People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 4112.

Decision Date28 June 1946
Docket NumberNo. 4112.,4112.
Citation156 F.2d 316
PartiesPEOPLE OF PUERTO RICO v. EASTERN SUGAR ASSOCIATES et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Lloyd Kreeger, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen. (John F. Sonnett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jerome H. Simonds, Bonnell Phillips, Jane Agnes Parker, Attys., Department of Justice, Warner Gardner, Sol., Irwin W. Silverman, Chief Counsel, Division of Territories and Island Possessions, and Shirley Ecker Boskey, Atty., Department of the Interior, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.

E. T. Fiddler, of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for appellees.

Before MAGRUDER, MAHONEY, and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.

WOODBURY, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from an order of the District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico dismissing a petition to condemn approximately 3,100 acres of land situated on the Island of Vieques owned by the appellee, Eastern Sugar Associates, subject to a mortgage held by the appellee, National City Bank of New York, on the ground that the petition fails "to state a public use or purpose for which private property may be acquired by eminent domain."

By Act No. 26 approved April 12, 1941, (Laws of Puerto Rico 1941, p. 388 et seq.) called the "Land Law of Puerto Rico," the insular Legislature launched a far-reaching program of agrarian reform. This law is long and rather complicated. At the moment it will suffice to say that after a lengthy "Statement of Motives" the Act creates a board in the "nature of a governmental agency or instrumentality of The People of Puerto Rico" in the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, to be called the "Land Authority of Puerto Rico", "for the purpose of carrying out the agricultural policy of The People of Puerto Rico as determined by this Act, and to take the necessary action to put an end to the existing corporative latifundia in this Island, block its reappearance in the future, insure to individuals the conservation of their land, assist in the creation of new landowners, facilitate the utilization of land for the best public benefit under efficient and economic production plans; provide the means for the agregados1 and slum dwellers to acquire parcels of land on which to build their homes, and to take all action leading to the most scientific, economic and efficient enjoyment of land by the people of Puerto Rico." Then the Act goes on to make detailed provisions with respect to the organization, powers, and duties of the Land Authority, and to authorize it both to expropriate lands held in violation of the so called 500 acre provision of the Organic Act (39 Stat. 964, 48 U.S.C.A. § 752) and also to request the Insular Government to acquire on its behalf by eminent domain "title to any real property or estate thereon (sic) which might be necessary or advisable for the purposes of the Authority." The act fully establishes the procedure to be followed in condemnation proceedings and provides, apparently adequately, for payment of "just compensation" for property so taken.

As this Land Law stood, after amendment, at the time the present condemnation proceedings were instituted, the Land Authority was authorized to dispose of lands which it acquired for three purposes; (1) in small parcels to individual agregados for the erection of their dwellings, (2) in somewhat larger parcels to individual farmers for subsistence farms, and (3) in large parcels by lease to expert farmers, agronomists, or other qualified persons with experience in agricultural management, for the operation of "proportional-profit" farms as described in detail in §§ 64-73 of the Act.

Following enactment of the Land Law, the Insular Legislature by Act No. 90, approved May 11, 1944, popularly called the "Vieques Act", made specific provisions for the relief of economic distress which it said existed on the small outlying islands of Vieques and Culebra, both municipalities of Puerto Rico. In its "Statement of Motives" this statute refers to the condemnation of some 20,000 acres of land on Vieques by the United States for Naval purposes (see Baetjer et al. v. United States, 1 Cir., 143 F.2d 391), which it said paralyzed the sugar industry on that island and caused acute economic distress to its inhabitants which could only be relieved by a renewal of that industry there, and the establishment thereon of a distillery, and then it provides:

"Section 1. — The Land Authority is directed and empowered to acquire, through purchase or condemnation proceedings, or in any other form or by any other means compatible with the laws of Puerto Rico, the lands belonging to the Eastern Sugar Associates in the Island of Vieques, as well as any other lands in the Island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, that may be necessary, in the judgment of the Land Authority of Puerto Rico, to carry out the provisions of this Act.

"Section 2. — As soon as the Land Authority acquires these lands from the Eastern Sugar Associates, it shall establish the consequent organization of the same and shall devote them principally to the planting of sugar cane and of any other products that may be necessary to develop in Vieques the sugar industry and the liquor industry."

With this brief outline of the most pertinent statutory provisions, we turn to the proceedings in the case at bar.

In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 26 of 1941, (The Land Law) the Governor of Puerto Rico on March 20, 1945, "representing The People of Puerto Rico, in the name and on order of the Land Authority," filed a petition in the District Court of the Judicial District of Humacao (an Insular Court) for the condemnation of the lands on the Island of Vieques here in litigation. In this petition it is alleged:

"3. The Land Authority desires to condemn the said lands to carry out all of the objects or purposes of the Land Law of Puerto Rico in force, that is to say:

"(a) Distribution and transfer of lands to a number of `squatters' (`agregados') at the rate of one parcel of not less than one fourth of a cuerda2 nor more than three cuerdas per family, in which said `squatters' may erect their dwellings, in harmony with the provisions of Title Fifth of the said Land Law.

