People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court, S.F. 23322

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Citation: 16 Cal.3d 30,544 P.2d 1322,127 Cal.Rptr. 122
• Decision Date: 04 February 1976
• Docket Number: S.F. 23322
• Parties: , 544 P.2d 1322 The PEOPLE ex rel. Evelle J. YOUNGER, as Attorney General, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF OAKLAND et al., Real Parties in Interest.

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127 Cal.Rptr. 122 16 Cal.3d 30, 544 P.2d 1322 The PEOPLE ex rel. Evelle J. YOUNGER, as Attorney General, etc., et al., Petitioners,
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent;
BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF OAKLAND et al., Real Parties in Interest. S.F. 23322. Supreme Court of California,
In Bank. Feb. 4, 1976.
Rehearing Denied March 3, 1976.

[16 Cal.3d 33]

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[544 P.2d 1323] Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Carl Boronkay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roderick Walston, William M. Chamberlain, Gregory K. Wilkinson and Richard C. Jacobs, Deputy Attys. Gen., for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

J. Kerwin Rooney, Gerald P. Martin, Jr., Oakland, Charles Negley, Maloney, Chase, Fisher & Hurst, San Francisco, and Joseph D. Ryan, Berkeley, for real parties in interest.

Lillick, McHose & Charles, Frederick W. Wentker, Jr., and Gary P. Snyder, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of real parties in interest.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

The People, on the relation of the Attorney General and of the California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Francisco Region (Regional Board) seek a writ of mandate directing respondent superior court to vacate its order granting judgment on the pleadings and its pretrial order in the underlying action for the imposition of civil penalties pursuant to section 13350, subdivision (a)(3) [16 Cal.3d 34] (3) of the Water Code. ¹ Essentially we are called upon to construe the foregoing statute and to determine (1) whether the civil liability provided for therein may be imposed upon a public entity; (2) whether such liability may be imposed without fault or requires proof of negligence or intent; and (3) whether the maximum $6,000 per day liability may be imposed for each day the oil referred to in the statute remains in the state waters or only for each day that it is deposited therein.

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[544 P.2d 1324] The facts in brief are these: On January 19, 1973, 125,000 gallons of oil were discharged into the waters of the Oakland Estuary from oil storage tanks located on real property owned by real party in interest Board of Port Commissioners of the City of Oakland (Port of Oakland). The tanks and the oil stored therein were owned by real parties in interest Port Petroleum Co., Purity Oil Sales, Inc., Economy Refining Service Co., Inc., dba Pacific Petroleum Co., and Michael D. Marcus. The oil discharge occurred when unknown persons entered upon the property and opened valves on the tanks and connecting pipes.

Following three days of hearings, the Regional Board found the facts to be as stated above, concluded that the failure to surround the tanks with a wall and to provide adequate security as a protection against intruders was a contributing cause of the oil discharge, and that the Port of Oakland and the owners of the tanks were responsible under section 13350, subdivision (a)(3), for causing or permitting oil to be deposited in the waters of the state. Accordingly, the Regional Board requested the Attorney General to take appropriate action.

On June 7, 1973, through the Attorney General, the People (hereafter plaintiff) brought the underlying action for civil penalties against real parties in interest (hereafter defendants). On May 16, 1975, following [16 Cal.3d 35] argument on cross-motions for summary judgment and on defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings, respondent court granted the motion of defendant Port of Oakland for judgment on the pleadings 'for the reason that Water Code section 13350 imposes liability primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishment, and the defendant Port is immune from such liability pursuant to Government Code section 818.' The court denied the motions for judgment on the pleadings of the remaining defendants and also denied all motions for summary judgment and partial summary judgment made by all of the parties. On May 28, 1975, respondent court issued a pretrial order governing the prosecution of the action against the remaining defendants in the case in which it directed that in order to establish the liability of said defendants under section 13350, subdivision (a)(3), plaintiff must prove that they negligently or intentionally caused or permitted an oil spill and further determined that such section imposes liability only for each day that oil enters the waters of the state and not for each day that oil remains on the waters before being removed. At the same time the court entered a judgment of dismissal as to defendant Port of Oakland.

