People Of The State Of Ill. v. Lenyoun, 1-06-3696.

CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois
Writing for the CourtJustice GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court.
Citation932 N.E.2d 63,342 Ill.Dec. 172,402 Ill.App.3d 787
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Martinez S. LENYOUN, Defendant-Appellee.
Docket NumberNo. 1-06-3696.,1-06-3696.
Decision Date28 June 2010

402 Ill.App.3d 787
932 N.E.2d 63
342 Ill.Dec.
172

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Martinez S. LENYOUN, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-06-3696.

Appellate Court of Illinois,First District, First Division.

June 28, 2010.


932 N.E.2d 64

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

932 N.E.2d 65

Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, County of Cook, James E. Fitzgerald,

932 N.E.2d 66

Manny Magence, Matthew Connors, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

The Boyd Law Firm, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court.

342 Ill.Dec. 175
402 Ill.App.3d 787

The circuit court granted the pretrial motion of the defendant, Martinez S. Lenyoun, to quash the warrant authorizing the search of apartment 2E in a six-unit building because the sworn complaint made no showing of probable cause to justify the search. Judge Thomas M. Tucker also ruled that because probable cause to search the apartment was wholly lacking, the evidence seized was subject to suppression, the good-faith doctrine notwithstanding. We understand the State to contend that in light of the deference owed to a judicial determination of probable cause, the warrant is not constitutionally deficient. In the alternative, the State contends the police officers that

402 Ill.App.3d 788

seized the evidence acted in good-faith reliance on the search warrant, which precludes suppression. We affirm. The complaint for the search warrant amounted to no more than a “bare-bones” affidavit of probable cause for the search of the defendant's residence. Where probable cause is wholly lacking, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply.

Background

On February 18, 2004, Detective Carlo Viscioni of the Hillside police department filed a complaint for a warrant to search the defendant and his vehicle. The complaint detailed surveillance of the defendant and an individual named Paul Jones for narcotics trafficking beginning on February 2, 2004, by officers from the Maywood police department, the Wheaton police department, and the Hillside police department. The complaint noted that in August 2001, Paul Jones was arrested at an apartment leased by the defendant where officers seized narcotics and weapons. On three different dates in February 2004, surveillance officers observed the defendant depart from 110 Hillside Avenue, Hillside, drive to a location in a nearby municipality, meet an individual on a street, and appear to exchange an item for United States currency.

On February 16, 2004, an individual with whom the defendant had such an exchange was detained shortly thereafter by the Hillside police. That individual, Darrell Cox, was found to be in possession of cocaine, which he claimed to have purchased from the defendant. Mr. Cox stated he arranged to purchase cocaine from the defendant by calling a number the defendant had given him, which Mr. Cox gave to the police. Mr. Cox also identified the defendant from a photo array as the individual that drove to meet him on the street and sold him the drugs.

On February 18, 2004, at approximately 2 p.m., Detective Viscioni filed a complaint for a search warrant with a judge from the fourth municipal district of the circuit court of Cook County. The judge issued a search warrant for the defendant's person and his vehicle. That same day, the defendant was observed leaving 110 Hillside Avenue, Hillside, as he had on the three prior dates before engaging in street exchanges that were described in the complaint for the search warrant. At approximately 6 p.m., Detective Viscioni and fellow officers stopped the defendant in his vehicle. The defendant and his vehicle were thoroughly searched pursuant to the search warrant. No contraband was recovered. The officers did recover a list that contained the word “dope” and four business cards, one of which contained the same telephone number Mr. Cox stated he called to arrange

402 Ill.App.3d 789

a drug

342 Ill.Dec. 176
932 N.E.2d 67

buy. The telephone number corresponded to a cell phone. No information was obtained to connect the cell phone number with apartment 2E, 110 Hillside Avenue, Hillside, Illinois. The defendant's vehicle was registered to 315 S. 28th Avenue, Bellwood, Illinois. Following the execution of the search warrant, the defendant denied Detective Viscioni's request for consent to search apartment 2E at the Hillside address; the defendant denied living in Hillside, though the Illinois driver's license he produced listed 110 Hillside Avenue as his residence. A K-9 unit from the Westchester police department alerted to the interior of the defendant's vehicle and to the $352 the defendant had on his person.

