider them together.

The demurrer was based upon the grounds that this court had no original jurisdiction of the subject of the action, and that the writ or petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This court can have no power to issue the writ of prohibition, unless it be conferred by the organic act, or some other act of Congress, or by some territorial statute within the power of the legislature to pass. The organic act of the territory (9 SOURCE IS NOT CLEAR provides that "the said supreme and district courts, respectively, shall possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction," and the supreme court of the United States says that this language "includes almost every matter, whether of civil or criminal cognizance, which can be litigated in a court of justice:" Ferris v. Higley, 87 U.S. 375, 20 Wall. 375, 22 L.Ed. 383.

We do not understand it to be denied that this court would have jurisdiction to issue the writ in aid of its appellate powers. The denial seems to go only to its power to issue the writ as an independent, original writ. This court, possessing appellate powers, has, as a part thereof, a superintending control over the inferior tribunals of justice throughout the territory, and has likewise a right to protect and enforce its appellate powers. The supreme court of the United States, although authority to issue writs of this class otherwise than as part of its appellate jurisdiction is denied to it by the constitution, which forbids its exercising any other than appellate powers generally, yet is held to be empowered to use these writs in aid of its appellate powers. In Marbury v. Madison, a mandamus case, that court recognized that mandamus could be used as part of its appellate powers, and it declared that "it is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create the cause:" 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60.

The same court again, upon certain applications for writs of habeas corpus, through Chief Justice Marshall, in the opinion of the court, seemed to place habeas corpus and mandamus in the same class, and referred to the case of Marbury v. Madison, and held that in the matter then before the court the appellate powers alone of the court were sought to be exercised; that in granting the writs of habeas corpus it was the purpose to revise the decision of an inferior court by which a citizen had been committed to jail; and that such revision was simply the exercise of appellate jurisdiction: Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 4 Cranch 75, 2 L.Ed. 554.

In the case at bar it is likewise sought to revise and correct the proceeding in a cause already instituted, and not one created by this court, and to prevent further action where the court below is claimed to be acting without authority of law, and which, without authority, may commit a citizen to prison. The writ of prohibition is oftentimes resorted to in aid of the appellate power of the court, for the purpose of preventing unauthorized action by an inferior court, and to control the action of the lower court. 1 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 341; 2 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 214. We are, therefore, inclined to think that it is only necessary to invoke the appellate powers of this court in order to obtain sufficient authority for issuing the writ in the case at bar.

It seems clear, then, that authority in this court to issue these writs--at least in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the court--is conferred under and by the general language of the organic act granting chancery and common-law jurisdiction, and authorizing appeals to this court. But the more consideration we give to this general language, "chancery and common-law jurisdiction," the more strongly are we inclined to hold that, under it, this court has full power to issue these writs, not only in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the court, but also as an independent, original proceeding, aside from appellate powers. From the reasoning of the supreme court of the United States we are inclined to think that that court would have so held in regard to its own powers had it not been for the prohibiting clause of the constitution: Const. art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 2. There is no such prohibition upon the original jurisdiction of this court. It is evident that if the language of the original act was to cover those writs at all, they were to cover the writs as known at the common law.

At common law the writ of prohibition and the other writs, were used, not only in aid of appellate jurisdiction, but also as original, independent writs, aside from appellate power of the court issuing the same. The question as to the power of this court to issue the writ of prohibition has never heretofore been presented to this court, but the authority to issue writs of certiorari and mandamus, which belong to the same general class of special proceedings as prohibition, has been passed upon.

In the case of Shepperd v. Second District Court it was held that this court could issue the writ of mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and not otherwise: 1 Utah 340.

In the case of Young v. Cannon it was held that this court had jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari under the territorial statute: 2 Utah 560; Civil Proc. Act, section 434 (Comp. Laws, 521), similar to section 951 of present Code of Civil Procedure (Laws 1884, p. 322.)

In the case of Maxwell v. Burton, 2 Utah 595, it was held that this court had jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus under territorial statutes, and that such provision was not in conflict with the Poland act, giving exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts in certain matters, and that the case of Shepperd v. Second District Court, in so far as it held a contrary doctrine, was disapproved: Civil Proc. Act, sec. 445 (Comp. Laws, 523); Poland Act, Supp. Rev. St., U.S., c. 469, p. 105.

The conclusion to be drawn from these decisions is that whether this court has, under the organic act, and subsequent acts of Congress, original jurisdiction or not to issue the writs of this class, is not material, as the legislature of the territory has authority to give such jurisdiction, and has done so. If the legislature has such authority, and has exercised it, and has in clear and plain terms conferred upon this court such original jurisdiction, then this court has such authority in any phase of the case in which it may be viewed. The organic act (section 6) provides "that the legislative power of said territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act." The question of jurisdiction, so long as the action thereon is consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress, is held to be a rightful subject of legislation: Ferris v. Higley, 87 U.S. 375, 20 Wall. 375, 22 L.Ed. 383.

Our attention has not been called to any provision of the Constitution, or of the organic act, or any other act of Congress, with which such legislation would be inconsistent, nor do we know of any such provision, or believe that any exists. There being, then, no known inconsistency, the conclusion is inevitable that the legislature has the power to confer the jurisdiction on this court to issue the writ as an original independent writ aside from any appellate jurisdiction possessed by the court. The Code of Civil Procedure declares that the writ may be issued "by any court except probate and justices' courts" (Laws 1884, p. 326, sec. 983); and it further provides (Id. 158) as to the supreme court, as follows:

"Sec. 19. The jurisdiction of this court is of two kinds: First, original; second, appellate.

Sec. 20. Its original jurisdiction extends to the issuance of writs of mandate, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction."

When the decisions of this court already referred to were made these two sections had not been enacted. The authority to this court to issue the writ of prohibition as an...