Plaintiff thereupon filed the instant petition. We issued an alternative writ of mandate, having determined that "there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and that (this) case is a proper one for the exercise of our original jurisdiction.' (Citations.)' (Brooks v. Small Claims Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 661, 663, 105 Cal.Rptr. 785, 786, 504 P.2d 1249, 1250.)

We turn to the merits. Government Code section 818 provides: 'Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.' ² This section was added to the code upon the recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission, which commented: 'Public entities should not be liable for punitive or exemplary damages. . . .' (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 4 Cal. Law Revision Com.Rep. (Jan.1963) p. 817.) Damages which are punitive in nature, but not 'simply' or solely punitive in

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[544 P.2d 1325] that they fulfill 'legitimate and fully justified compensatory functions,' have been held Not to be punitive damages within the meaning of section 818 [16 Cal.3d 36] of the Government Code. (Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 13, 14--16, 84 Cal.Rptr. 173, 465 P.2d 61; State Dept. of Corrections v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 885, 97 Cal.Rptr. 786, 489 P.2d 818.)

In Helfend we observed that while the collateral source rule ³ may be punitive in nature in that it requires a wrongdoer to pay damages for an injury for which compensation may have been made in whole or in part, it is not simply, that is solely, punitive. This is so, we pointed out, since the rule 'embodies the venerable concept that a person who has invested years of insurance premiums to assure his medical care should receive the benefits of his thrift.' (2 Cal.3d at pp. 9--10, 84 Cal.Rptr. at p. 178, 465 P.2d at 66.) We reasoned that the rule not only expressed a policy of encouraging persons to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries but also effectuated a closer approximation to a full compensation for them. Accordingly, we held that these legitimate and important functions of the collateral source rule, which are compensatory in nature, dictate that damages awarded in tort cases where the plaintiff has been compensated by an independent collateral source, should not be classified as punitive within the meaning of section 818 of the Government Code. We concluded that '(i)n view of the several legitimate and important functions of the collateral source rule in our present approach to the law of torts and damages, we find no appropriate justification for labelling the rule 'punitive' or for not applying it to public entities and public employees . . ..' (2 Cal.3d at p. 16, 84 Cal.Rptr. at p. 183, 465 P.2d at p. 71.)

In State Dept. of Corrections this court held that the provision in Labor Code section 4553 to the effect that compensation recoverable by an employee for an industrial injury shall be increased by one-half if he is injured by reason of the serious and wilful misconduct of the employer, does not award punitive damages within the meaning of section 818 of the Government Code. Again we noted that the rule is punitive in nature in that the employer 'is required to pay a higher amount of compensation by reason of his serious and wilful misconduct than he would have been compelled to pay if his conduct were less culpable' (State Dept. of Corrections v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 5 Cal.3d 885, 890, 97 Cal.Rptr. 786, 789, 489 P.2d 818, 821) but that it is not simply, that is solely, punitive because it does not result in an award greater than full compensation for the injury. We concluded [16 Cal.3d 37] that since the increased award for wilful misconduct of the employer is not 'beyond the equivalent of harm done' but rather 'contemplates more fully compensating the plaintiff for an industrial injury rather than penalizing the employer, we hold that the award made here does not violate section 818 of the Government Code.' (Id. at p. 891, 97 Cal.Rptr. at p. 790, 489 P.2d at p. 822.)

Plaintiff concedes that the civil liability imposed by section 13350, subdivision (a)(3), is punitive in nature in that it seeks to deter oil spills in state waters and, by making it costly to be held responsible for them, to impress upon the public the necessity of taking every precaution against their occurrence. However, plaintiff contends that such liability is not solely punitive as it fulfills legitimate compensatory functions. ⁴ In the first place, such

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[544 P.2d 1326] civil liability compensates the people of the state for the unquantifiable damage which an oil spill causes; and secondly, the money recovered as a result of the imposition of the liability is used to aid in cleaning up and abating the pollution of state waters. As to plaintiff's first point, it is clear, we think, that the damage resulting from the deposit of oil in state waters is by its very nature unquantifiable. The harm caused not only to the waters themselves but to the wildlife and marine life dependent upon them as well as its pervasive and continued effect defies a general assessment of damages to say nothing of their calculation in terms of money. ⁵ Thus the

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[544 P.2d 1327] moneys...