About two hours after the unsuccessful search of the defendant's person and his vehicle, Detective Viscioni returned to the same circuit court judge with a second application for a search warrant. The complaint was approved by an assistant State's Attorney at 7:47 p.m. The complaint for the second warrant was identical to the first except that it added information obtained in the execution of the first warrant of the defendant and his vehicle. The complaint listed the recovery of the business cards, the list with the word “dope,” the defendant's driver's license showing the address of 110 Hillside Avenue, Hillside, Illinois, and the alerts by the K-9 unit to the vehicle and to the United States currency recovered from the defendant. The complaint requested a search warrant for the defendant's person and apartment 2E at “110 Hillside Ave, Hillside, Cook County, IL.” The warrant was signed on February 18, 2004, and apparently executed immediately thereafter.

On the defendant's motion to quash the search warrant and suppress the evidence, the parties proceeded with argument only before the circuit court. Both parties treated the motion as presenting a question of law only. According to Judge Tucker, the legal argument presented by the defendant was “that the document itself [the complaint for search warrant] did not contain sufficient information to support a search warrant.” After oral arguments by counsel, Judge Tucker agreed that the complaint was constitutionally deficient. He ruled the complaint for the second warrant lacked “sufficient specificity for the 2E apartment” to justify a search. A hearing date was given on the State's oral motion for a good-faith finding on the part of the officers executing the search warrant.

At the hearing on the State's motion, a single witness was called. Detective Viscioni testified this case was the first time he had ever applied for a search warrant. Detective Viscioni admitted he did not inform the circuit court judge at the time he requested the second warrant that the execution of the first warrant resulted in no seizure

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of contraband from the defendant or his vehicle. Detective Viscioni admitted he never saw drugs or had been told by anyone else that “drugs or other drug paraphernalia” were present in apartment 2E prior to the execution of the second warrant. Detective Viscioni admitted that he had no information that anyone had ever “ purchased drugs from the defendant while he was in apartment 2E.” Nor did Detective Viscioni ever witness “the defendant take drugs, drug paraphernalia or any other drug related items into or out of that apartment.” Detective Viscioni admitted that no one he was aware of “had previously purchased drugs from the defendant or anyone else while at that apartment.” Detective Viscioni conceded that no wire taps existed where the defendant was “overheard * * * conducting drug activities from apartment 2E.” Detective Viscioni conceded that no “undercover buys [were ever made] from the defendant

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932 N.E.2d 68

or anyone else from apartment 2E.” Finally, Detective Viscioni admitted that on or before the issuance of the second warrant, he never saw “the defendant go into apartment 2E.”

Judge Tucker denied the State's motion for a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. “I don't believe there is sufficient evidence to support the search. Therefore, the motion is denied.”

This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The State asserts in the “Issues” section of its brief that the initial issue presented for review by this court is whether “the issuing judge had probable cause to believe the defendant was engaged in criminal activity.” This broad language is not an accurate statement of the issue before us. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(3). The issue regarding the validity of the search warrant is whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 693 (1984); People v. McCarty, 223 Ill.2d 109, 153, 306 Ill.Dec. 570, 858 N.E.2d 15 (2006).

