People in Interest of L. V. A.
| Decision Date | 16 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 11938,11938 |
| Citation | 248 N.W.2d 864 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of South Dakota in the Interest of L.V.A., a child. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Gary R. Richards, Spearfish, for appellant.
Harry W. Christianson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for respondent State of South Dakota; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief.
This case is before us on an intermediate appeal from a transfer certificate of the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit At the transfer hearing and in this appeal the juvenile raises the following questions:
for Butte County. By its transfer certificate, the circuit court transferred L.V.A., a juvenile, to adult court for criminal proceedings upon two counts of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
(1) Is SDCL 26--11--4 unconstitutional for vagueness;
(2) Was there sufficient evidence to justify transfer.
(3) Does jeopardy attach at a juvenile transfer hearing;
(4) Does a right of appeal exist from a transfer order; and
(5) Was a photograph of the scene erroneously admitted.
In the early morning hours of February 26, 1976, police officers Herb Lurz and Dan Rogers of Belle Fourche, South Dakota, received a radio call reporting gun shots near Eighth and State Streets in Belle Fourche. The officers responded to the call. Near the intersection of Eighth and State Streets several shots were fired at the police vehicle, breaking the red light and windshield. The police officers saw no one in the vicinity and they could not determine the direction from which the shots came.
Between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m., the juvenile and two male companions had left a teenage party in Belle Fourche, the juvenile and one of his companions each carrying a .22 caliber rifle. Later, they returned to the party, breathing hard, still in the possession of the rifles, and explaining that they 'had fired their rifles downtown.'
A petition alleging the delinquency of the juveniles was filed February 27, 1976, by the Butte County State's Attorney. The act of delinquency was alleged to be the shooting at the officers with the intent to kill. After the juvenile was released on bond, the attorney general filed a 'Petition and Request for Transfer Hearing' on March 17, 1976, alleging attempted murder and conspiracy.
A transfer hearing was held on March 23, 1976, at which time the above facts were established. In addition, a court service worker testified about his investigation of the juvenile and offered his opinion that the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile was limited.
Following the transfer hearing the court entered findings of fact and reasons for transfer in addition to a certificate transferring the juvenile to adult court.
The juvenile's first contention is that SDCL 26--11--4 1 is unconstitutionally vague and violative of the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. VI, § 2, of the South Dakota Constitution.
The juvenile asserts that the statute fails to provide adequate criteria or standards to guide the juvenile court in determining whether to transfer a juvenile to adult The 'vagueness' argument rests upon either the theory that there has been a delegation of legislative authority with standards inadequate to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory administrative actions, or that the statute is so vague that a person cannot reasonably know what conduct the law expects from him. Neither of these theories has any application to SDCL 26--11--4. In a transfer hearing the circuit court is acting in its capacity as the juvenile court nad not as an administrative agency. SDCL 26--7--1. Neither does the statute attempt to define any criminal conduct; instead, it establishes the judiciary's function in determining the legal proceedings to be used in the processing of a juvenile for certain violations of the laws of the state. 3
court. The juvenile relies solely upon People v. Fields, 1972, 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217, in which a similar Michigan statute was held to have been unconstitutionally vague 2
Furthermore, when considered with the intent of SDCL, Chapters 26--7--26--8 and 26--11 (), the statute provides a sufficient standard to prevent the exercise of the juvenile court's discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory manner. 4
However, because a transfer hearing is a "critically important' action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile,' it is subject to the 'constitutional principles (of) due process and the assistance of counsel.' Kent v. United States, 1966, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. Those due process requirements are required by South Dakota statutes as well as by Kent.
Before transfer, the juvenile is entitled to a hearing, and notice of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing must be given to the juvenile, his parents, guardian or other custodian and their attorneys. Kent v. United States, supra; SDCL 26--8--11, 26--8--12, 26--8--13, 26--8--13.1; SDCL 26--8--22.1 and SDCL 26--11--4. The petition for The juvenile to the effective assistance of counsel, and, if he is without sufficient of financial means, counsel must be appointed by the court. Kent v. United States, supra; SDCL 26--8--13.1; SDCL 26--8--22.1 and 26--8--22.2. Prior to the hearing, the juvenile's parents had retained Mr. Richards. However, at the transfer hearing the juvenile requested that he be provided with appointed counsel, and Mr. Richards was appointed. The record reflects that he was adequately prepared and provided effective representation at the transfer hearing.
transfer served six days in advance provided adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the hearing. Although the record does not show notice of the time and place of the hearing, all parties were present and no objection has been made that adequate notice was not given.
Counsel for the juvenile must be given access to and a meaningful opportunity to review the court records and social reports submitted, reviewed, or admitted as evidence, so that they may 'be subjected * * * to examination, criticism, refutation.' Kent v. United States, 383, U.S. at 563, 86 S.Ct. at 1058; see also SDCL 26--8--30; SDCL 26--11--4. Only the investigative report of the court service worker was reviewed and received as evidence, and it had been furnished to counsel prior to the hearing.
It is incumbent upon the juvenile court, in addition to the order of certification as required by SDCL 26--11--4, to accompany it Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 561, 86 S.Ct. at 1057. Here, the court set forth in a six-page 'Statement of Facts and Reasons for Transfer' a summary of the evidence presented, the criteria used in making a determination to transfer, 5 and the reasons for transfer under those criteria. The 'Statement of Facts and Reasons for Transfer' provided an adequate basis for review by this court.
We find the standard of SDCL 26--11--4 to be adequate to meet any attack that it is unconstitutionally vague, that the statutes heretofore cited are applicable to transfer hearings, and that the procedures used at the hearing satisfy the due process requirements.
Although we find SDCL 26--11--4 contains a standard sufficient to meet the constitutional challenges, the discretion of the juvenile court to transfer may not be exercised arbitrarily. To assist the juvenile courts, the United States Supreme Court and many other courts have approved or adopted standards for the transfer of a juvenile to adult court. 6
An examination of these standards reveals two basic areas of consideration: (1) the circumstances of the crime, and (2) the amenability of the juvenile to treatment within the juvenile system. Because of the separability of the evidence involved, we suggest that the transfer hearing consider the problems of transfer in two phases.
In the first phase, the court should consider evidence of the circumstances surrounding (1) Prosecutive merit. The court must be presented with evidence which establishes that the public offense alleged in the petition has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the offense. 7
the alleged violation. Initially, there must be a determination that the factual evidence warrants further proceedings, that is:
(2) Seriousness of the alleged offense. Although the seriousness of the offense alone does not warrant transfer, when considered with the other criteria, it may become the deciding factor in making a transfer. 8
(4) Subject of the alleged offense. Greater weight may be given by the court to offenses against persons, particularly where personal injury has resulted.
(5) Motivation for the commission of the alleged offense. Evidence of an advance plan or scheme may be considered, as well as the apparent reasons for the commission of the alleged offense.
(6) Ages and circumstances of other persons involved in the alleged offenses. Although the existence of adult companions may be considered, the convenience of prosecuting several defendants at one trial should not be given undue weight.
If there has been evidence presented establishing a public offense and probable cause to believe the juvenile committed the offense, the court should then hear evidence to determine whether the juvenile is amenable to the rehabilitative treatment available within the juvenile system. Factors which may be considered are:
(1)...
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