People of Porto Rico v. Fortuna Estates, 1526.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1922
• Docket Number: 1526.
• Parties: PEOPLE OF PORTO RICO v. FORTUNA ESTATES et al. [1]
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

279 F. 500

PEOPLE OF PORTO RICO v. FORTUNA ESTATES et al. ^[1]

No. 1526.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

March 8, 1922

Lt Col. Grant T. Trent, Judge Advocate, of Washington, D.C., and Joseph A. Loret, of San Juan, P.R. (Salvador Mestre, Atty Gen. for Porto Rico, and Capt. Arthur W. Beer, Judge Advocate, of Washington, D.C., of counsel), for the People of Porto Rico.

Rounds Hatch, Dillingham & Debevoise, of New York City (Francis E Neagle, of New York City, and O. B. Frazer and Nelson Gammans, both of San Juan, P.R., of counsel), for appellees.

Before BINGHAM, JOHNSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

BINGHAM Circuit Judge.

This an action of ejectment or 'revindication' originally brought by the people of Porto Rico against Fortuna Estates, a New York corporation, in the district court for the judicial district of Ponce, Porto Rico. The process was served March 10, 1917. March 20, 1917, on the petition of the defendant, accompanied by the requisite bond, the cause was removed to the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico by order of the district court of Ponce, on the ground that the matter in controversy exceeded the sum or value of $3,000, not including interest or costs, and that the defendant was a citizen and resident of New York and not domiciled in Porto Rico. May 23, 1917, the people of Porto Rico moved to remand the cause on the ground that no diversity of citizenship existed. This motion was denied August 21, 1917, subject to plaintiff's exception. August 22, 1918, the plaintiff was allowed to amend its complaint and join Russell & Co., S. en C., as a defendant, it appearing that subsequent to the denial of the motion to remand Fortuna Estates had conveyed its title to the land in question to Russell & Co., S. en C., a partnership organized under the Civil Code of Porto Rico, the members of which were all citizens of a state of the Union, except one, who was a subject of Great Britain-- none of the partners were domiciled in Porto Rico.

In the amended complaint, after setting out the parties, the plaintiff alleged that it was the owner in fee simple of certain land situated in the municipality of Ponce 'at the place known as 'El Tuque' or 'Las Cucharas,' being known and described as follows: One hundred and seventy-five (175) cuerdas, containing a lagoon bounded on the north by the hacienda 'Reparada,' on the south by the Antillian Sea, on the east by mangrove swamp and land of the people of Porto Rico, and on the west by the Antillian Sea and lands of the hacienda 'Reparada"'; that the defendant Fortuna Estates had theretofore unlawfully dispossessed the plaintiff and that the defendant Russell & Co., S. en C., had purchased the property and was now unlawfully dispossessing the plaintiff.

In their answer the defendants denied that the plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of the land, and alleged that at the time of the commencement of the action Fortuna Estates was and Russell & Co., S. en C., now is the owner in fee simple of a certain piece of land (describing it) and that the land described in the complaint was included in and formed a part of the land described in their answer, and denied that either of them had unlawfully dispossessed the plaintiff. The defendants also filed an amended answer and, in addition to the matters above set out, alleged the following distinct defenses:

(a) That, prior to the bringing of the action, the plaintiff had leased the land to a third party for a long term of years; (b) that Russell & Co., S. en C., was the owner in fee simple of the land and that its predecessors in title had been in actual possession of it under a just title since 1842, exercising full ownership over the same; (c) that said Russell & Co., S. en C., was the owner of the land by prescription in accordance with sections 1957 and 1959 and the Civil Code of Spain, prior laws of Spain, and sections 1858 and 1860 of the Civil Code of Porto Rico; (d) that the defendants and their predecessors in title had been in possession of the land for more than 60 years and that the cause of action is barred by prescription, in accordance with article 1963 of the Civil Code of Spain and section 1864 of the Civil Code of Porto Rico; (e) that the defendant Fortuna Estates purchased the land described in its answer from the former owner thereof, whose title thereto in dominio was duly recorded in the registry of property without any defect whatsoever, and that, as regards said land, it and Russell & Co., S. en C., are third parties under the mortgage law who have purchased in good faith and without notice of any defect in the title, and are, therefore, the owners and entitled to the possession, and that the land described in the complaint is included within the land so purchased.

The case was tried by a jury and a verdict rendered for the defendants. Judgment was entered for the defendants and the plaintiff prosecutes this writ of error.

There are 42 assignments of error by which the plaintiff undertakes to raise the following questions:

(1) Was the suit one which, by reason of the citizenship of the parties, could be properly removed to the federal District Court? (2) Did the federal District Court lose jurisdiction over the cause, the Fortuna Estates having transferred its title to Russell & Co., S. en C., after the court had denied the plaintiff's motion to remand? (3) Did prescription, other than immemorial prescription of 100 years, run against the Spanish government in Porto Rico prior to the adoption of the Spanish Civil Code and its extension to that island on July 31, 1889? (4) Could the defendants or their predecessors acquire title to the disputed land by 10 years' prescription subsequent to July 31, 1889, against the Spanish government, the government of the United States, or the people of Porto Rico? and (5) What is the seashore under the laws of Spain and Porto Rico?

By the Organic Act of Porto Rico, known as the Jones Act of March 2, 1917, 39 Stat. 951, 965 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, Secs. 3803qq-3803r), it is provided:

'Sec. 41. That Porto Rico shall constitute a judicial district to be called 'the district of Porto Rico.' * * * The District Court for said district shall be called 'the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico.' * * * Such District Court shall have jurisdiction of all cases cognizable in the District Courts of the United States, and shall proceed in the same manner. * * * Said District Court shall have jurisdiction of all controversies where all of the parties on either side of the controversy are citizens or subjects of a foreign state or states, or citizens of a state, territory, or District of the United States not domiciled in Porto Rico, wherein the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest or cost, the sum or value of $3,000. * * *

'Sec. 42. That the laws of the United States relating to appeals, writs of error and certiorari, removal of causes, and other matters or proceedings as between the courts of the United States and the courts of the several states shall govern in such matters and proceedings as between the District Court of the United States and the courts of Porto Rico. * * * '

In the Judicial Code of the United States, as amended January 20, 1914, it is provided: 'Sec. 28. Any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, of which the District Courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by this title, which may now be pending or which may hereafter be brought, in any state court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein to the District Court of the United States for the proper district. Any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the District Courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by this title, and which are now pending or which may hereafter be brought, in any state court, may be removed into the District Court of the United States for the proper district by the defendant or defendants therein, being nonresidents of that state. ' Comp. St. Sec. 1010.

'Sec. 24. The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows:

'First. Of all suits of a civil noture, at common law or in equity, brought by the United States, or by any officer thereof authorized by law to sue, or between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants from different states; or, where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three thousand dollars, and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or (b) is between citizens of different states, or (c) is between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. * * * ' Comp. St. Sec. 991.

Sections 28 and 24 of the Judicial Code, as amended and made applicable by the Organic Act of Porto Rico to define the jurisdiction of the District Court of Porto Rico and the removal of causes thereto from the local courts of the island, read as follows:

'Sec. 28. Any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, of which the * * * (District Court of Porto Rico is) given original jurisdiction by * * * (the Organic Act of Porto Rico), which may now be pending or which may hereafter be brought, in any * * * (local court of the island), may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein to the District Court of the United States for * * * (Porto Rico). Any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of which

...