People of State of Ill. ex rel. Edgar v. Chicago
| Decision Date | 27 September 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95 C 3883.,95 C 3883. |
| Citation | 942 F.Supp. 366 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. Jim EDGAR, Governor of the State of Illinois, and James E. Ryan, Attorney General of Illinois, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation created pursuant to the laws of the State of Illinois, and the City of Gary, a Municipal Corporation created pursuant to the laws of the State of Indiana, Defendants, and The State of Indiana, Evan Bayh, Governor of the State of Indiana, and the Chicago-Gary Regional Airport Authority, Defendants-Intervenors. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Roger Philip Flahaven, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Chicago, IL, James R. Carroll, Quinlan & Crisham, P.C., Chicago, IL, for People of State of Illinois, Jim Edgar, James E. Ryan.
Mark W. Lewis, Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, Earl L. Neal, Earl L. Neal & Associates, Chicago, IL, Gail A. Niemann, Andrew S. Mine, City of Chicago, Law Department Corporation Counsel, Chicago, IL, Michael A. Forti, City of Chicago Law Department, Chicago, IL, Susan S. Sher, Corporation Counsel City of Chicago, Chicago, IL, for City of Chicago.
Mark W. Lewis, Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, Earl L. Neal, Earl L. Neal & Associates, Chicago, IL, Gail A. Niemann, Andrew S. Mine, City of Chicago, Law Department Corporation Counsel, Chicago, IL, Michael A. Forti, City of Chicago Law Department, Chicago, IL, Susan S. Sher, Corporation Counsel City of Chicago, Chicago, IL, Darnail Lyles, Meyer, Lyles & Godshalk, Gary, IN, Corinth Bishop, II, East Chicago, IN, for City of Gary.
George Francis Fitzpatrick, Jr., Swanson, Martin & Bell, Chicago, IL, D. William Moreau, Jr., Daniel T. Hackman, Nana Quay-Smith, Bingham, Summers, Welsh & Spilman, Indianapolis, IN, for State of Indiana, Evan Bayh.
Plaintiffs, the State of Illinois, and relators Governor James Edgar and Attorney General James Ryan, brought an action against the cities of Chicago, Illinois and Gary, Indiana ("Cities"), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under federal and state law. The State of Indiana, its Governor, Evan Bayh ("Indiana"), and the Chicago-Gary Regional Airport Authority ("Authority") filed a motion to intervene as parties-defendant in order to defend the constitutionality of an Indiana statute implicated by the complaint, which the court granted without objection. The Cities moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and to strike and/or for a more definite statement. Due to Indiana's entrance into the lawsuit, the court postponed a ruling on the Cities' motion and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the court had lost its original jurisdiction in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1251, which grants to the Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over "all controversies between two or more states." The court now addresses all pending matters.
Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution states "No State shall ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State...." This is known as the "Compact Clause."
In 1959, Congress enacted a law that authorizes states to enter into "an agreement, not in conflict with a law of the United States, with another state to develop or operate an airport facility." 73 Stat. 333 (1959); 49 U.S.C. § 44502(e) (1996). In 1963, Illinois enacted a law which authorizes a "governmental unit," including a city, "to combine in the creation of an airport authority for the purpose of jointly supporting and operating an airport terminal" with a city in another state once that state has enacted "reciprocal authorizing legislation." Interstate Airport Authorities Act ("IAAA"), Ill. Laws 1963, p. 2121; 70 ILCS 10/2, 10/5 (1993). In 1980, Indiana enacted a law which mirrors the form and content of Illinois'. See Ind.Code 8-22-4-1 et seq. (1982).
In 1995, the Cities entered into an agreement entitled "Compact Between the City of Chicago and the City of Gary Relating to the Establishment of the Chicago-Gary Regional Airport Authority" ("RAAC"). The RAAC created the Chicago-Gary Regional Airport Authority and vests the Authority with the power
to jointly evaluate the Bi-State Region's need for additional Airport capacity, to jointly coordinate and plan for continued development, enhancement and operation of the Existing Airports and the development of any New Regional Airport serving the Bi-State Region and to assume the continued autonomous management and operation by the City of Chicago of the Chicago Airports and the continued autonomous management and operation by the City of Gary of the Gary Regional Airport.
