People in Interest of G.W.R., 95CA1128

• Citation: 943 P.2d 466
• Case Date: March 20, 1997
• Court: Court of Appeals of Colorado

Page 466

943 P.2d 466 21 Colorado Journal 395 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,
In the Interest of G.W.R., Juvenile-Appellant. No. 95CA1128. Colorado Court of Appeals,
Div. A. March 20, 1997.
Rehearing Denied April 17, 1997.
Petition for Certiorari Denied Sept. 2, 1997.
Cross-Petition for Certiorari Granted Sept. 2, 1997.

Page 467

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Denver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Anne Stockham, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Chief Judge STERNBERG.

G.W.R., a juvenile, appeals from a judgment adjudicating him a delinquent after a jury found him guilty of committing acts that would constitute one count of sexual assault on a child. Among other contentions on appeal, G.W.R. argues that he was denied a speedy trial and that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements regarding similar offenses against other children. We affirm.

At trial, the prosecution presented testimony that the victim's father discovered G.W.R. molesting the father's six-year-old son. Also, the prosecutor introduced similar transaction testimony from five other witnesses. The first two testified that they had seen G.W.R. fondle two girls, one two and one three years old. Three other witnesses testified they had been told by a three-year-old girl, T.K., that G.W.R. "touched her" inappropriately.

As to the latter testimony, the trial court conducted an in-camera hearing as required by statute to determine the admissibility of T.K.'s hearsay statements, and ruled that the witnesses could testify to what T.K. told them. G.W.R. did not then object to this ruling, and the three witnesses testified to what the girl had told them. The adjudication here at issue followed.

I. Speedy Trial

G.W.R. first contends that reversal is required because his right to a speedy trial was violated. Specifically, he argues that because he was detained without bail, the court was required to try him or release him within sixty days. Under the circumstances here, we disagree.

Sections 19-2-204 & 19-2-205, C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.) of the Children's Code provide standards for the detention of juveniles, and these standards satisfy constitutional requirements of fundamental fairness. People v. Juvenile Court, 893 P.2d 81 (Colo.1995).

Section 19-2-205 specifically requires that a juvenile held without bail be tried within sixty days of the order denying him bail. However, § 19-2-502, C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.), of the Children's Code provides that a juvenile's right to speedy trial is governed by § 18-1-405, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), which provides in relevant part:

If a trial date is offered by the court to a defendant who is represented by counsel and neither the defendant nor his counsel expressly objects to the offered date as being beyond the time within which such trial shall be had pursuant to this section, then the period within which the trial shall be had is extended until such trial date and may be extended further pursuant to any other applicable provisions of this section.

Here, there was no dispute that G.W.R. was detained for more than sixty days after his detention hearing, and before his trial began. However, G.W.R., through his counsel, affirmatively accepted a trial date beyond that sixty-day period. Therefore, we hold that G.W.R. waived his right to the speedy trial protections of §...