People of The State of Ill. v. HILL
| Decision Date | 04 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-08-0116.,1-08-0116. |
| Citation | 934 N.E.2d 43,343 Ill.Dec. 43,402 Ill.App.3d 903 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of The State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnnie HILL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Chicago (Deputy Defender Patricia Unsinn and Assistant Appellate Defender Steven W. Becker, of counsel), for Appellant.
Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (Assistant State's Attorneys Alan J. Spellberg and Sally L. Dilgart, of counsel), for Appellee.
Modified Upon Rehearing
Following a jury trial, defendant, Johnnie Hill, was convicted of first degree murder and home invasion in the death of his ex-girlfriend, Tamara Miller, and sentenced by the trial court to 60 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) that his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the State's notice of intent to seek the death penalty, which was not filed until 247 days after his arraignment, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 416(c) (188 Ill.2d R. 416(c)); and (2) that fees imposed by the trial court should be vacated, because they were not authorized by statute and were unrelated to defendant's offense. In its reply brief, the State concedes that the trial court improperly assessed fees against defendant and that those assessments should be vacated. Therefore, the only issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to strike the State's notice of intent to seek the death penalty. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the circuit court.
Defendant does not raise any issues concerning the validity of his conviction and, thus, we note only briefly the facts underlying that conviction. On November 17, 2001, defendant went to the apartment of his ex-girlfriend, Tamara Miller, who had obtained an order of protection prohibiting defendant from having any contact with her. Defendant waited outside Miller's apartment, and when she opened the door to leave, he forced his way in. Miller and defendant struggled. He punched her several times, pushed her into the bedroom and forced her to undress. In his confession, defendant said he did this because he thought that would prevent her from trying to escape. Shortly thereafter, Miller fell to her death from the bedroom window of her ninth-floor apartment.
After his arrest, defendant admitted to police officers and an assistant State's Attorney that he had forced his way into Miller's apartment, forced her to undress, and beat her but claimed that she jumped out of the window in an effort to escape from him. Witnesses at the scene, however, testified that they saw Miller falling backwards out of the window, and fragments of Miller's fingernails containing Hill's DNA were later found in the window sill.
Defendant was arraigned on December 31, 2001, and charged with first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2006)), home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 2006)), residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2006)), and robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2006)). On September 4, 2002, 247 days after his arraignment, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Almost four years later, on July 24, 2006, defendant, who was represented by three attorneys from the Cook County public defender's office, two of whom were members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar, filed a motion to strike that notice, asserting that it was untimely filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 416(c). Specifically, defendant asserted that Rule 416(c) requires that the notice of intent to seek the death penalty be filed within 120 days after arraignment, unless for good cause shown the court directs otherwise, and that the State failed to show good cause for filing the notice 247 days after arraignment. The State argued that the committee comments to Rule 416(c) specifically state that if no notice of intent is filed, it is presumed that the State is seeking the death penalty, and the trial court should treat it as a capital case. Further, the State argued, that is exactly how both sides treated the case after the indictment and until the defendant filed his motion to strike. After a brief hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to strike.
Prior to voir dire, defendant waived his right to a jury for purposes of determining whether he was eligible for the death penalty and for sentencing. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and home invasion. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, in part, that the trial court erred in not striking the State's notice of intent to seek the death penalty as untimely. The trial court denied that motion. A sentencing hearing was held before the trial judge, who found that defendant was death eligible under section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(19) (West 2006)), because he committed the murder in violation of an order of protection. However, the trial judge did not impose the death penalty or a natural life sentence, but instead sentenced defendant to 60 years' imprisonment and imposed a $25,000 fine. The court also issued an order imposing costs and fees listed as court system, mental health court, youth diversion/peer court, drug court and court supervision fees. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence. The trial court granted the motion, in part, by giving defendant monetary credit for time spent in custody, but did not alter the remainder of defendant's sentence. This appeal followed.
The primary issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to strike the State's notice of intent to seek the death penalty, which was filed 247 days after defendant's arraignment. Before addressing that issue, however, we must first address the State's arguments that defendant's claim regarding the late notice of intent to seek the death penalty (1) is moot, (2) is barred by laches, (3) was forfeited due to defendant's failure to object sooner, and (4) did not prejudice defendant.
First, the State argues that defendant's claim is moot because the judge did not impose a death sentence but, rather, sentenced defendant to 60 years. Therefore, the State asserts, there is no live controversy, and because this court cannot preclude the death penalty or grant the requested relief, it should refuse to entertain the claim. We disagree. As defendant asserts, if the circuit court had found that he was not death eligible, as it would have done if it had denied the State's notice of intent to seek the death penalty, the maximum prison sentence he could have received would have been 60 years. It is conceivable that if 60 years rather than death was the maximum sentence, the trial judge might have sentenced defendant to a lesser term. An analogous issue was addressed in People v. Jackson, 199 Ill.2d 286, 263 Ill.Dec. 819, 769 N.E.2d 21 (2002), wherein our supreme court held that an aggravated battery defendant's complaint that her sentence was unconstitutional was not moot, even though she was on parole and no longer incarcerated, because whether her sentence was 5 years or 10 years affected how long she could be reincarcerated for a violation of the conditions of her release. Jackson, 199 Ill.2d at 294, 263 Ill.Dec. 819, 769 N.E.2d 21. Similarly, in this case, even though defendant did not receive the death penalty, it is possible that if the trial court had granted his motion to strike the State's notice, he would have been sentenced to less than the maximum sentence of 60 years. Further, contrary to the State's argument, this court can grant the requested relief, by remanding the case to the trial court for resentencing. Therefore, we reject the State's argument that defendant's claim is moot.
Next, the State argues that defendant's claim is barred by laches, because he waited until four years after the State's notice was filed to object to that notice. Laches is an equitable doctrine that precludes a litigant from asserting a claim when the litigant's unreasonable delay in raising the claim has prejudiced the opposing party. Tully v. Illinois, 143 Ill.2d 425, 432, 158 Ill.Dec. 546, 574 N.E.2d 659 (1991). The doctrine is grounded in the equitable notion that courts are reluctant to aid a party who has knowingly slept on his rights to the detriment of the opposing party. Tully, 143 Ill.2d at 432, 158 Ill.Dec. 546, 574 N.E.2d 659. The State relies on the holding in Tully, a civil case, and does not cite a criminal case applying the laches doctrine to a defendant in a criminal case, much less a defendant in a capital case. Even if the doctrine were to apply to defendants in a criminal case, the State would not prevail on this issue. Two elements are necessary to find laches: (1) lack of diligence by the party asserting the claim; and (2) prejudice to the opposing party resulting from the delay. Tully, 143 Ill.2d at 432, 158 Ill.Dec. 546, 574 N.E.2d 659. We do not find that both elements were met in this case. Although a four-year delay may indicate a lack of due diligence by defendant, there is no evidence in the record showing that the State was prejudiced, as defendant filed the motion prior to the start of the trial and well before the hearing on defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. Therefore, defendant's claim is not barred by laches.
The State also contends that defendant forfeited his claim by failing to file a timely motion to strike the State's notice. The State relies on Gulley v. Noy, 316 Ill.App.3d 861, 250 Ill.Dec. 138, 737 N.E.2d 1115 (2000), for support. In Gulley, plaintiff...
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