"(b) Distribution and operation of lands in individual farms whose area shall fluctuate between five (5) and twenty-five (25) cuerdas, in harmony with the provisions of Title 25 and following of the said Land Law.

"(c) Establishment of farms of proportional benefit whose area shall fluctuate between one hundred (100) and five hundred (500) acres to be dedicated principally to the planting and cultivation of sugar cane in harmony with the provisions of Title Fifth of the said Land Law and Law numbered 90 approved May 11, 1944."

Then the petition goes on to characterize the above purposes as "of public utility" and to aver that the acquisition of the property "is also a public necessity"; that $270,326.33 "is the just and reasonable compensation which the plaintiff should pay for the acquisition of the said properties, with all their plantations, improvements, uses, servitudes and appurtenances, as well as the buildings" thereon, and that the above sum has been deposited in the office of the Secretary of the Court for the use of the persons entitled thereto.

On the same day that this petition was filed, and also in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 26, supra, the Governor filed in the same court a Declaration of Taking in which it is recited that "the People of Puerto Rico have been requested to condemn" the properties owned by Eastern Sugar Associates on the Island of Vieques here involved; that condemnation is sought "under the authority of, and in conformity with" the Land Law, the Vieques Act, and the Insular Condemnation Act of March 12, 1903, Laws Puerto Rico 1903, p. 50, and that acquisition of the property "is for the purpose of executing the * * * works and projects for the public use and public utility" as set out in Section 3, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the petition which we have quoted above. On the day the petition and declaration were filed, the Humacao District Court entered a judgment vesting title to the lands in fee simple absolute in the Land Authority and giving it the right to immediate possession.

Following this action of the insular District Court the appellees on March 24, 1945, petitioned that court for removal of the cause to the District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico — Eastern Sugar Associates on the ground of diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy, 48 U.S.C.A. §§ 863, 864; National City Bank on the ground that it is a national banking association and the suit, so far as it was concerned, arose out of a transaction involving banking in an insular possession of the United States. 48 Stat. 184, 12 U.S.C.A. § 632. Two days later an order was entered removing the cause in accordance with the bank's petition and on March 28, 1945, on motion of the Eastern Sugar Associates, the court below issued an ex parte order temporarily restraining the Land Authority from interfering with the Associates' possession and title. Then on April 3, 1945, after hearing, this temporary injunction was continued until further order of the court.

On April 16, 1945, Eastern Sugar Associates filed a motion to dismiss and an answer, the motion based upon the ground, among others, that it appeared on the face of the complaint that the taking was not for a public use and purpose and thus violated rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and § 2 of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, 48 U.S.C.A. § 737. On April 21, 1945, the National City Bank of New York answered with a general denial of the material allegations in the complaint and a request that its mortgage lien be transferred to the compensation awarded in the event that judgment should be entered in favor of The People of Puerto Rico. After hearing arguments of counsel...

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22 cases
  • Alton v. Alton
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • October 15, 1953
    ...269 U.S. 536, 46 S.Ct. 106, 70 L.Ed. 400; Gonzalez v. People of Porto Rico, 1 Cir., 1931, 51 F.2d 61; People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 1 Cir., 1946, 156 F.2d 316, certiorari denied, 1946, 329 U.S. 772, 67 S.Ct. 190, 91 L. Ed. The similarity of territories and states has al......
  • State of Washington v. Udall
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • December 24, 1969
    ...the property was not taken for a "public use." Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954); Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Assoc., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772, 67 S.Ct. 190, 91 L.Ed. 664 9See Byse, supra note 7, at 1490-91; Jaffe, The Right to Ju......
  • Midkiff v. Tom
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • March 28, 1983
    ...a community. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (discussed infra, Sec. VI(A)). Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772, 67 S.Ct. 190, 91 L.Ed. 664 (1946) is an example of a case that involves both changes......
  • Alton v. Alton
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • October 15, 1953
    ...269 U.S. 536, 46 S. Ct. 106, 70 L. Ed. 400; Gonzalez v. People of Porto Rico, 1 Cir. (1931), 51 F.2d 61; People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 1 Cir. (1946), 156 F.2d 316, certiorari denied (1946), 329 U.S. 772, 67 S. Ct. 190, 91 L. Ed. 664. The similarity of territories and st......
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3 books & journal articles
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    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 9-01, September 1985
    • Invalid date
    ...powers into interchangeable instruments for implementing government's generic legislative power . . . ."). 33. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. 34. 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 35. Id. at 318. Corporative latifundias are large, landed estates, much like those in Hawaii. Id. at......
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    • UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy Vol. 24 No. 1, June 2006
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    ...467 U.S. at 243-244 (citations omitted). (96.) Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. (97.) See, e.g., People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Assocs., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946), where a federal court of appeals upheld an agrarian reform measure that broke up large tracts of land and redistributed it ......

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