People of State of Illinois Collum v. Board of Education of School Dist No 71, Champaign County, Ill, No. 90

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBLACK
Citation68 S.Ct. 461,333 U.S. 203,92 L.Ed. 649
PartiesPEOPLE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. McCOLLUM v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. NO. 71, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, ILL, et al
Decision Date08 March 1948
Docket NumberNo. 90

333 U.S. 203
68 S.Ct. 461
92 L.Ed. 649
PEOPLE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. McCOLLUM

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. NO. 71, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, ILL, et al.

No. 90.
Argued Dec. 8, 1947.
Decided March 8, 1948.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.

Page 204

Mr. Walter F. Dodd, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Messrs. Owen Rall, of Chicago, Ill., and John L. Franklin, of Champaign, Ill., for appellees.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case relates to the power of a state to utilize its tax-supported public school system in aid of religious

Page 205

instruction insofar as that power may be restricted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.

The appellant, Vashti McCollum, began this action for mandamus against the Champaign Board of Education in the Circuit Court of Champaign County, Illinois. Her asserted interest was that of a resident and taxpayer of Champaign and of a parent whose child was then enrolled in the Champaign public schools. Illinois has a compulsory education law which, with exceptions, requires parents to send their children, aged seven to sixteen, to its tax-supported public schools where the children are to remain in attendance during the hours when the schools are regularly in session. Parents who violate this law commit a misdemeanor punishable by fine unless the children attend private or parochial schools which meet educational standards fixed by the State. District boad § of education are given general supervisory powers over the use of the public school buildings within the school districts. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 122, §§ 123, 301 (1943).

Appellant's petition for mandamus alleged that religious teachers, employed by private religious groups, were permitted to come weekly into the school buildings during the regular hours set apart for secular teaching, and then and there for a period of thirty minutes substitute their religious teaching for the secular education provided under the compulsory education law. The petitioner charged that this joint public-school religious-group program violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The prayer of her petition was that the Board of Education be ordered to 'adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all instruction in and teaching of all religious education in all public schools in Champaign District Number 71, * * * and in all public school houses and buildings in said district when occupied by public schools.'

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The board first moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that under Illinois law appellant had no standing to maintain the action. This motion was denied. An answer was then filed, which admitted that regular weekly religious instruction was given during school hours to those pupils whose parents consented and that those pupils were released temporarily from their regular secular classes for the limited purpose of attending the religious classes. The answer denied that this coordinated program of religious instructions violated the State or Federal Constitution. Much evidence was heard, findings of fact were made, after which the petition for mandamus was denied on the ground that the school's religious instruction program violated neither the federal nor state constitutional provisions invoked by the appellant. On appeal the State Supreme Court affirmed. 396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.2d 161. Appellant appealed to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 344(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344(a), and we noted probable jurisdiction. 67 S.Ct. 1524.

The appellee presses a motion to dismiss the appeal on several grounds, the first of which is that the judgment of the State Supreme Court does not draw in question the 'validity of a statute of any State' as required by 28 U.S.C. § 344(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344(a). This contention rests on the admitted fact that the challenged program of religious instruction was not expressly authorized by statute. But the State Supreme Court has sustained the validity of the program on the ground that the Illinois statutes granted the board authority to establish such a program. This holding is sufficient to show that the validity of an Illinois statute was drawn in question within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 344(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344(a). Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 258, 55 S.Ct. 197, 202, 79 L.Ed. 343. A second ground for the motion to dismiss is that the appellant lacks standing to maintain the action, a ground which is also without merit. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 443, 445, 464, 59 S.Ct. 972, 978, 986, 83 L.Ed. 1385, 122 A.L.R. 695.

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A third ground for the motion is that the appellant failed properly to present in the State Supreme Court her challenge that the state program violated the Federal Constitution. But in view of the express rulings of both state courts on this question, the argument cannot be successfully maintained. The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.

Although there are disputes between the parties as to various inferences that may or may not properly be drawn from the evidence concerning the religious program, the following facts are shown by the record without dispute.1 In 1940 interested members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and a few of the Protestant faiths formed a voluntary association called the Champaign Council on Religious Education. They obtained permission from the Board of Education to offer classes in religious instruction to public schoolp upils in grades four to nine inclusive. Classes were made up of pupils whose parents signed printed cards requesting that their children be permitted to attend;2 they were held weekly, thirty minutes for

Page 208

the lower grades, forty-five minutes for the higher. The council employed the religious teachers at no expense to the school authorities, but the instructors were subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools.3 The classes were taught in three

Page 209

separate religious groups by Protestant teachers,4 Catholic priests, and a Jewish rabbi, although for the past several years there have apparently been no classes instructed in the Jewish religion. Classes were conducted in the regular classrooms of the school building. Students who did not choose to take the religious instruction were not released from public school duties; they were required to leave their classrooms and go to some other place in the school building for pursuit of their secular studies. On the other hand, students who were released from secular study for the religious instructions were required to be present at the religious classes. Reports of their presence or absence were to be made to their secular teachers.5

The foregoing facts, without reference to others that appear in the record, show the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council in promoting religious education. The operation of the state's compulsory education system thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are released

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in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504. There we said: 'Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.6 Neither can force or influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 7 Neither a state nor

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the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State." Id., at pages 15, 16 of 330 U.S., at page 511 of 67 S.Ct. The majority in the Everson case, and the minority as shown by quotations from the dissenting views in our notes 6 and 7, agreed that the First Amendment's language, properly interpreted, had erected a wall of separation between Church and State. They disagreed as to the facts shown by the record and as to the proper application of the First Amendment's language to those facts.

Recognizing that the Illinois program is barred by the First and Fourteenth Amendments if we adhere to the views expressed both by the majority and the minority in the Everson case, counsel for the respondents challenge those views as dicta and urge that we reconsider and repudiate them. They argue that historically the First Amendment was intended to forbid only government preference of one religion over another, not an impartial governmental assistance of all religions. In addition they ask that we distinguish or overrule our holding in the Everson case that the Fourteenth Amendment made the 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment applicable as a prohibition against the States. After giving full consideration to the arguments presented we are unable to accept either of these contentions.

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  • ESTABLISHMENT'S POLITICAL PRIORITY TO FREE EXERCISE.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 97 Nbr. 2, January 2022
    • 1 Enero 2022
    ...Again, I am not making a claim about motivations but about correspondences and effects. (91) Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Comm. for Pub. ......
  • Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and Local Government
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 19-1, March 1966
    • 1 Marzo 1966
    ...Board," Law and Contem- porary Problems, 14 (Winter 1949), 22. The quotation of Justic Jackson is from McCol- lum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (dissenting Senior v. New Canaan Zoning Commission, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959), appeal dismissed, 80 S.Ct. 1083 (1960). 16 New......
  • The Supreme Court and State Civil Liberties
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 14-4, December 1961
    • 1 Diciembre 1961
    ...T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone, Pillar of the Law (New York: Viking, 1956), p. 535. 53 People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, U.S. 306 (1952). 837 Despite the great amount of controversy in constitutional law, there has arisen substantial agreem......

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