RAAC § 5-5. The RAAC also permits the Cities, "through the Authority, to plan for any future additional airport capacity needed," id. § 5-10(f), giving the Authority the ability to "evaluate, plan, develop, secure permits, licenses and approvals for, acquire, finance, construct, equip, own, and operate new Regional Airport facilities." Id. § 20-10. The Authority may also enter all pertinent contracts, id. § 20-15, and appoint and discharge personnel "irrespective of the civil service, personnel or merit system laws of either the State of Illinois or the State of Indiana," Id. § 20-20.
Plaintiffs' complaint contains three counts. The first is entitled "Declaratory Judgment," and alleges that "[t]he purported compact is invalid as a matter of federal law." Cmplt. ¶ 29. It further alleges that "Defendants lack authority to enter into the purported compact," id. ¶ 29(a), and that "[n]either the Compact Clause nor 49 U.S.C. § 44502(e) contemplates any role to be played by a political subdivision of a state in the creation of an interstate compact." Id. ¶ 29(b). Count 1 also alleges that the RAAC is not a "valid interstate compact" because "the agreement provides for unilateral modification and termination."
The court interprets Count 1 to present two distinct claims. First, plaintiffs allege that the RAAC is void because cities — as a general rule — may not enter into interstate compacts; such authority belongs only to states as sovereigns. Second, plaintiffs allege that the RAAC is void because its obligations are illusory.
The remaining counts present state law claims and a request for relief. Count 2 is entitled "Quo Warranto." It requests that Chicago show "by what warrant it exercises the alleged right to enter into" the RAAC. Count 3, entitled "Injunction," seeks to prevent Chicago from making payments under the RAAC.
The Cities respond that plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a federal cause of action. Specifically, the Cities argue that plaintiffs have not raised a federal question, have not presented a "well-pleaded" complaint, and have not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that they have standing to prosecute any federal claim.
With regard to the court's concern over its original jurisdiction, none of the parties believe that the case properly belongs in front of the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the court must assure itself that jurisdiction properly lies in federal district court, despite the apparent consent of the parties. Fed. R.Civ.Pro. 12(h)(3); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Demos, 18 F.3d 485, 487 (7th Cir.1994). Therefore, the court turns first to the issue of its original jurisdiction.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) vests original and exclusive jurisdiction in the United States Supreme Court over "all controversies between two or more states," which "necessarily denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other federal court." Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78, 113 S.Ct. 549, 553, 121 L.Ed.2d 466 (1993). In the present case, the caption places Illinois on the left and Indiana on the right; it appears that the requirements of § 1251 are satisfied.
However, § 1251(a) encompasses only those controversies in which "the complaining State has suffered a wrong through the action of the other State, furnishing grounds for judicial redress...." Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15, 60 S.Ct. 39, 42, 84 L.Ed. 3 (1939). Moreover, the wrong suffered must be "directly caused by the actions of another State." Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 663, 96 S.Ct. 2333, 2335, 49 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976). Additionally, the claim must have the requisite "seriousness and dignity." Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77-79, 113 S.Ct. 549, 553, 121 L.Ed.2d 466 (1992). The model dispute fit for the Supreme Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction is one between two states of such seriousness and magnitude that it would amount to "casus belli" were the states fully sovereign. Id. at 77, 113 S.Ct. at 552 () (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 571 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. 2558, 2569 n. 18, 77 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983)).
As previously noted, Indiana is present in the lawsuit to defend the constitutionality of its own regional airport authority statute. Despite Indiana's initial concern, plaintiffs have failed to press any constitutional attack. Though plaintiffs' "ultra vires" argument used the Compact Clause to attack indirectly the constitutionality of the IAAA (which, on its face, authorizes the allegedly "ultra vires" acts), plaintiffs' subsequent briefs fail to even cite — let alone discuss the import of — the IAAA. Due to plaintiffs' total failure to address the IAAA, the court has no choice but to deem the argument completely waived. Because the IAAA is no longer under constitutional attack, Indiana's reciprocal statute is similarly safe.
In its discretion, the court may drop a party from a lawsuit sua sponte whose presence no longer effects the issues being litigated. See ...
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