People of State v. Dowdy

Citation489 Mich. 373,802 N.W.2d 239
Decision Date11 July 2011
Docket NumberDocket No. 140603.
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.Randall Lee DOWDY, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Stuart J. Dunnings, III, Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph B. Finnerty, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.State Appellate Defender (by Christine A. Pagac) for defendant.Ronald J. Schafer and Terrence E. Dean for amicus curiae the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.Legal Aid of Western Michigan (by Miriam Aukerman) for amicus curiae Jane Poe and others.Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, and Mark G. Sands, Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae the Attorney General.

Opinion

YOUNG, C.J.

We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine whether homeless sex offenders are obligated to comply with the registration requirement imposed by the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA).1 Specifically, we consider whether homeless sex offenders have a “residence” or “domicile” such that they can comply with the statute's registration requirements. We hold that homelessness is not a bar to compliance with SORA because homelessness does not preclude an offender from entering a police station and reporting to a law enforcement agency regarding the offender's residence or domicile. The Legislature intended SORA to be a comprehensive system that requires all sex offenders to register, whether homeless or otherwise. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand this case for trial.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1984, defendant, Randall Lee Dowdy, pleaded guilty to a charge of kidnapping, five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC–I), and a charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 2 Defendant remained incarcerated until 2002.

As a consequence of defendant's CSC–I convictions, he is required to register as a sex offender.3 Defendant signed a form upon being released from incarceration acknowledging that his obligations under SORA had been explained to him. Defendant registered his residence as 430 North Larch, Lansing, Michigan, which is a location of the Volunteers of America (VOA), a homeless shelter.4 Defendant obtained services at the VOA until the fall of 2006, when the VOA staff discovered that he was a sex offender. He left the VOA in accordance with its policy barring sex offenders from receiving its services. It appears that defendant was homeless at all times relevant to this case.

In 2006, the Lansing Police Department attempted to verify where defendant was living. According to police records, the last time that defendant reported his residence or domicile, as SORA requires, was in November 2002. In October 2006, the police visited the VOA in a further attempt to verify defendant's information and determined that he no longer received services there. On the basis of these facts, the Ingham County Prosecutor charged defendant with violating the reporting and notification requirements of SORA.5

After a preliminary examination, defendant was bound over to the Ingham Circuit Court, where he filed a motion to dismiss the charges. Defendant argued that SORA required him to register an address in order to comply with his statutory obligations, but claimed that because he was homeless and did not have an address, he was unable to comply with the obligation to report a “residence” to police under SORA. The circuit court found these arguments persuasive and dismissed the charges, holding that defendant's homelessness rendered it impossible for him to comply with SORA. The prosecution appealed, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented. On appeal in this Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.6

On remand, a Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The Court reasoned that homeless individuals have neither a residence nor a domicile as SORA defines those terms.7 The panel explained that “residence” referred to “a place, a dwelling, an abode, where an individual has a ‘regular place of lodging,’ and held that [t]he provisional location where a homeless person happens to spend the night” does not satisfy the dictionary definitions of “lodging.” 8 Therefore, the panel held that the statutory language required only those sex offenders with a “residence” or a “domicile” to notify law enforcement and that, because the homeless have neither, they cannot comply with the statute's requirements. 099FN;B01010

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT

SORA is a conviction-based registration statute that requires individuals convicted of certain “listed offenses” to register as sex offenders. 17 An offender's registration disclosure includes information regarding where the offender lives, identifying information, and a summary of the offender's convictions.18 Offenders are also required to sign a form acknowledging their obligations as sex offenders under SORA.19

The Legislature used broad language to describe SORA's scope and intent. SORA is intended to “better assist law enforcement officers and the people of this state in preventing and protecting against the commission of future criminal sexual acts by convicted sex offenders.” 20 The Legislature determined that convicted sex offenders—homeless or otherwise—pose a potential serious danger to the safety and morals of the people of Michigan and particularly to the state's children.21 SORA is therefore intended to “provide law enforcement and the people of this state with an appropriate, comprehensive, and effective means to monitor those persons who pose such a potential danger.” 22 Consistent with this intent, SORA requires sex offenders to comply with a variety of statutory obligations, two of which are at issue here: (1) the quarterly reporting requirement of MCL 28.725a(4)(b), and (2) the notification requirement of MCL 28.725(1). Inherent in both obligations is the requirement that a sex offender inform law enforcement regarding the location of the offender's “residence” or “domicile.”

All sex offenders convicted of one or more listed offenses that are felonies have an affirmative obligation to report quarterly to a law enforcement agency for “verification of domicile or residence.” 23 These offenders “ shall report in person ” to the police between the first and fifteenth day of each January, April, July, and October.24 This quarterly reporting requirement is not contingent on where an offender resides or is domiciled, and all offenders who are not incarcerated must comply.

Additionally, all sex offenders have an ongoing obligation to keep law enforcement apprised of changes to their residence or domicile. Specifically, sex offenders shall notify the local law enforcement agency or sheriff's department having jurisdiction where his or her new residence or domicile is located or the department post of the individual's new residence or domicile within 10 days after the individual changes or vacates his or her residence [or] domicile....” 25 According to the statute's plain language, a sex offender's obligation to notify law enforcement of a new “residence” or “domicile” is triggered when the offender changes or vacates the previous “residence” or “domicile,” not when the new “residence” or “domicile” is established.

After an offender complies with the quarterly reporting requirement pursuant to MCL 28.725a(4)(b), the law enforcement agency to whom the offender reports is under an affirmative statutory obligation to verify the information provided by the sex offender.26 MCL 28.725a(8) directs sex offenders to maintain either a valid driver's license or an official state identification card, either of which may be used as proof of an offender's residence or domicile for purposes of law enforcement verification. However, those are not the exclusive means by which an offender may prove residence or domicile to law enforcement. SORA expressly contemplates sex offenders with an uncommon residence or domicile by providing that Michigan State Police “may specify other satisfactory proof of domicile or residence.” 27 Thus, if a sex offender is unable to provide any of the statutorily specified documents or the offender's residence or domicile is difficult to confirm, the Michigan State Police is empowered to formulate alternative methods whereby the offender may provide information to verify the offender's residence or domicile.

B. “RESIDENCE” AND “DOMICILE”

To comply with the statute's registration requirements, sex offenders must provide information regarding their “residence” or “domicile.” 28 SORA defines “residence” for “registration and voting purposes” as

that place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lodging. If a person has more than 1 residence, or if a wife has a residence separate from that of the husband, that place at which the person resides the greater part of the time shall be his or her official residence for the purposes of this act.29

Thus, a person's “residence” under SORA is a combination of three things: that place where a person (1) habitually sleeps, (2) keeps personal effects, and (3) has a regular place of lodging.

The words that the Legislature used to define “residence” have a broad scope and contemplate a wide array of “residences.” However, the definition of “residence” does not include every location where a person might sleep, regardless of the length of the stay. A “residence,” for purposes of SORA, is only that place where an offender habitually sleeps and establishes regular lodging. The Court of Appeals panel in this case held that defendant was relieved of any obligation to comply with SORA because “the concepts of habitually and regularity are...

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