We also reject the State's position in its briefs that the circuit court granted the motion to quash the search warrant because the warrant omitted “Hillside” from the address of 110 Hillside Avenue as one of two possible residences for the defendant. The circuit court did not base its ruling declaring the warrant invalid on such an omission. There can be no real dispute that Detective Viscioni, as one of the executing officers, knew that the apartment to be searched is located in Hillside. Any fair reading of the warrant would enable “the officer executing the warrant, with reasonable effort, to identify the place to be searched. [Citations.]” McCarty, 223 Ill.2d at 149, 306 Ill.Dec. 570, 858 N.E.2d 15. In fact, at the

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time of the execution of the first warrant, the defendant produced an Illinois driver's license showing his residence to be 110 Hillside Avenue, Hillside, Illinois. That apartment 2E in Hillside was not specifically listed as a possible residence of the defendant in the complaint did not render the warrant fatally defective; nor did the circuit court so...

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18 practice notes
  • People v. Reyes, 2-17-0379
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 24 Noviembre 2020
    ...demonstrably false. See Bryant , 389 Ill. App. 3d at 525, 329 Ill.Dec. 284, 906 N.E.2d 129.¶ 81 Defendant cites People v. Lenyoun , 402 Ill. App. 3d 787, 795, 342 Ill.Dec. 172, 932 N.E.2d 63 (2010), for the proposition that it is bad faith for "officers [to] essentially cut and paste inform......
  • People v. Padilla, 1-17-1632
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 24 Junio 2021
    ...not provide probable cause to believe that any contraband was located there. Defendant likened his case to that of People v. Lenyoun , 402 Ill. App. 3d 787, 342 Ill.Dec. 172, 932 N.E.2d 63 (2010).¶ 77 The State filed a written response on July 7, 2014, maintaining that just three days after......
  • People v. Lomax, 1–10–3016.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 7 Agosto 2012
    ...the unfettered (and hence unconstitutional) intrusion into a home that Richardson recognized as a possibility. See People v. Lenyoun, 402 Ill.App.3d 787, 800, 342 Ill.Dec. 172, 932 N.E.2d 63 (2010) (“physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendm......
  • People v. Pitts, 1–13–2205.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 24 Marzo 2016
    ...is produced. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 2014 IL App (2d) 121167, ¶¶ 11–15, 381 Ill.Dec. 946, 11 N.E.3d 882 ; People v. Lenyoun, 402 Ill.App.3d 787, 789–90, 342 Ill.Dec. 172, 932 N.E.2d 63 (2010). It is undisputed that the State failed to produce the original second page of the complaint fo......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
18 cases
  • People v. Reyes, 2-17-0379
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 24 Noviembre 2020
    ...demonstrably false. See Bryant , 389 Ill. App. 3d at 525, 329 Ill.Dec. 284, 906 N.E.2d 129.¶ 81 Defendant cites People v. Lenyoun , 402 Ill. App. 3d 787, 795, 342 Ill.Dec. 172, 932 N.E.2d 63 (2010), for the proposition that it is bad faith for "officers [to] essentially cut and paste inform......
  • People v. Padilla, 1-17-1632
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 24 Junio 2021
    ...not provide probable cause to believe that any contraband was located there. Defendant likened his case to that of People v. Lenyoun , 402 Ill. App. 3d 787, 342 Ill.Dec. 172, 932 N.E.2d 63 (2010).¶ 77 The State filed a written response on July 7, 2014, maintaining that just three days after......
  • People v. Lomax, 1–10–3016.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 7 Agosto 2012
    ...the unfettered (and hence unconstitutional) intrusion into a home that Richardson recognized as a possibility. See People v. Lenyoun, 402 Ill.App.3d 787, 800, 342 Ill.Dec. 172, 932 N.E.2d 63 (2010) (“physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendm......
  • People v. Pitts, 1–13–2205.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 24 Marzo 2016
    ...is produced. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 2014 IL App (2d) 121167, ¶¶ 11–15, 381 Ill.Dec. 946, 11 N.E.3d 882 ; People v. Lenyoun, 402 Ill.App.3d 787, 789–90, 342 Ill.Dec. 172, 932 N.E.2d 63 (2010). It is undisputed that the State failed to produce the original second page of the complaint fo......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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