People Of The State Of Mich. v. Richmond, Docket No. 136648.

• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J
• Citation: 486 Mich. 29,782 N.W.2d 187
• Docket Number: Docket No. 136648.
• Decision Date: 30 April 2010
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Edwin Dewayne RICHMOND, Defendant-Appellant.

486 Mich. 29
782 N.W.2d 187

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Edwin Dewayne RICHMOND, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 136648.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 30, 2010.

782 N.W.2d 188

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, and

782 N.W.2d 189

Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the people.

Matthew R. Abel, Detroit and Alan L. Kaufman for defendant.

Brian A. Peppler, David S. Leyton, and Donald A. Kuebler, Flint, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, B. Eric Restuccia, Solicitor General, and Joel D. McGormley, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.OpinionMICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, J.

We granted leave to appeal to address whether the dismissal of the charges against defendant on the prosecution's motion rendered moot the prosecution's subsequent appeal in the Court of Appeals. People v. Richmond, 483 Mich. 1115, 766 N.W.2d 843 (2009). We hold that the prosecution's voluntary dismissal of the charges rendered its appeal moot and, as a result, the Court of Appeals erred by reaching the substantive issues of the prosecution's appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After receiving an anonymous tip, the police seized a bag of garbage that was left at a curb in front of defendant's home. The bag contained a plant stem that tested positive for marijuana and mail that was addressed to defendant. The police then obtained a search warrant from a magistrate to search defendant's home. On the basis of evidence gathered during the execution of the search warrant, defendant was subsequently charged with manufacturing 5 kilograms or more but less than 45 kilograms of marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)( ii ), possession with intent to deliver marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)( iii ), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. After defendant was charged and bound over to the circuit court for trial, he moved to quash the bindover and suppress the evidence, arguing, among other things, that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause and the search was therefore illegal.

The circuit court suppressed the evidence, ruling that the examining magistrate had abused her discretion in issuing the warrant. The circuit court's ruling excluded all the evidence against defendant. The prosecutor then moved to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice, stating that “[g]iven the Court's decision, it would make more sense for me to dismiss this case at this time since we are not able to go forward since the evidence has been suppressed.” ¹ As a result, the court signed an order of acquittal/dismissal, which indicated that the case was dismissed without prejudice “on the motion of the People.” The prosecution appealed the circuit court's decision to suppress the evidence to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's suppression order and remanded the case for reinstatement of the charges against defendant. People v. Richmond, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 22, 2008 (Docket Nos. 277012 and 277015), 2008 WL 1810309. Defendant appealed in this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals

782 N.W.2d 190

erred by reversing the circuit court on the merits. Defendant also argued, for the first time, that the prosecution could not appeal the circuit court's ruling in the Court of Appeals because the issue was moot after the prosecution voluntarily obtained dismissal of the case. After initially denying defendant's application for leave to appeal People v. Richmond, 482 Mich. 1041, 757 N.W.2d 118 (2008), we granted defendant's application on reconsideration, limited to the consideration of the mootness issue, Richmond, 483 Mich. at 1115, 766 N.W.2d 843. II. ANALYSIS

In this case, we must determine whether the dismissal of the charges on the prosecution's motion rendered moot the prosecution's subsequent appeal in the Court of Appeals and, if so, whether the issue was nevertheless justiciable. We hold that the prosecution's voluntary dismissal of the charges rendered its appeal moot and, because a court should not hear moot issues except in circumstances that are not applicable under the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals erred by reaching the substantive issues of the prosecution's appeal.

