People of Territory of Utah v. Scott
| Decision Date | 19 June 1894 |
| Docket Number | 493 |
| Citation | 37 P. 335,10 Utah 217 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH, RESPONDENT, v. JOHN SCOTT, APPELLANT |
APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District, Hon H. W. Smith, Judge.
John Scott was convicted of burning a building and appeals.
Reversed.
Messrs Brown & Henderson and Messrs. Warner & Warner, for appellant.
Mr Samuel R. Thurman, Assistant U. S. Attorney, for respondent.
The defendant John Scott was jointly indicted with Patrick Condon on the charge of having burned an inhabited building, known as the hotel and dwelling house of one Frederick Scott. The defendant John Scott was tried separately, and convicted. The building was occupied at the time as a hotel by Frederick Scott, a tenant of the other defendant, Patrick Condon, who owned the building. Exceptions were taken by the defendant to the refusal of the court to charge as requested, and to the admission of certain testimony offered to connect Condon with the burning, and also to testimony showing the building was insured by the owner. The defendant Scott was a stranger in that locality, and on the day preceding the fire had put up at the hotel in question. The testimony against him was circumstantial. The prosecuting attorney, in his opening statement to the jury, stated, among other things, that he would show that the motive for the burning was to obtain insurance; that Scott and Condon had an understanding by which the building was to be burned in order to obtain the insurance of $ 3,000.
On the trial. J. W. Rutlidge was allowed to testify, against the objection of the defendant as to competency and irrelevancy, that, some considerable time before the fire, Condon had taken out a policy of insurance for $ 3,000 on the building and contents (this insurance had been reduced before the fire, but the policies of insurance were not produced); that the hotel was not paying; and that the furniture had been moved out of the house some time prior to the fire. This testimony as to insurance was taken, under objection and exception, out of its order, with the statement that the prosecution would connect it thereafter with the defendant. At the close of this witness' testimony the defendant's attorney moved to strike out his testimony in relation to insurance on the ground that it was hearsay, not the best evidence, and that the indictment does not charge the burning with intent to defraud the insurance company, which motion was denied, and the ruling excepted to. Other testimony was given concerning the statement of Condon, in which the defendant Scott in no way participated, and it was subsequently stricken out. No other testimony was received, in any manner connecting Condon with the defendant Scott in the burning, nor did it appear that these parties ever met, or knew each other, prior to the fire.
At the close of the people's testimony the defendant's counsel moved to strike out of the record all of the testimony relative to the insurance upon the property, and that the jury be instructed to disregard the testimony about insurance, on the ground that the testimony was immaterial and incompetent, that it was admitted on the ground that the defendant Scott would be connected with the defendant Condon in the burning, and that no evidence had been given, in any manner connecting defendant Scott with Condon or the insurance. The court remarked that if the motion was separated he would strike out the evidence as to who insured the building, but would leave the fact that it was insured before the jury. Defendant's attorney insisted upon the motion, and it was overruled, and exception taken. No further testimony was given, showing Condon's connection with the transaction in any manner. At the close of the testimony the defendant's counsel requested the court to instruct the jury that there was no evidence in the case connecting the defendant with Condon, and the jury should not consider any relation between them. This request was refused, and exception taken. The charge of the court was silent upon this subject, and upon the subject of insurance.
Upon the argument in this court, and in the brief of the prosecution, it is admitted that the people failed to connect defendant Scott with defendant Condon, in any manner, with reference to the burning, or with the insurance, and the record discloses no such combination or connection between the two parties. The indictment does not charge the defendant with the burning with intent to defraud any insurance company, and the evidence in no manner connects Scott with Condon, so as to make him responsible for the acts statements, or...
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