A. OVERVIEW OF THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE

It is well established that a court will not decide moot issues. This is because it is the “principal duty of this Court ... to decide actual cases and controversies.” Federated Publications, Inc. v. City of Lansing, 467 Mich. 98, 112, 649 N.W.2d 383 (2002), citing Anway v. Grand Rapids R. Co., 211 Mich. 592, 610, 179 N.W. 350 (1920). That is, “ ‘[t]he judicial power ... is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.’ ” Anway, 211 Mich. at 616, 179 N.W. 350 (citation omitted). As a result, “this Court does not reach moot questions or declare principles or rules of law that have no practical legal effect in the case before” it. Federated Publications, 467 Mich. at 112, 649 N.W.2d 383. Although an issue is moot, however, it is nevertheless justiciable if “the issue is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet evade judicial review.” Id. It is “ ‘universally understood ... that a moot case is one which seeks to get a judgment on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is none, ... or a judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy.’ ” Anway, 211 Mich. at 610, 179 N.W. 350, quoting Ex parte Steele, 162 F. 694, 701 (N.D.Ala.1908). Accordingly, a case is moot when it presents “nothing but abstract questions of law which do not rest upon existing facts or rights.” Gildemeister v. Lindsay, 212 Mich. 299, 302, 180 N.W. 633 (1920).

In general, because reviewing a moot question would be a “ ‘purposeless proceeding,’ ” Stern v. Stern, 327 Mich. 531, 534, 42 N.W.2d 737 (1950) (citation omitted), appellate courts will sua sponte refuse to hear cases that they do not have the power to decide, including cases that are moot, In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich. 396, 434 n. 13, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999), citing Ideal Furnace Co. v. Int'l Molders' Union of North America, 204 Mich. 311, 169 N.W. 946 (1918).² Whether a case is moot is a threshold issue that a

782 N.W.2d 191

court addresses before it reaches the substantive issues of the case itself. In re MCI, 460 Mich. at 435 n. 13, 596 N.W.2d 164.B. APPLICATION OF THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE

In this case, the prosecution's own action clearly rendered its subsequent appeal moot. After the circuit court suppressed the evidence, the prosecution moved to dismiss the charges against defendant. As a result of the prosecution's voluntarily seeking dismissal of the charges, the circuit court dismissed the charges without prejudice and any existing controversy between the parties was rendered moot. Once the charges were dismissed, an action no longer existed, and, thus, there was no longer any controversy left for the Court of Appeals to consider. Accordingly, because all the charges against defendant had been dismissed at the time of the prosecution's appeal, the Court of Appeals judgment was based on a “ ‘pretended controversy,’ ” Anway, 211 Mich. at 610, 179 N.W. 350 (citation omitted), that did not “rest upon existing facts or rights,” Gildemeister, 212 Mich. at 302, 180 N.W. 633. Because a court cannot “tender advice” on matters that are no longer in litigation, see Anway, 211 Mich. at 611-612, 179 N.W. 350, quoting Snell v. Welch, 28 Mont. 482, 482, 72 P. 988 (1903) (quotation marks omitted), the Court of Appeals made a determination on a “ ‘mere barren right-a purely moot question,’ ” which, under this Court's precedent, it did not have the power to decide, Anway, 211 Mich. at 605, 179 N.W. 350, quoting Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. 179, 186, 17 S.Ct. 52, 41 L.Ed. 395 (1896).³

Although the prosecution does not have a constitutional right to appeal, the dissent argues that the prosecution may nevertheless appeal because the dismissal was a “final order” and the prosecution has a statutory right under MCL 770.12(1) and MCR 7.202(6)(b) to appeal a final order. The “final order” that the prosecution appealed in this case, however, was the order of acquittal/dismissal that was granted at the prosecution's request. This dismissal rendered the other issues in the case moot,⁴ including the evidentiary issue, and the prosecution's statutory right to appeal does not give courts the power to review an otherwise moot issue.⁵ Thus, in this

782 N.W.2d 192

case, the prosecution, not this Court, denied itself appellate review by obtaining dismissal of its own case and, therefore, rendering its appeal moot.⁶

When the issues raised by a party on appeal are clearly moot, an appellate court should ordinarily decline to address the substantive issues raised in the appeal unless an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. As noted, this Court has held that even though an issue is moot, it is nevertheless justiciable if the issue is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet may evade judicial review. Federated Publications, 467 Mich. at 112, 649 N.W.2d 383. The facts of this case, however, do not meet this exception.

This Court has declined to apply this exception when the party seeking review of an issue on appeal has rendered the issue moot by that party's own volitional conduct and the party could have avoided mooting the issue by seeking an appeal. For example, in Federated Publications, the city denied a newspaper's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Id. at 103, 649 N.W.2d 383. The newspaper subsequently sued...